Carroll v. Xerox Corp.

• Citation: 294 F.3d 231
• Decision Date: 28 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-2013.,01-2013.
• Parties: Francis J. CARROLL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. XEROX CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

294 F.3d 231

Francis J. CARROLL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. XEROX CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 01-2013.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard January 9, 2002.

Decided June 28, 2002.

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William J. Royal, Jr., with whom Truelove Dee & Chase, LLP was on brief for appellant.

Judith A. Malone, with whom Peter E. Schwartz and Palmer & Dodge LLP were on brief for appellees.

Before LYNCH and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges, and WOODLOCK,^* District Judge.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Francis J. Carroll brought suit against, inter alia, his former employer, Xerox Corporation, alleging (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4, and (2) various state common law claims. The district court dismissed the common law claims and subsequently allowed Xerox's motion for summary judgment on the remaining disability discrimination claims. On appeal, Carroll challenges both rulings. We affirm.

I.

Carroll began working at Xerox in 1970. After holding various positions there, he assumed his first sales position with Xerox in 1986. In 1990, Carroll transferred to a sales position in Xerox's Boston office and began reporting to John O'Brien, the district manager of the Boston office. In March, 1995, O'Brien was promoted to Vice-President, General Manager of the New England Customer Business Unit (CBU), and Carroll began reporting directly to Joseph Profeta, the new manager of Sales Operations.

While reporting to Profeta, Carroll served as an Agent Channel Manager (ACM). In this role, he managed 25-35 independent sales "agents" who sold Xerox equipment to smaller accounts. As an ACM, Carroll managed the sales of his agents, trained his agents and answered their questions, tracked his agents' progress on revenue and units sold to ensure that sales targets were met, and communicated with his agents, supervisors and colleagues through e-mail and other means.

In 1995, Xerox eliminated a number of CBU positions, including one of the four ACM positions and many support personnel, as part of a reduction-in-force. At various times throughout 1995, Carroll had a full-time, and then a part-time, administrative support person reporting to him. When both of these administrative support personnel made job changes for personal reasons, they were not replaced due to the personnel reduction taking place in the CBU.

In early 1995, Carroll received his sales targets for that year and learned that his target objectives had increased 94% from the previous year. Although these large increases were partly the result of the typical increases that occurred every year, they were also the result of a change in the methodology used to generate the performance objectives from 1994 to 1995. On or about April 1, 1995, plaintiff began falling behind in meeting his sales targets for that year. At about this time, he complained to Profeta about his workload and the job pressure.

On April 25, 1995, Carroll went to his primary care physician, Dr. Eric Reines, for a physical. Dr. Reines found that Carroll had a mild leaking from two valves of his heart, which Dr. Reines saw frequently in healthy patients. Based upon these results, Dr. Reines' only concern was preventing an infection called endocarditis, and he accordingly instructed Carroll to take antibiotics prior to any dental work.

In July, 1995, Carroll complained to O'Brien in a meeting about his workload. In this conversation, Carroll requested that Xerox allow him to take an early retirement. Although O'Brien supported Carroll in his request for early retirement, that request was denied on the ground that Carroll's position did not fall within the eligibility criteria for the early retirement program.

On September 18, 1995, Carroll went to urgent care, complaining of chest pains. After a number of tests — including an electrocardiogram and a stress test — Dr. Reines concluded that it was unlikely that Carroll had coronary artery or heart disease. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Reines concluded that the chest pain was related to stress and that the pain resulted from a muscle spasm in the esophagus. Dr. Reines concluded that, albeit painful, the condition has no medical repercussions and no bearing upon a patient's heart condition.

At Carroll's request, Dr. Reines wrote a letter addressed "To whom it may concern" which stated:

[Carroll's] chest pains probably are not due to coronary artery disease but probably are stress related.... [Carroll has] reported extreme work stress which is the likely cause of the chest pain and in middle-aged men is a very common cause of hypertension and hypertensive response to exercise.

