Union Pacific R. v. Greentree Transp. Trucking

• Decision Date: 16 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-3326.,00-3326.
• Citation: 293 F.3d 120
• Parties: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, v. GREENTREE TRANSPORTATION TRUCKING CO.; Dave Saunders Trucking, Greentree Transportation Trucking Company, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

293 F.3d 120

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, v. GREENTREE TRANSPORTATION TRUCKING CO.; Dave Saunders Trucking Greentree Transportation Trucking Company, Appellant.

No. 00-3326.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

May 16, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Before: SCIRICA and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge.^*

OPINION OF THE COURT

POLLAK, District Judge.

This case involves a shipment of cigarettes, a train derailment, and a stolen trailer. The issues before this court are whether the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act applies to the case at hand and, if so, whether the District Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff railroad.

I. Background

A large quantity of cigarettes was to be sent-first by train and then by ship-from Atlanta to Tokyo. The Atlanta shipper of the cigarettes was Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., the Tokyo consignee was Sumitomo Corp., and the intended final carrier by water, culminating in delivery to the consignee, was American President Lines, which issued a bill of lading covering the shipment.¹ The Norfolk & Southern picked the shipment up in Atlanta on November 11, 1996, and transported it by rail to New Orleans, where the shipment was transferred to the Southern Pacific. (Union Pacific, the plaintiff in the District Court and appellee here, is the successor in interest of Southern Pacific.) If the delivery had proceeded according to plan, Southern Pacific would have delivered the shipment of cigarettes to San Pedro, California, at which point the American President Lines vessel APL Wisdom would have transported the cigarettes to Tokyo.

All did not go according to plan. The Southern Pacific train that was carrying the shipment of cigarettes, along with other shipments, derailed in Painted Rock, Arizona, on November 16, 1996. After the cigarettes were taken from the derailment site to the Southern Pacific yard in Phoenix, Ronald Appelt, a Southern Pacific field manager, discussed the transportation of two trailers to California with Dave Saunders, an independent trucking contractor. Saunders, who had entered into a trip lease with Greentree Transportation Company (a defendant in the District Court and appellant here), represented that Greentree would charge Southern Pacific $2904 to deliver the two trailers to California.²

Trailer number REAZ610430, bound for Desert Empire Storage in San Bernadino, was to be driven by Saunders. Trailer number XTRZ230873, bound for a dock in San Pedro, was to be driven first by Gary O'Donnell, another independent Greentree driver, and then by Saunders. This latter trailer contained the cigarette shipment. The arrangement that Appelt and Saunders agreed on was that O'Donnell would transport his portion of the shipment-the San Pedro-bound trailer-to the Beacon Truck Stop in San Bernadino and would then leave the shipment unattended until Saunders could take over the shipment. Upon arrival at a dock in San Pedro, this trailer was to be loaded onto the American President Lines vessel APL Wisdom, which would transport the cigarettes to their final destination in Tokyo.

The first part of this arrangement proceeded smoothly. When Saunders arrived at the Beacon Truck Stop in San Bernadino, he acknowledged receipt of the San Pedro-bound trailer from O'Donnell in good condition. Saunders then proceeded to deliver the San Bernadino-bound trailer to its destination, at Desert Empire Storage in San Bernadino. At this point, the operation ceased to proceed smoothly. When Saunders returned to the Beacon Truck Stop, the location where the San Pedro-bound trailer had been left, he discovered that the trailer — including, of course, the shipment of cigarettes inside the trailer — was missing. It was determined that the trailer and the shipment of cigarettes had been stolen.

Notwithstanding the theft of one of the two trailers, Greentree billed Southern Pacific $2904, the rate originally quoted by Saunders in his discussions with Appelt for the transportation of the two trailers. Southern Pacific paid the entire $2904 to Greentree, and also paid the full value of the stolen freight—$160,977.58— to what Union Pacific refers to in its pleadings as "its Customer."³ Southern Pacific demanded reimbursement in this amount ($160,977.58) from Greentree. While Greentree's insurance carrier ultimately paid $10,000 to Union Pacific, as successor in interest to Southern Pacific, the remaining $150,977.58 has not been paid by Greentree or its insurance carrier.

