Domenica v. United States, 5784.
Decision Date | 29 June 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 5784.,5784. |
Citation | 292 F.2d 483 |
Parties | James J. DOMENICA, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
James J. Domenica, pro se, on brief for appellant.
Elliot L. Richardson, U. S. Atty., and William J. Koen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Boston, Mass., on brief for appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the denial, on its face, of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to "vacate a judgment of conviction" entered upon a plea of guilty, or, alternatively (although not prayed for artistically), to vacate the sentence. On October 30, 1958, an indictment was returned in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in three counts against petitioner and others, Count 3 charging armed robbery of a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (18 U.S.C. § 2113 (d)). On the following day petitioner appeared for arraignment, accompanied by counsel, and pleaded not guilty. Bail was set and subsequently furnished. Trial was delayed because of the alleged mental incompetency of another defendant. After his sanity was determined, that defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Thereafter, on January 25, 1960, petitioner appeared before the court, retracted his pleas of not guilty, and pleaded guilty to all three counts. Sentence was imposed on Count 3, which he is presently serving. The other two counts were later dismissed. On November 9, 1960, petitioner filed his present motion in the district court. This motion was denied without opinion, and he appeals.
The above facts appear of record. Petitioner's motion alleges certain other facts. In view of its denial without hearing we must, for present purposes, take the factual allegations therein as true, except to the extent that they are contradicted by the record or are inherently incredible, and to the extent that they are merely conclusions rather than statements of fact. It thus appears that on November 1, 1958, petitioner was indicted in the state court. The recitation of the state charges indicates that the acts alleged were in substance the same as those in the federal indictment. On November 30, 1959, petitioner pleaded guilty in the state court and was sentenced to a correctional institution. Petitioner states that his plea was obtained "through coercion." We will not accept this unsupported conclusion, but it is presently immaterial.
Petitioner next asserts that on December 14, 1959, when his codefendant changed his plea and was sentenced in the district court, petitioner was present with his counsel, that he informed counsel of his innocence and his desire for a trial, and that he heard counsel so inform the court. Petitioner states, "Then the clerk of Courts read off the indictments against me, and I pleaded not guilty." In view of the fact that the record reflects no such occurrence, but on the contrary shows that the defendant had already been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty on October 31, 1958, we cannot believe that this event took place on the date alleged. Rather, petitioner must here be speaking of October 31, 1958. The motion continues,
Petitioner's argument assumes, although he never specifically alleged it, that he did not understand the nature of the charges. At the time of arraignment this may have been the case,1 but this would be of no consequence. Before his eventual plea petitioner was out on bail for a year and constantly represented by counsel of his choice, to whom, according to the petition, he paid a substantial fee. The indictment is a simple one. We could not, on this record, believe that by January, 1960, petitioner did not understand it.
Petitioner further alleges that on January 25, 1960, he had expected his counsel to be present with witnesses, but that counsel told him there was no need for witnesses because he had already been convicted in the state court, and Petitioner alleges that counsel refused him "permission" to speak to the United States Attorney and to the court and told him that a defendant represented by counsel is not allowed to speak himself.
Mere prediction by counsel of the court's likely attitude on sentence, short of some implication of an agreement or understanding, is not ground for attacking a plea. Floyd v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 910, certiorari denied 359 U.S. 947, 79 S.Ct. 728, 3 L.Ed. 2d 680. Nor, generally, is other advice, simply because it turns out poorly. Cf. Diggs v. Welch, 1945, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 667, certiorari denied 325 U. S. 889, 65 S.Ct. 1576, 89 L.Ed. 2002; Adams v. United States, 1955, 95 U.S. App.D.C. 354, 222 F.2d 45, 47 note 5. Refusal of permission to speak to the court on the ground that it is forbidden is something else.
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...rather than statements of fact.'" Otero-Rivera v. United States, 494 F.2d 900,902 (1st Cir. 1974) (quoting Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483, 484 (1st Cir. 1961)).Perocier-Morales v. United States, 887 F. Supp.2d at 417-18. Petitioner's arguments about counsel's ignorance, the Mexican......
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