Hoffman v. Chandler
Decision Date | 05 March 2013 |
Docket Number | No. CV–12–0149–PR.,CV–12–0149–PR. |
Citation | 655 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24,295 P.3d 939,231 Ariz. 362 |
Parties | Frank HOFFMAN, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Terry L. CHANDLER, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the COUNTY OF PIMA, Respondent Judge, The State of Arizona; Tucson City Prosecutor's Office, Real Parties in Interest. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mary C. Trejo, Tucson Public Defender By Kristina J. Bohn, Deputy Public Defender, Tucson, Attorney for Frank Hoffman.
Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney By Baird S. Greene, Deputy City Attorney, William F. Mills, Principal Assistant, Prosecuting City Attorney, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona and Tucson City Prosecutors Office.
¶ 1 Subsection (A)(3) of A.R.S. § 13–4033 authorizes a defendant to appeal a post-judgment order that affects substantial rights, while subsection (B) prohibits a defendant in noncapital cases from directly appealing any judgment or sentence entered pursuant to a plea agreement. We today hold that subsection (B) bars a defendant from directly appealing a contested post-judgment restitution order entered pursuant to a plea agreement that contemplated payment of restitution up to a capped amount. Any appellate review must be obtained through post-conviction relief proceedings.
¶ 2 The State charged Frank Hoffman with several offenses stemming from his involvement in a traffic accident that injured another person. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hoffman pleaded no contest to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and, among other things, agreed to pay restitution up to $53,653.45. The Tucson City Court adjudicated Hoffman guilty, imposed a term of probation, and ordered him to pay fines, fees, and restitution in an amount to be determined later, but not to exceed $53,653.45.
¶ 3 Approximately three months later, the court held a contested restitution hearing and entered an order requiring Hoffman to pay $40,933.45 in restitution. Hoffman appealed to the superior court, which subsequently dismissed the appeal on the State's motion. Relying on A.R.S. § 13–4033(B) and Rule 17.1(e) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court ruled that Hoffman waived his right to directly appeal the restitution order by entering into the plea agreement and could challenge the order only through Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceedings. Hoffman sought special action relief from the court of appeals, which declined jurisdiction.
¶ 4 We granted review to clarify the scope of § 13–4033(B), a purely legal issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.
¶ 5 The Arizona Constitution guarantees defendants in criminal prosecutions “the right to appeal in all cases.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. Before 1992, a defendant could directly appeal a judgment or sentence entered pursuant to a plea agreement. A.R.S. § 13–4033 (1989). But the increasing number of these appeals was straining our appellate justice system. Ariz. State S., Fact Sheet for H.B. 2481, 40th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mar. 19, 1992). Consequently, the legislature amended § 13–4033 and, among other changes, added subsection (B), which provides: “In noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or an admission to a probation violation.” 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 779. The legislature, however, did not change what is now subsection (A)(3), which permits a defendant to appeal from “[a]n order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party.” § 13–4033(A)(3).
¶ 6 After the legislature added subsection (B), this Court amended Rule 17.1(e) to provide that a defendant in a noncapital case who pleads guilty or no contest “waives the right to have the appellate courts review the proceedings by way of direct appeal, and may seek review only by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 and, if denied, a petition for review.” Order Amending Rule 17.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (Apr. 7, 1992). We have since held that a petition for post-conviction relief is “the only constitutionally guaranteed appeal” after a defendant enters into a plea agreement. State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 458, 910 P.2d 1, 3 (1996); see also State v. Regenold, 226 Ariz. 378, 379 ¶ 5, 249 P.3d 337, 338 (2011) ().
¶ 7 Hoffman argues § 13–4033(A)(3) authorizes his appeal from the restitution order as a post-judgment order affecting his substantial rights. The city court entered a “judgment” by adjudicating Hoffman guilty of DUI. SeeAriz. R.Crim. P. 26.1(a) ( ). Read in isolation, § 13–4033(A)(3) would authorize Hoffman to directly appeal the post-judgment restitution order as it indisputably affected his “substantial rights.” But we must “strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.” State v. Wagstaff, 164 Ariz. 485, 491, 794 P.2d 118, 124 (1990). Thus, the issue is whether the restitution order is part of Hoffman's “sentence” and thus not appealable under § 13–4033(B).
