Arnold v. Anton Coop. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 01 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09CA2422.,09CA2422.
• Citation: 293 P.3d 99
• Parties: April ARNOLD, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ANTON COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, Chester Kenney, and Louanne Kenney, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

293 P.3d 99

April ARNOLD, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.ANTON COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, Chester Kenney, and Louanne Kenney, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 09CA2422.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Sept. 1, 2011.

McNamara Law Firm, P.C., J. Bryan Gwinn, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

McClure & Eggleston, LLC, John C. McClure, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee Anton Cooperative Association.

Overturf McGath Hull & Doherty, P.C., Brandon P. Hull, Nikolai N. Frant, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellees Chester Kenney and Louanne Kenney.

Opinion by Judge TERRY.

In this appeal, we consider the subject matter jurisdiction of Colorado courts in a suit alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation under part 6 of the Colorado Civil Rights Act, sections 24–34–601 to –605, C.R.S.2010(CRA). We conclude that district courts and county courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under part 6 of the CRA, and that the trial court therefore erred in dismissing the CRA claim of plaintiff, April Arnold. We also conclude, however, that the trial court did not err in dismissing Arnold's contract claims before trial.

Arnold appeals the trial court's judgment against her and in favor of defendants, Anton Cooperative Association (the Association), Chester Kenney, and Louanne Kenney. Arnold also appeals the orders awarding costs and fees to defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

I. Background

Arnold is a member of the Association, which operates a general store. Chester Kenney is the Manager of the Association, and Louanne Kenney is his wife and an employee of the Association.

In May 2006, the Association sent Arnold a letter informing her that the Association's board had “decided that the best possible outcome under the circumstances would be for [Arnold] to not conduct business at the Anton coop.” The parties do not contest that this notice meant that Arnold could no longer enter or purchase from the Association's store.

Arnold filed a discrimination claim against the Association with the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD). After investigating Arnold's claim, CCRD issued a notice to her stating that (1) it lacked probable cause to support Arnold's claim of discrimination, and (2) if she desired, she could pursue her claim in district court.

Arnold filed suit against the Association in Washington County District Court. The complaint alleged the following facts:

• For approximately nine years, Arnold was a member of and had done business with the Association, and had purchased various materials and supplies at the Association's store for both business and personal use.

• The Association's store “is the only place within 30 miles to purchase many necessities.”

• Louanne Kenney told Arnold that she “did not want to do business with” Arnold because Chester Kenney was seeking to have a relationship with Arnold. From that point on, the Kenneys made it difficult for Arnold to do business at the store, including encouraging employees to treat her in a rude manner and to decline to perform services for her.

• These actions by the Kenneys culminated in the May 2006 letter indicating the Association would no longer do business with Arnold.

The complaint contained three claims for relief, alleging that (1) the Association's store was a place of public accommodation and the Association had discriminated against Arnold because of her gender and (unspecified) disability, in violation of the CRA; (2) the Association had breached the terms of its membership contract with her; and (3) defendants Chester and Louanne Kenney had intentionally interfered with the membership contract.

The Association's answer denied the material allegations underlying Arnold's claims. Its counterclaim alleged that, on various occasions while Arnold was in the store, she had been disruptive, lost self-control, raised her voice, used an intimidating manner, and made unreasonable demands in the presence of the Association's employees, board members, and sometimes other patrons, and that board members and employees were intimidated by and fearful of her. It also alleged that Arnold had presented two checks from a closed bank account in satisfaction of a debt owed to the Association. Based on these allegations, the Association sought a permanent injunction to prevent Arnold from entering or using the Association's facilities.

Defendants filed pretrial motions to dismiss Arnold's claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss Arnold's CRA claim, reasoning that section 24–34–603, C.R.S.2010, vests county courts with jurisdiction over public accommodation claims under the CRA, and that district courts therefore lack jurisdiction over such claims. Shortly before trial was to begin, the court dismissed Arnold's other two claims on the ground that Arnold had not identified any enforceable contractual right to recovery. The Association later voluntarily dismissed its counterclaim.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Arnold argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for discrimination in a place of public accommodation under part 6 of the CRA. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record, but we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. Levine v. Katz, 192 P.3d 1008, 1012 (Colo.App.2006). “Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo.” Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo.2010).

To reasonably effectuate the General Assembly's intent, a statute must be read and considered as a whole. In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 666–67 (Colo.2007). “We will interpret a statute to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” Id. at 667. “If separate clauses within a statute may be reconciled by one construction but would conflict under a different interpretation, the construction which results in harmony rather than inconsistency should be adopted.” People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986).

B. Jurisdiction Under Section 24–34–603

The trial court concluded that only the county courts have jurisdiction to hear public accommodation claims under the CRA. Defendants now contend that claims for damages under the public accommodation provisions contained in part 6 of the CRA may only be brought in county court, and that because Arnold did not seek relief other than damages, her claim could not be brought in district court. Both the trial court and defendants relied on the language of section 24–34–603, which states:

The county court in the county where the offense is committed shall have jurisdiction in all civil actions brought under this part 6 to recover damages to the extent of the jurisdiction of the county court to recover a money demand in other actions. Either party shall have the right to have the cause tried by jury and to appeal from the judgment of the court in the same manner as in other civil suits.

We disagree that this provision precludes jurisdiction in the district courts to hear claims of any kind under part 6, let alone claims for damages.

We begin our analysis by reference to article VI, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution. As relevant here, that section states, “[t]he district courts shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil ... cases, except as otherwise provided herein.” While the General Assembly has the power to limit the courts' jurisdiction, “no statute will be held to so limit court power unless the limitation is explicit.” In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 373–74 (Colo.1981).

The CRA contains no explicit limitation of jurisdiction to the county courts. On the contrary, reading the disparate parts of the CRA harmoniously, as we must, see In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d at 666–67, we conclude the following:

• The district courts have jurisdiction over claims brought under the public accommodation provisions contained in part 6 of the CRA. See§ 24–34–306(2)(b)(I)(B), C.R.S.2010 (where a party files a charge alleging discriminatory or unfair practice under CRA parts 4 through 7, and the CCRD issues a notice that no probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the charge, then the CCRD shall advise the parties that if the charging party wishes to file a civil action in a district court based on the charged conduct, the party must do so within ninety days); § 24–34–306(11), C.R.S.2010 (if the complainant has requested and received a notice of right to sue under § 24–34–306(15), C.R.S.2010, he or she may file a civil action seeking relief under CRA parts 4 through 7 “in the district court for the district in which the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred”); § 24–34–306(14), C.R.S.2010 (subject to certain exceptions, no person may file a civil action in a district court based on CRA parts 4 through 7 without first having exhausted administrative remedies); § 24–34–602(1), C.R.S.2010 (action seeking assessment of fine due to discrimination in a place of public accommodation under CRA part 6 may be filed in “any court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the violation occurred”).

• The county courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts over claims for damages under the public accommodation provisions of part 6 of the CRA, but damages claims brought in a county court may not exceed the jurisdictional limits of the county courts. § 24–34–603; Ohmie v. Martinez, 141 Colo. 480, 483, 349 P.2d 131, 132 (1960) (district and county court jurisdiction is concurrent with respect to matters that fall within the jurisdiction of both).

We reject defendants' contention that, by filing her public accommodation claim in district court, Arnold was limited to seeking injunctive...