Union Pacific filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on November 16, 1998, seeking money damages from Greentree in the amount of $150,977.58. Union Pacific filed its complaint pursuant to the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1) (1997).⁴ After Greentree filed an answer, Union Pacific moved for summary judgment. On February 29, 2000, the District Court granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment and awarded damages in the amount of $150,977.58. On March 10, 2000, Greentree filed (1) a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, and (2) a motion for summary judgment in Greentree's favor. On March 29, 2000, before the District Court had ruled on either of Greentree's two motions, Greentree filed a notice of appeal in this court, appealing the "Final Judgment entered in this action on the 29^th day of February, 2000." On April 18, 2000, this court entered an order staying the appeal pending disposition by the District Court of Greentree's Rule 59(e) motion and summary judgment motion. On April 24, 2000, the District Court entered an order denying both of Greentree's motions. Greentree's appeal then proceeded in this court, without any amendment of the notice of appeal.

II. Applicability of the Carmack Amendment to the Case at Bar

Greentree contends that (1) under the Carmack Amendment, only a shipper or other "person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading," 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), is a proper plaintiff, and (2) Union Pacific is not a shipper or other "person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading" but an intermediate carrier, and therefore the District Court lacked authority to entertain Union Pacific's suit against Greentree.⁵ The Supreme Court has held that the Carmack Amendment was enacted "to relieve shippers of the burden of searching out a particular negligent carrier from among the often numerous carriers handling an interstate shipment of goods," Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 119, 70 S.Ct. 499, 94 L.Ed. 698 (1950), by permitting a shipper to hold either the initiating carrier or delivering carrier liable for damages to its goods in interstate commerce, Mexican Light & Power Co. v. Tex. Mexican Ry. Co., 331 U.S. 731, 733, 67 S.Ct. 1440, 91 L.Ed. 1779 (1947), regardless of which carrier actually caused the damage. An initiating or delivering carrier liable to a shipper may then recover from a connecting carrier for damages that occur on the connecting carrier's line. Id. See also Commodity Credit Corp. v. Norton, 167 F.2d 161, 164 (3d Cir.1948) (quoting Ga., Fla. & Ala. R.R. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 194, 195, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948 (1916)).

Under ordinary circumstances, a through bill of lading is issued by the initiating carrier and presented to the shipper. This document "governs the entire transportation, and thus fixes the obligations of all participating carriers to the extent that the terms of the bill of lading are applicable and valid." Commodity Credit Corp., 167 F.2d at 164 (quoting Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. at 194, 195, 36 S.Ct. 541). The Supreme Court explained in Mexican Light & Power that a second bill of lading issued by a connecting carrier does not alter the terms of the original bill of lading "unless the connecting carrier has received a consideration for the bill of lading in addition to that which flowed under the bill of lading issued by the initiating carrier." 331 U.S. at 734, 67 S.Ct. 1440.

In the case at bar, there was uncontroverted evidence that, subsequent to the issuance by American President Lines of a bill of lading, Southern Pacific and Greentree entered into a second contract of carriage: a contract under which Greentree was to receive—and, in the event, did receive—$2904 to transport two trailers, one of which contained the shipment of cigarettes, from Phoenix to California. This contract was separate from the American President Lines bill of lading, and the consideration paid to Greentree was—as the Court put it in Mexican Light & Power— "in addition to that which flowed under the [first] bill of lading." Id.⁶ Thus, Union Pacific (in succession to Southern Pacific), as shipper, properly initiated this suit against Greentree, as carrier, pursuant to the Carmack Amendment.⁷

III. Summary Judgment

Greentree raises two additional issues for review: (1) whether the District Court erred in not granting summary judgment to Greentree due to a contractual time bar on bringing suit; and (2) whether the District Court overlooked genuine issues of material fact, thereby committing error in granting summary judgment to Union Pacific.

A. Standard of review

On an appeal from an order entering summary judgment, this court undertakes de novo review, applying the same standard the District Court should apply. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). While the record on appeal must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party who lost on summary judgment in the District Court, United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962), an appellate court may only review the record as it existed at the time summary...