As a result of this condition, Carroll took disability leave from September 18 to December 18, 1995. Other than a no-work restriction, there were no other restrictions placed on Carroll's activities during the three-month leave period. In the fall of 1995, psychologist Joseph Patalano treated Carroll for mental health issues. Dr. Patalano saw Carroll twice a month, and had phone contact with him twice a month. While Carroll was out on disability leave, one of the other ACMs, Richard Jarry, successfully covered Carroll's territory in addition to his own and the territory of one of the ACMs who was terminated in the reduction-in-force.

In late November or early December, while out on leave, Carroll informed Profeta that he would be interested in exploring a transfer to a position with Xerox in Houston, Texas, where much of his family lived. Carroll had worked for Xerox in Texas for several years prior to assuming his post in Boston. Profeta told him that he would help him with his transfer request.

With Dr. Patalano's approval, Carroll returned to work at Xerox on December 18, 1995. His doctors did not communicate to Xerox any restrictions on his ability to work. On his first day back to work following his leave, Carroll interviewed for a sales representative position at the Xerox office in Houston.¹ Profeta arranged for Xerox to cover Carroll's travel expenses. Carroll made no reference in his Houston interview to a medical condition that interfered with his ability to work, nor did he ask for any restrictions on his work or for any accommodations for any medical condition.

The interview apparently went well. That evening, Xerox offered Carroll a sales representative position in the Houston CBU at the highest salary for the grade corresponding to that position. That salary was lower than the salary he was receiving as an ACM.

Carroll telephoned Profeta from Houston to inform him that the sales representative position offered to him in Houston was a non-managerial position on a lower level than his position as a sales manager. Profeta checked with Human Resources and learned that Xerox policy required that Carroll's salary be adjusted to the maximum of the range for the new position which was a lower-graded, non-managerial position. Nevertheless, when Profeta asked him whether he still wanted the transfer, Carroll reiterated his desire to transfer to Houston, notwithstanding the salary reduction. Accordingly, he signed Xerox's offer letter, agreeing to assume the sales representative position in Houston at the lower salary, as stated in the letter. Carroll continued to work in the Houston CBU as a sales representative for over two years until he voluntarily retired on May 8, 1998. Carroll did not request any accommodation or reduced workload in Houston, except for a short disability leave for a back injury unrelated to his stress condition in 1995.

II.

In May, 1996, Carroll filed a disability discrimination charge against Xerox with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He subsequently filed a complaint in federal court against Xerox, and O'Brien and Profeta individually, alleging disability discrimination under federal and state law. In essence, Carroll premised his claim on allegations that (1) Xerox failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by either (a) reducing his workload in Boston or (b) transferring him to the sales representative position in Houston at the same salary he had in Boston; and (2) Xerox discriminated against him because of his disability in denying his request for early retirement.

In addition, Carroll brought against defendants various state common law claims of breach of contract/promissory estoppel, fraud and misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. Shortly thereafter, Carroll filed an amended complaint which effectively dismissed his disability discrimination claims against the two individual defendants, O'Brien and Profeta. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the common law claims in their entirety, leaving Xerox as the only remaining defendant in the case. Xerox then moved for summary judgment on the disability discrimination claims. Ruling from the bench, the district court granted that motion on grounds that Carroll failed to satisfy the statutory elements of such claims. Specifically, the court held that Carroll failed to demonstrate, inter alia, 1) a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of Xerox and 2) that he was a qualified individual with a disability under the relevant statutes. The court also found that the record failed to show that Carroll ever made a request for a reasonable accommodation. With respect to Carroll's showing of disability, the court stated in its separate supplemental written order:

[Carroll] failed to show that he was precluded by his impairment from a substantial class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Instead, the evidence presented by the plaintiff tended to show only that he was precluded from performing his particular job. As such, the impairment does not constitute a...