Worthen Co v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 28 May 1934
• Docket Number: No. 856,856
• Citation: 292 U.S. 426,93 A.L.R. 173,54 S.Ct. 816,78 L.Ed. 1344
• Parties: W. B. WORTHEN CO. et al. v. THOMAS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

292 U.S. 426

54 S.Ct. 816

78 L.Ed. 1344

W. B. WORTHEN CO. et al.

v THOMAS.

No. 856.

Submitted May 2, 1934.

Decided May 28, 1934.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas.

Mr. Henry M. Armistead, of Little Rock, Ark., for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel intentionally omitted] Messrs. Kenneth W. Coulter and Harry Robinson, both of Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee, Mrs. W. D. Thomas, and her husband, Ralph Thomas, were engaged in business as copartners in Little Rock, Arkansas, under the name of Enterprise Harness Company. The became indebted for the rent of premises leased o the partnership by appellant, W. B. Worthen Company, Agent. On August 31, 1932, judgment for the amount thus due ($1,200), with interest, was recovered against both partners. Ralph Thomas died on March 5, 1933. Thereupon, on March 10, 1933, a writ of garnishment was served upon the Missouri State Life Insurance Company alleging the indebtedness of that Company to Mrs. Thomas, in the sum of $5,000 as the beneficiary of a policy of insurance upon the life of Ralph Thomas. The service of the writ, under the laws of Arkansas, created a lien upon the indebtedness.¹

A few days later, on March 16, 1933, the Legislature of Arkansas passed an act (Act No. 102 (p. 321) of the Laws of 1933) providing as follows: 'All moneys paid or payable to any resident of this state as the insured or beneficiary designated under any insurance policy or policies providing for the payment of life, sick, accident and/or disability benefits shall be exempt from liability or seizure under judicial process of any court, and shall not be subjected to the payment of any debt by contract or otherwise by any writ, order, judgment, or decree of any court, provided, that the validity of any sale, assignment, mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of any policy of insurance or if any avails, proceeds or benefits thereof, now made, or hereafter made, shall in no way be affected by the provisions of this act.'

Appellee, on April 5, 1933, filed a motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and for the purpose of scheduling the money owing to her by the Insurance Company as being exempt from seizure under judicial process. On April 6, 1933, the Insurance Company answered the garnishment, admitting its indebtedness. The court then ordered the payment of $2,000 into its registry as sufficient to cover appellant's claim and released the garnishee from further liability. Appellant responded to the motion to dismiss the garnishment, and to the claim of exemption, by insisting that Act No. 102 (p. 321) of the Laws of 1933, if so applied, contravened article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States by impairing the obligation of appellant's contract. The court of first instance overruling that contention, and holding the insurance moneys to be free from all judicial process, dismissed the garnishment and granted the schedule of exemption. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 65 S.W.(2d) 917. The constitutional question was again urged by petition for rehearing, which was denied. The case comes here on appeal.

1. There is no question that the state court gave effect to the Act of 1933, and we are not concerned with any earlier state statute in relation to policies of insurance.² The debt of the wife herself, as a member of a business partnership, is involved. We have not been referred to any statute of Arkansas, existing prior to the firm's contract and to the incurring by appellee of the debt in question, which in such a case, either by the terms of the statute or by the construction of it by the state court, precluded resort to insurance moneys such as those in question.³ The state court has mentioned none. On the contrary, the state court recognized the greater breadth of the Act of 1933, as compared with earlier statutes, and its controlling operation, and with this recognition sustained and applied it.⁴ 'The only question,' said the court, 'for determination here is the constitutionality of Act No. 102 (p. 321) of 1933, approved March 16, 1933.'

2. The exemption created by the Act of 1933, as to the avails of life insurance policies, is unlimited. There is no limitation of amount, however large. Nor is there any limitation as to beneficiaries, if they are residents of the State. There is no restriction with respect to particular circumstances or relations. 'All moneys paid or payable' to any resident of the State 'as the insured or beneficiary designated' under any life insurance policy, are exempted 'from liability or seizure under judicial process' and 'shall not be subjected to the payment of any debt.' The profits of a business, if invested in life insurance, may thus be withdrawn from the pursuit of creditors to whatever extent desired. No conditions are imposed, save that assignees, mortgagees, or pledgees of policies are protected.

Such an exemption, applied in the case of debts owing before the exemption was created by the Legislature, constitutes an unwarrantable interference with the obliga- tion of contracts in violation of the constitutional provision. Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 622, 623, 21 L.Ed. 212; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 604, 24 L.Ed. 793; Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126, 129, 41 S.Ct. 408, 65 L.Ed. 857. Chief Justice Marshall, in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 198, 4 L.Ed. 529, observed that: 'It is not true that the parties have in view only the property in possession when the contract is formed, or that its obligation does not extend to future acquisitions. Industry, talents, and integrity, constitute a fund which is as confidently trusted as property itself. Future acquisitions are, therefore, liable for contracts; and to release them from this liability impairs their obligation.' This principle was applied to an exemption of insurance moneys, in relation to antecedent debts, in Bank of Minden v. Clement, supra. The argument of appellee that a judgment is not in itself a contract within the constitutional protection,⁵ and that it is competent for the State to alter or modify forms of remedies, is unavailing. The judgment and garnishment in the instant case afforded the appropriate means of enforcing the contractual obligations of the firm of which appellee was a member and the statute altered substantial rights. Gunn v. Barry, supra; Edwards v. Kearzey, supra; Fisk v. Police Jury of Jefferson, 116 U.S. 131, 134, 6 S.Ct. 329, 29 L.Ed. 587; Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481.

3. The Legislature sought to justify the exemption by reference to the emergency which was found to exist. But the legislation was not limited to the emergency and set up no conditions apposite to emergency relief.

We held in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, supra, page 434 et seq. of 290 U.S., 54 S.Ct. 231, that the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts did not make it impossible for the State, in the exercise of its essential reserved power, to protect the vital interests of its people. The exercise of that reserved power has repeatedly been sustained by this Court as against a literalism in the construction of the contract clause which would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of self-protection. We held that this reserved protective power extended not only to legislation to safeguard the public health, public safety, and public morals, and to prevent injurious practices in business subject to legislative regulation, despite interference with existing contracts—an exercise...