291 U.S. 502 (1934), 531, Nebbia v. New York

Docket Nº:No. 531
Citation:291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940
Party Name:Nebbia v. New York
Case Date:March 05, 1934
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 502

291 U.S. 502 (1934)

54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940

Nebbia

v.

New York

No. 531

United States Supreme Court

March 5, 1934

Argued December 4, 5, 1933

[54 S.Ct. 506] APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF MONROE COUNTY, NEW YORK

Syllabus

1. As a basis for attacking a discriminatory regulation of prices, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the party complaining must show that he himself is adversely affected by it. P. 520.

2. A regulation fixing the price at which storekeepers may buy milk from milk dealers at a higher figure than that allowed dealers in buying from producers, and allowing dealers a higher price than it allows storekeepers in sales to consumers, held consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the distinctions between the two classes of merchants. P. 521.

3. As part of a plan to remedy evils in the milk industry which reduced the income of the producer below cost of production and threatened to deprive the community of an assured supply of milk, a New York statute sought to prevent destructive price-cutting by stores which, under the peculiar circumstances, were able to buy at much lower prices than the larger distributors and to sell without incurring delivery costs, and, to that end, an order of a state board acting under the statute fixed a minimum price of ten cents per quart for sales by distributors to consumers and of nine cents per quart for sales by stores to consumers. Held that, as applied to a storekeeper, the regulation could not be adjudged in conflict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since, in view of the facts set forth in the opinion, it appeared not to be unreasonable or arbitrary or without relation to the purpose of the legislation. Pp. 530 et seq.

4. The use of private property and the making of private contracts are, as a general rule, free from governmental interference; but they are subject to public regulation when the public need requires. P. 523.

5. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conditions the exertion of regulatory power by requiring that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process, that the regulation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. P. 525.

Page 503

6. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts. P. 525.

7. The power of a State to regulate business in the public interest extends to the control and regulation of prices for which commodities may be sold, where price regulation is a reasonable and appropriate means of rectifying the evil calling for the regulation. Pp. 531 et seq.

8. There is no principle limiting price regulation to businesses which are public utilities, or which have a monopoly or enjoy a public grant or franchise. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113. P. 531.

9. To say that property is "clothed with a public interest," or an industry is "affected with a public interest," means that the property or the industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good. Pp. 531-536.

10. There is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory. P. 536.

11. Decisions denying the power to control prices in businesses found not to be "affected with a public interest" or "clothed with a public use" must rest finally upon the basis that the requirements of due process were not met because the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and effect. P. 536.

12. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a State is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. P. 503.

13. The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of such an enactment; every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the court may think the enactment unwise, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power. P. 537.

Page 504

14. If the lawmaking body, within its sphere of government, concludes that the conditions or practices in an industry make unrestricted competition an inadequate safeguard of the consumer's interests, produce waste harmful to the public, threaten ultimately to cut off the supply of a commodity needed by the public, or portend the destruction of the industry itself, appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort to correct the threatened consequences may not be set aside because the regulation adopted fixes prices -- reasonably deemed by the legislature to be fair to those engaged in the industry and to the consuming public. P. 538.

15. This is especially clear where the economic maladjustment is one of price, which threatens harm to the producer at one end of the series, and the consumer, at the other. P. 538.

16. The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group of people. P. 539.

17. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty. P. 539.

262 N.Y. 259; 186 N.E. 694, affirmed.

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a storekeeper for selling milk at a price below that allowed by an order promulgated by a state board pursuant to statutory authority. The appeal here is from the judgment of the County Court entered on remittitur.

Page 515

ROBERTS, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Legislature of New York established, by Chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, a Milk Control Board with power, among other things, to "fix minimum and maximum . . . retail prices to be charged by . . . stores to consumers for consumption off the premises where sold." The Board fixed nine cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a five cent loaf of bread for eighteen cents, and was convicted for violating the Board's order. At his trial, he asserted the statute and order contravene the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and renewed the contention in successive appeals to the county court and the Court of Appeals. Both overruled his claim and affirmed the conviction.1

[54 S.Ct. 507] The question for decision is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk. We first inquire as to the occasion for the legislation, and its history.

During 1932, the prices received by farmers for milk were much below the cost of production. The decline in prices during 1931 and 1932 was much greater than that of prices generally. The situation of the families of dairy producers had become desperate, and called for state aid similar to that afforded the unemployed, if conditions should not improve.

Page 516

On March 10, 1932, the senate and assembly resolved

That a joint Legislative committee is hereby created . . . to investigate the causes of the decline of the price of milk to producers and the resultant effect of the low prices upon the dairy industry and the future supply of milk to the cities of the State; to investigate the cost of distribution of milk and its relation to prices paid to milk producers, to the end that the consumer may be assured of an adequate supply of milk at a reasonable price, both to producer and consumer.

The committee organized May 6, 1932, and its activities lasted nearly a year. It held 13 public hearings at which 254 witnesses testified and 2,350 typewritten pages of testimony were taken. Numerous exhibits were submitted. Under its direction, an extensive research program was prosecuted by experts and official bodies and employees of the state and municipalities, which resulted in the assembling of much pertinent information. Detailed reports were received from over 100 distributors of milk, and these were collated, and the information obtained analyzed. As a result of the study of this material, a report covering 473 closely printed pages, embracing the conclusions and recommendations of the committee, was presented to the legislature April 10, 1933. This document included detailed findings, with copious references to the supporting evidence; appendices outlining the nature and results of prior investigations of the milk industry of the state, briefs upon the legal questions involved, and forms of bills recommended for passage. The conscientious effort and thoroughness exhibited by the...

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