Bedor v. Johnson, 10SC65.

CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
Citation292 P.3d 924
Docket NumberNo. 10SC65.,10SC65.
PartiesRichard BEDOR, Petitioner v. Michael E. JOHNSON, Respondent.
Decision Date22 January 2013

292 P.3d 924

Richard BEDOR, Petitioner
v.
Michael E. JOHNSON, Respondent.

No. 10SC65.

Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.

Jan. 22, 2013.


[292 P.3d 925]


Walter H. Sargent, Walter H. Sargent, a professional corporation, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Earl G. Rhodes, Younge & Hockensmith, P.C., Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner.

Franklin D. Patterson, Brian D. Kennedy, Frank Patterson & Associates, P.C., Greenwood Village, Colorado, James R. Alvillar, James R. Alvillar and Associates, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Respondent.


Thomas D. Neville, Ogborn, Summerlin & Ogborn, LLC, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association.

Jeffrey C. Ruebel, Ruebel & Quillen, LLC, Westminster, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this negligence action, we review whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine after the Respondent, Michael E. Johnson, lost control of his vehicle in winter driving conditions and collided with Petitioner, Richard Bedor. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it tendered the sudden emergency instruction. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

¶ 2 In addition, we hold that trial courts should no longer give the sudden emergency instruction in negligence cases because the instruction's potential to mislead the jury greatly outweighs its minimal utility.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 Bedor was driving eastbound outside of Telluride, Colorado on January 16, 2004, at about 7:00 a.m., when he the saw headlights of a westbound vehicle cross the center line. Bedor slowed down, but the westbound car, driven by Johnson, spun out of control and slid sideways into the front of Bedor's vehicle. Both Bedor and Johnson were injured in the accident. An investigation of the scene revealed that Johnson lost control of his vehicle when he hit an icy patch of snow on the road.

¶ 4 Bedor filed a negligence action against Johnson. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The investigating police officer testified that an ice patch regularly forms during the winter in the portion of the westbound lane in which Johnson was driving. Johnson acknowledged that he had previously experienced the ice patch in that area and “was aware of the possibility” that the ice might be present the morning of the accident. There was conflicting evidence at trial regarding whether Johnson was intoxicated, speeding, or both when he lost control and spun into Bedor's vehicle.

¶ 5 Johnson requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. He argued that he did not cause the ice patch that led to the accident and that he acted reasonably in light of the sudden emergency the ice presented. Bedor's counsel objected, but the trial court overruled the objection and instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The jury returned a verdict in Johnson's favor. It found that although Bedor indeed suffered injuries, damages, or losses on account of the accident, Johnson was not negligent and therefore did not cause Bedor's injuries, damages, or losses. The trial court awarded $34,616.73 in costs to Johnson.

¶ 6 Bedor appealed the jury verdict to the court of appeals. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine and thereby prejudiced Bedor's case. The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict in an unpublished opinion. Bedor v. Johnson, No. 08CA2421, slip op. at 22, 2009 WL 3863408 (Colo.App. Nov. 19, 2009) (not selected for official publication). It reasoned that the trial court properly issued the sudden emergency instruction because competent evidence at trial showed that Johnson was confronted with a sudden or unexpected occurrence—the ice patch—that was not of his own making. Id. at 4–8.

[292 P.3d 926]

¶ 7 Bedor petitioned this Court for certiorari review of “whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a driver who loses control of a vehicle in winter driving conditions, crosses over into the lane of oncoming traffic, and collides with plaintiff's vehicle is entitled to a ‘sudden emergency’ instruction.” After oral argument, this Court ordered supplemental briefing on the question of “whether a separate jury instruction concerning sudden emergencies should continue to be given in any negligence case?” We now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and abolish the sudden emergency doctrine.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 8 Trial courts have a duty to correctly instruct juries on matters of law. Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo.2011); Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150, 1157 (Colo.2009). To determine whether the trial court has performed this duty, we first review de novo the jury instruction at issue to assess whether the instruction correctly states the law. Day, 255 P.3d at 1067. If it does, then we review the trial court's decision to give the jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id.

III. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion

¶ 9 Although the pattern sudden emergency jury instruction given by the trial court correctly stated the law as it existed at the time of trial, see CJI–Civ. 4th 9:11,1 the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine because competent evidence did not support giving the instruction in this instance. See Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 364, 366 (Colo.1991).

¶ 10 The sudden emergency doctrine recognizes “that a person confronted with sudden or unexpected circumstances calling for immediate attention is not expected to exercise the judgment of one acting under normal conditions.” Young, 814 P.2d at 365 (citing W.P. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 33 (5th ed. 1984)). A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on sudden emergency if a party requests the instruction and competent evidence supports that request. Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Colo.2011); Davis v. Cline, 177 Colo. 204, 208–09, 493 P.2d 362, 364 (1972). “Competent evidence” in this context is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there was a sudden emergency and that the party requesting the instruction did not cause the emergency. See Young, 814 P.2d at 366;see also City of Colo. Springs v. Givan, 897 P.2d 753, 756 (Colo.1995) (defining “competent evidence”).

¶ 11 This Court determined that competent evidence supported giving the sudden emergency instruction in Young and Davis. In Young, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant deliberately applied her brakes and jerked her car to the left in an attempt to avoid the plaintiff's car after an unidentified driver abruptly swerved into the center lane of traffic, forcing the defendant to brake suddenly. 814 P.2d at 364. Similarly in Davis, this Court held that competent evidence supported the plaintiff's request for a sudden emergency instruction when the plaintiff veered sharply to avoid a bus that had suddenly moved into her lane. 177 Colo. at 206–07, 493 P.2d at 363. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's evasive maneuver showed that the plaintiff “chose a course of conduct ... which she might not have chosen otherwise except for the compelling circumstances of the emergency situation,” and thus merited an instruction on sudden emergency. Davis, 177 Colo. at 208, 493 P.2d at 364.Young and Davis indicate that a trial court may properly give the sudden emergency instruction when competent evidence shows that the party requesting the instruction took deliberate action in response to a sudden emergency situation.

¶ 12 In contrast to Young and Davis, where competent evidence supported the trial court's sudden emergency instruction, we

[292 P.3d 927]

recently determined in Kendrick that competent evidence did not support the trial court's decision to tender the instruction when the defendant put her car in four wheel drive in anticipation of wintery driving conditions. 252 P.3d at 1059. Although the defendant took deliberate action to avoid a collision by applying her brakes and making an illegal right turn after hitting a slippery patch of road, we held that the trial court abused its discretion by giving the sudden emergency instruction because competent evidence did not show that the defendant was confronted with a “sudden or unexpected occurrence” when trial testimony showed that the defendant “anticipated that the roads and intersections would likely be icy that morning.” Id. at 1058–60. With these cases in mind, we turn to the evidence underlying the sudden emergency instruction given by the trial court in this case.

¶ 13 The evidence here showed that Johnson lost control of his vehicle upon encountering the snow patch. A loss of control does not constitute a deliberate response to a sudden emergency; rather, it indicates a complete lack of such a deliberate response. Thus, Young and Davis indicate that the trial court should not have given the instruction in this instance. In addition, the evidence showed that Johnson was specifically aware of the possibility that snow and ice might be on the road in the vicinity of the snow patch because he drove that stretch of road on a regular basis. His awareness was therefore similar to the Kendrick defendant's cognizance of wintery driving conditions and thus did not merit a sudden emergency instruction.

¶ 14 Furthermore, additional, albeit inconclusive, evidence showed that Johnson may have been speeding and/or intoxicated when he lost control of his vehicle. This evidence tends to show that Johnson might have contributed to, if not caused, the alleged “sudden emergency” that led to the accident. That Johnson's pre-accident conduct may have caused or contributed to the emergency situation demonstrates that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on sudden emergency...

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2 firm's commentaries
  • Colorado Tort Law Update
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