¶ 8 We interpret § 13–4033(B) to effect the legislature's intent, looking first to the language of the provision. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 283 ¶ 14, 110 P.3d 1013, 1017 (2005). If the terms are ambiguous, we employ secondary principles of statutory interpretation. Id. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Arellano, 213 Ariz. 474, 477 ¶ 9, 143 P.3d 1015, 1018 (2006).
¶ 9 The language of subsection (B) does not reflect whether a restitution order contemplated by a plea agreement but entered after entry of judgment is part of a “sentence,” and the legislature has not defined the term in A.R.S. §§ 13–105, –4033, or elsewhere. Several reasons, however, convince us that such an order is part of a “sentence” for purposes of subsection § 13–4033(B). First, considering a post-judgment restitution order as part of a sentence furthers the legislative goal of eliminating direct appeals involving plea agreements. A.R.S. § 13–104 ( ); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 188 Ariz. 380, 385, 936 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1997) ( ). Before the 1992 amendment to § 13–4033, defendants who entered into plea agreements commonly challenged restitution orders on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Nosie, 150 Ariz. 498, 499, 724 P.2d 584, 585 (App.1986); State v. O'Connor, 146 Ariz. 16, 17, 703 P.2d 563, 564 (App.1985). Although the legislature was presumably aware of such appeals when it sought to reduce the burden on appellate courts, cf. Taylor v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 198 Ariz. 310, 317 ¶ 21, 9 P.3d 1049, 1056 (2000) ( ), it did not expressly exclude restitution orders from the ambit of § 13–4033(B).
¶ 10 Second, excluding a post-judgment restitution order entered pursuant to a plea agreement from the reach of § 13–4033(B) would create a hybrid system of appellate review. Under Hoffman's view of § 13–4033(B), a defendant who pleads guilty could seek appellate review of a contested post-judgment restitution order on direct appeal but would have to pursue review of remaining issues through Rule 32 proceedings. This dual-track review would unnecessarily burden the appellate justice system and could lead to inconsistent results. State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247, 250–51 ¶ 16, 34 P.3d 356, 359–60 (2001) ( ). Cf. State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, 184 ¶ 10, 291 P.3d 974, 978 (2013) ( ).
¶ 11 Third, the legislature mandates restitution when a crime victim has suffered economic loss. A.R.S. § 13–603(C). Because this mandatory provision applies when a defendant enters into a plea agreement, and restitution is typically imposed at the time of sentencing, State v. Holguin, 177 Ariz. 589, 591, 870 P.2d 407, 409 (App.1993), the term “sentence” in § 13–4033(B) is most reasonably construed to include a post-judgment restitution order.
¶ 12 Hoffman points out that after the 1992 amendment to § 13–4033, appellate courts have continued to assume jurisdiction over direct appeals of post-judgment orders by defendants who had entered plea agreements. But with two exceptions, see infra ¶¶ 13–14, none of the cases Hoffman cites concerned a challenge to an order entered as a direct consequence of a plea agreement's terms. See Regenold, 226 Ariz. at 380 ¶ 12, 249 P.3d at 339 ( ); State v. Ponsart, 224 Ariz. 518, 521–22 ¶¶ 2–12, 233 P.3d 631, 634–35 (App.2010) (same); State v. Delgarito, 189 Ariz. 58, 59, 938 P.2d 107, 108 (App.1997) ( ). Moreover, since 1992, appellate courts have routinely dismissed appeals of post-judgment orders that challenged plea agreement terms. See, e.g., Fisher v. Kaufman, 201 Ariz. 500, 501 ¶¶ 5–6, 38 P.3d 38, 39 (App.2001) ( ); State v. Jimenez, 188 Ariz. 342, 344–45, 935 P.2d 920, 922–23 (App.1996) ( ).
¶ 13 Hoffman cites two cases...
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