Thompson v. Davis

Decision Date08 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. 01-15091.,01-15091.
Citation295 F.3d 890
PartiesCharles W. THOMPSON; Stephen Bogovich, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gray DAVIS, Governor State of California; Joseph Sandoval, Secretary of Youth and Corrections Agency; James Gomez, Director of the Dept. of Corrections; John W. Gillis, Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms; James W. Nielsen, Chairman of the Board of Prison Terms, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Sara Norman, San Quentin, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

John M. Appelbaum and Michael J. Williams, Sacramento, CA, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-00297-GEB(GGH).

Before: BRIGHT,* B. FLETCHER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION

PER CURIAM.

ORDER

The opinion of this court filed March 8, 2002, 282 F.3d 780, slip op. at 3859, is amended as follows:

On page 3863 of the slip opinion, add the following sentence to the end of the first full paragraph: "The plaintiffs' claim that the state parole board is categorically denying inmates consideration for parole because of their disability, drug addiction, survives the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion."

On page 3863 of the slip opinion, in the last paragraph delete "primarily due to" and replace with "because of." On page 3869 of the slip opinion, in the paragraph starting with "Another flaw in the district court's reasoning ...," delete "to determine parole release" and replace with "in the parole context." In the same paragraph, add "long" after "For example, circuit courts have." Delete "race is an impermissible criterion in the parole decision-making process" and replace with "parole boards may not exclude an inmate for consideration for parole based on race." Change "same constitutional promises" to "similar constitutional promises."

On page 3870 of the slip opinion, in the first full paragraph, change the first sentence to read (and add new footnote 4): "The same holds true in the parole context: since a parole board may not categorically exclude African-Americans from consideration for parole because of their race, and since Congress thinks that discriminating against a disabled person is like discriminating against an African-American, the parole board may not categorically exclude a class of disabled people from consideration for parole because of their disabilities.4"

On page 3871, in the last line of the opinion add "AND REMANDED" after "REVERSED."

OPINION

Charles W. Thompson and Stephen L. Bogovich (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), two California state prisoners, seek prospective injunctive relief against various state officials who have a role in the parole process. For convenience we refer to them as "Defendants." Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by denying them full and fair consideration for parole based on their disability of drug addiction. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that the ADA does not apply to the substantive decision-making process of parole proceedings. Because we conclude that there is no categorical rule excluding parole decisions from the scope of the ADA, we reverse the ruling of the district court and remand for further proceedings. The plaintiffs' claim that the state parole board is categorically denying inmates consideration for parole because of their disability, drug addiction, survives the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs are state prisoners who are serving terms of fifteen years to life for second-degree murder. According to their complaint, Plaintiffs have a history of drug addiction, which substantially limited their judgment, ability to learn, ability to comprehend the long-range effects of their acts, and ability to maintain stable social relationships and stable employment. Both received treatment for substance abuse while in prison and have been drug-free since 1990 and 1984, respectively. Both became statutorily eligible for parole in 1993 and assert that they have been denied parole release dates because of their substance abuse histories.

Plaintiffs, without the benefit of counsel,2 filed this action in federal court. Plaintiffs assert that the Board of Prison Terms ("Board"), the state parole authority, follows an unwritten policy of automatically denying parole to prisoners with substance abuse histories in violation of Title II of the ADA. Specifically, the pro se complaint alleges that the Board refused to set a parole release date for Plaintiffs because of their records of drug addiction and/or because the Board regarded them as drug addicts. The complaint further alleges that the Board denied Plaintiffs an individualized assessment of their future dangerousness because of their disability. Plaintiffs seek only prospective injunctive relief from Defendants in their official capacities.

A magistrate judge initially decided that, because the complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were improperly denied parole, their claims might affect their release from prison, and they could proceed only by writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the case on the magistrate judge's recommendation, but this court reversed on appeal, holding that Plaintiffs' ADA claim "does not necessarily imply the invalidity of their continuing confinement." See Bogovich v. Sandoval, 189 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir.1999).

On remand, Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, which the magistrate judge interpreted as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Rule 12(b)(1) was inapplicable. The magistrate judge concluded that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was not warranted on the grounds stated by Defendants. Instead, sua sponte, the magistrate judge decided that the complaint should be dismissed because "[t]he ADA does not apply to the substantive decision making process in the criminal law context." The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Standard of Review

The district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th t Cir.2001). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. In addition, we construe pro se pleadings liberally on a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Ortez v. Washington County Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir.1996).

III. Discussion
A. ADA Framework

Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997). To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Weinreich, 114 F.3d at 978.

With respect to the first element, the ADA defines "disability" as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). Here, Plaintiffs allege that they are disabled based on subsections (B) and (C) — that is, they have a record of drug addiction and/or are regarded as being drug addicts by the Board.

Drug addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is a recognized disability under the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2000) ("The phrase physical or mental impairment includes ... drug addiction...."). While the term "qualified individual with a disability" does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, the ADA does protect individuals who have successfully completed or are participating in a supervised drug rehabilitation program and are no longer using illegal drugs, as well as individuals who are erroneously regarded as using drugs when they are not. See 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) & (b) (1994); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 831-32 (9th Cir.1995) (acknowledging an analogous provision in Title I). Plaintiffs allege that they have been rehabilitated and no longer use drugs. They also allege that their past drug addiction substantially limited certain major life activities, including their ability to learn and work. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000). Since Plaintiffs allege that they have a record of a substantially limiting impairment and that they are regarded by the Board as having a substantially limiting impairment, under § 12102(2)(B) and (C), they have pled that they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

With respect to the second element of disability discrimination, Plaintiffs allege that they are statutorily eligible for parole. As a...

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