Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co. v. Poarch

Decision Date10 July 1961
Docket NumberNo. 17099.,17099.
Citation292 F.2d 449
PartiesCHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Loraine Booker POARCH, as Executrix of the Estate of Paul E. Booker, Deceased, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Richard L. Gemson, Lutterman, Ploeger & Gemson, Seattle, Wash., Edward J. Crowley, Spokane, Wash., for appellant.

Jerome Williams, Cashatt, Williams, Connelly, & Rekofke, Spokane, Wash., Miller, Jansen & Sackmann, Ritzville, Wash., for appellee.

Before HAMLIN and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and LINDBERG, District Judge.

LINDBERG, District Judge.

This action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington to recover damages for alleged negligent injury to property. Federal jurisdiction was founded upon diversity of citizenship. The appellee, plaintiff below, owned a grain elevator and feed and produce building situated on land leased from appellant in Othello, Washington. Approximately fifty feet away, along its railroad right of way, appellant had a large frame ice house used to service its trains. The southern half of the ice house, nearest appellee's buildings, was no longer being used and was vacant. On June 13, 1957 a fire broke out in the unused portion of the ice house and quickly spread to appellee's buildings, destroying both the buildings and their contents.

The appellee's theory during the trial was that appellant was negligent in knowingly allowing the vacant portion of the ice house to become a fire hazard by permitting inflammable materials to accumulate inside and not taking reasonable steps to prevent children and itinerants from gaining access. Although appellee did, by process of elimination of other possible causes, attempt to show that some human agency must have started the fire, no specific evidence as to its origin was introduced and the trial court instructed the jury that it was not necessary for them to determine the exact cause of the fire. The jury returned a verdict for appellee and appellant here seeks reversal of the judgment entered or in the alternative a new trial.

The appellant contends that the lower court erred in (1) submitting the case to the jury because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show a causal connection between appellee's negligence and the outbreak of the fire, (2) instructing the jury that it could find appellant liable without determining the actual cause of the fire, and (3) permitting appellee's counsel in final argument to address by name six jurors, asking each to "retain and remember" a particular damage figure. Since the claimed errors (1) and (2) involve essentially the same general considerations they will be discussed together.

As previously noted, federal jurisdiction of this action is based upon diversity of citizenship and under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 the substantive law of the State of Washington will control.

The basic question is, Does Washington law in a case involving facts such as presented here require that plaintiff establish the precise origin of the fire? If the answer is no, then clearly the actual final concurring cause or causal connection between the antecedent negligence and the origin of the fire need not be shown.

Admittedly appellee and the lower court framed the complaint and instructions to encompass the holding of Prince v. Chehalis Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 1936, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, 292, 61 P.2d 1374. In that case plaintiff sued to recover for fire damage to its building which occurred when a fire started in the defendant's garage and spread to the plaintiff's building. The plaintiff's theory was that the defendant "had permitted the garage to get into such a state of disrepair that it created a fire hazard, and that the condition of the building was such that, if a fire did occur in it, it was reasonably probable that it would spread to the adjacent property." There was evidence to the effect that the garage was in a "pronounced state of disrepair", with doors open at either end, and contained a wooden floor covered with grease and oil. In addition there was evidence of an accumulation of combustible material inside the garage and that children and itinerants would at times enter the building. The lower court found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. In its opinion affirming the lower court the Washington Supreme...

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12 cases
  • Yagman, Matter of
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • November 6, 1986
    ...that the conduct and order of the trial are matters vested in the discretion of the district judge. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co. v. Poarch, 292 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir.1961). The district court did not abuse its discretion in this C. DIRECTED VERDICT The district court grant......
  • R & R Insulation Serv. Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co. R & R Insulation Serv. Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co. Crane Co. v. Royal Indem. Co. Royal Indem. Co. v. R & R Insulation Serv. Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 15, 2010
    ...fire on his premises, he may be liable for injury to others even though he has no connection with the fire's origin”); Chicago & C. v. Poarch, 292 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.1961) (fire spread from defendant's property onto the property of the plaintiff); Atmore Truckers Assn. v. Westchester Fire In......
  • Travelers Ins. v. Priority Business Forms
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • July 15, 1998
    ...a "fire trap" may be liable for damage resulting from an eventual fire, regardless of the cause. See Chicago, Milwaukee St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Poarch, 292 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.1961); Orfanos, 66 Md.App. 507, 505 A.2d 131. Travelers cites no Rhode Island case adopting this relaxed appro......
  • Hoptowit v. Ray
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • August 9, 1982
    ...is appropriate also for the review of various procedural rulings that are raised on this appeal. See Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Poarch, 292 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1961). C. Scope of Judicial Review. In entertaining a cause of action alleging Eighth Amendment violations in a sta......
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