Miller v. United States

Decision Date04 March 1935
Docket NumberNo. 342,342
Citation294 U.S. 435,79 L.Ed. 977,55 S.Ct. 440
PartiesMILLER v. UNITED STATES. *
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. James A. Lowrey, Jr., and Wallace Miller, both of Macon, Ga., for Petitioner.

The Attorney General and Mr. Will G. Beardslee, of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner enlisted in the United States Army June 7, 1917, and was honorably discharged April 3, 1919. On January 22, 1918, there was issued to him a war risk insurance policy, by the terms of which he was entitled to receive $57.50 per month in the event of his sustaining injuries causing total and permanent disability. No premiums were paid after the date of his discharge, and the policy then lapsed. Claim was made for insurance on June 5, 1931, twelve years later. The claim was disallowed by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on April 1, 1932. Thereupon, this action to recover judgment upon the policy was brought.

The facts upon which the action is based follow: On October 26, 1918, while in active service in France, petitioner sustained injuries in a railway accident resulting in the amputation of his right arm. He alleges that, for all practical purposes, the sight of his left eye was destroyed at the same time. Although the evidence shows that the defective condition of the eye was congenital, no point is made in respect of that fact; and for present purposes we put it aside. At the conclusion of the evidence before the trial court, the judge sustained a motion of the government for a directed verdict, on the ground that the injuries did not, as a matter of law, result in total and permanent disability. Verdict and judgment followed accordingly. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, 71 F.(2d) 361, and we brought the case here on certiorari.

Article 3 (section 301 et seq.) of the Act of 1917 (chapter 105, 40 Stat. 398, 405) relates to compensation for death or disability. The provisions in respect of insurance are dealt with separately in article 4 (page 409, § 400 et seq.) of the act; and this separation of the two subjects has been maintained a subsequent acts. The provision in respect of insurance (page 409, § 400) is that upon application to the bureau, the United States 'shall grant insurance against the death or total permanent disability' of enlisted men and other classes of persons named in the act. The provision of the act (section 302) with respect to compensation was enlarged by the amending act of December 24, 1919, c. 16, § 11, 41 Stat. 371, 373, so as to bring conclusively within the term 'total permanent disability' the loss of one hand and the sight of one eye; and this has since remained the law. No such amendment was carried into the insurance article of the act; and, in that respect, the statute has never been changed.

Section 13 of the 1917 act, as amended, Act May 20, 1918, c. 77, 40 Stat. 555, confers upon the Director of the Bureau authority to make such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes. Under that provision, a regulation was issued March 9, 1918, declaring: 'Any impairment of mind or body which renders it impossible for the disabled person to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation shall be deemed, in Articles III and IV, to be total disability.' It was while this regulation was in effect that section 302 of the act was amended, as stated above, to provide in respect of compensation that the loss of one hand and the sight of one eye should be deemed total permanent disability. In May, 1930, Regulation 3140 was promulgated. That regulation, among other things, declares that the loss of one hand and one eye 'shall be deemed to be total permanent disability under yearly renewable term insurance.'

Succinctly stated, petitioner contends (1) that section 302, as amended, applies to war risk insurance as well as to compensation allowances; (2) that regulation 3140 is within the power of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs (who succeeded the Director of the Bureau), and controls the present case; and (3) that, the foregoing aside, the evidence was sufficient to justify a verdict in his favor.

First. The argument as to the first point, in brief, is this: The amendment to the compensation article of the act, adopted in 1919, must be construed and applied in the light of the regulation of March 9, 1918, of which regulation congressional knowledge and approval are to be assumed. By that regulation, the bureau adopted a uniform rule applicable alike to compensation and insurance; and the contention seems to be, since Congress did not by express words limit the operation of the amendment of 1919 to compensation, it is fair to conclude that it was intended that the amendment, conforming to the principle of the regulation, should apply to both compensation and insurance. We see no warrant for that conclusion. When the regulations was adopted, neither article 3 nor article 4 contained any specific provision in respect of the disabling effect of the loss of one hand and the sight of one eye. By the amendment, not only was the formal expression of the new rule confined to article 3, but the opening words of the amendment quite clearly indicate a legislative intention to confine its application to that article. These words are: 'If and while the disability is rated as total and permanent, the rate of compensation shall be $100 per month,' etc. (Italics added.) It is hard to see why the intention of Congress to limit the operation of the amendment to compensation allowances is not thus definitely and clearly manifested.

Second. Regulation 3140 was not adopted until eleven years after the insurance policy had lapsed and petitioner's cause of action thereon had fully matured. Undoubtedly, the regulation in terms declares that permanent loss of the use of one hand and one eye shall be deemed to be total permanent disability under an insurance policy such as that issued to petitioner. But the regulation is both inapplicable and invalid.

It is inapplicable because it contains nothing to suggest that it was to be given a retrospective effect so as to bring within its purview a policy which had long since lapsed and which had relation only to an alleged cause of action long since matured. The law is well settled that generally a statute cannot be construed to operate retrospectively unless the legislative intention to that effect unequivocally appears. Twenty Per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187, 22 L.Ed. 339; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559, 5 S.Ct. 255, 28 L.Ed. 770; Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 266 U.S. 435, 437, 45 S.Ct. 143, 69 L.Ed. 367. The principle is strictly applicable to statutes which have the effect of creating an obligation An administrative regulation is subject to the rule equally with a statute; and accordingly, the regulation here involved must be taken to operate prospectively only.

It is invalid because not within the authority conferred by the statute upon the Director (or his successor,...

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