Cruzan v. Special School Dist, # 1

Decision Date20 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. 01-3417.,01-3417.
Citation294 F.3d 981
PartiesCarla CRUZAN, Appellant, v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, # 1; Dr. Robert McCauley, principal, in his official and individual capacity, Appellees. American Civil Liberties Union; Out-front Minnesota; Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network of Minnesota; Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association; National Center for Lesbian Rights, Amicus on Behalf of Appellee, Special School District, # 1.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Francis J. Manion, argued, New Hope, KY (Gregory R. Troy, St. Paul, MN, on the brief), for appellants.

Sandra L. Conroy, argued, Minneapolis, MN (Donald M. Lewis, Minneapolis, MN, (Donald M. Lewis, Minneapolis, MN, on the brief), for appellees.

BEFORE: HANSEN, Chief Judge, FAGG and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Carla Cruzan, a female teacher at Minneapolis Special School District, # 1, brought this action alleging the school district discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and her religion by allowing a transgendered coworker to use the women's faculty restroom. The district court* granted summary judgment to the school district. Cruzan v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F.Supp.2d 964 (D.Minn.2001). Cruzan appeals, and we affirm.

David Nielsen began working for the school district in 1969. Nearly thirty years later, in early 1998, Nielsen informed school administration that he was transgendered, that is, a person who identifies with and adopts the gender identity of a member of the other biological sex. Nielsen informed administration he would "transition from male to female" and be known as Debra Davis in the workplace. To plan for the transition, the school district collaborated with Davis, legal counsel, the parent teacher association, students' parents, and psychologists. Cruzan asked whether Davis would be allowed to use the school's women's restrooms, and administration informed her other arrangements would be made. Later, legal counsel informed the school that under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person's "self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness," Minn.Stat. § 363.01 subd. 45 (1998), Davis had the right to use the women's restroom. Thus, after Davis's transition in the spring of 1998, the school district permitted Davis to use the women's faculty restroom.

A few months later, in October 1998, Cruzan entered the women's faculty restroom and saw Davis exiting a privacy stall. Cruzan immediately left, found the principal in the hallway among students, and complained about encountering Davis in the restroom. The principal asked Cruzan to either wait in his office or to make an appointment to discuss the matter. Cruzan did not do so, and never approached the principal about her concerns again.

Instead, Cruzan filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, which dismissed Cruzan's charge, concluding there was no probable cause to believe an unfair discriminatory practice had occurred. The Department stated the MHRA neither requires nor prohibits restroom designation according to self-image of gender or according to biological sex. See Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn.2001) (stating same). After exhausting administrative remedies, Cruzan filed this action under Title VII and the MHRA asserting claims of religious discrimination and hostile work environment sex discrimination. Davis retired in 2001.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and affirm if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Cruzan, shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the school district is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rheineck v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., 261 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir.2001).

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, Cruzan had to show she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement, she informed the school district of her belief, and she suffered an adverse employment action. Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam). The district court concluded that assuming without deciding Cruzan had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the restroom policy, she failed to inform the school district of her belief and did not suffer an adverse employment action because of it. Cruzan, 165 F.Supp.2d at 967-68.

Although Cruzan expressed general disapproval of Davis's transition and the school district's decision to allow Davis to use the women's faculty restroom, Cruzan did not disclose or discuss the...

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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • September 10, 2009
    ...to show an adverse employment action.'" Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 476 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002)). Minor changes in working conditions that inconvenience an employee or alter the employee's work responsibilitie......
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    ...without more, does not constitute an act of harassment simply because a person is transgender. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., # 1 , 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (concluding that a transgender woman’s "merely being present in the women’s ... restroom" did not constitute ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • T: appending transgender equal rights to gay, lesbian and bisexual equal rights.
    • United States
    • Columbia Journal of Gender and Law Vol. 19 No. 3, September 2010
    • September 22, 2010
    ...(37) Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001). (38) See id. at 721. (39) See id. See also Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. #1,294 F.3d 981,983 84 (8th Cir. 2002) (in which a teacher alleged a hostile work environment as a result of her employerschool's permitting a trans woman to use the ......

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