Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 05 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 38540,38540
• Citation: 295 S.E.2d 727,250 Ga. 66
• Parties: BROWN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 727

295 S.E.2d 727

250 Ga. 66

BROWN v. The STATE.

No. 38540.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 5, 1982.

[250 Ga. 76] Frank B. Hester, Hester & Hester, Atlanta, for James Willie brown.

Bryant Huff, Dist. Atty., Lawrenceville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLARKE, Justice.

Appellant, James Willie Brown, was convicted for the murder of Brenda Sue Watson and given the death penalty. In his appeal to this court, Brown raises ten enumerations of error. For reasons which follow, we affirm.

FACTS

At approximately 8:30 p.m. of May 12, 1975, appellant and Brenda Watson arrived at the Mark Inn lounge in Gwinnett County. They ate a carryout steak and potato dinner that they had brought with them and spent several hours drinking and dancing. They left together at approximately 11:00 p. m.

Brenda Watson's body was found the next day near a trash pile close to an old logging road in a heavily wooded area some 500 feet off Deshon Road in Gwinnett County. A cord was tied around her left ankle, and she had indentations on her wrists and her right ankle which could indicate she had been tied there also. She was nude except for a blue terrycloth blouse which was pulled up over her breasts. A pair of panties had been forced so far down her throat that they were not discovered until the autopsy.

Warren Tillman of the State Crime Lab testified that Brenda Watson's death was caused by suffocation from the panties in her throat. He discovered seminal fluid and sperm in the victim's throat and vagina. From abrasions and contusions around the victim's vagina, Tillman concluded that the victim had been raped and that this had occurred before her death.

An undigested meal of steak and potatoes was found in the victim's stomach. Since a meal is usually digested within 4 hours, Tillman estimated that Watson died no later than 4:00 a. m.

Appellant was arrested May 15. Nylon cord found in his car was identical to that tied around the victim's left ankle. A hairbrush found in appellant's car contained hair similar in color and medulation to the victim's hair.

Appellant was questioned May 16. He initially denied knowing Brenda Watson. Upon being informed that he had been seen with her the night before her body had been discovered, he admitted that he and Ms. Watson had gone to the Mark Inn for drinks, but claimed that afterwards they went to a lounge off Covington Highway, where he left her. Later he stated that when they left the Mark Inn, Watson suggested they go to a quiet place in the country. Appellant took her to a secluded spot off Deshon Road. When he did, she told him that if he didn't pay her $200 she was going to call the police and claim he had tried to rape her. Appellant's response was to tie her up and gag her. Then he decided he might as well have sexual intercourse with her. So he did. On his way home he

discovered that her pocketbook was still in his car. He stopped at a bridge on Killian Hill Road and threw the pocketbook into the Yellow River.

ENUMERATIONS OF ERROR

1. In his first three enumerations of error, appellant raises the general grounds. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that every element of the offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's first three enumerations of error are without merit. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his eighth enumeration of error, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain a jury finding that he was sane on the date of the alleged offense.

(a) Appellant has a long history of mental illness. He was first admitted to Central State Hospital for evaluation in April, 1968, following his arrest on charges of assault with intent to rape, robbery, and two counts of assault with intent to murder. A provisional diagnosis of "Psychoneurotic Disorder, Dissociative Reaction" was made, but no signs of psychosis were noted, and the examining doctors recommended that appellant be returned to the custody of the court for further disposition of the charges against him.

Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced December 2, 1968, to serve 10 years on each count. On December 20, 1968, appellant was re-admitted to Central State for further evaluation and treatment. Upon further examination, appellant's diagnosis was changed to "Personality Disorder, Paranoid Personality # 301.0." Appellant remained in Central State until May, 1971. The final summary from Central State noted that the results of appellant's physical examinations, his lab tests, and his neurological examination were within normal limits. His IQ was average. He had made a good adjustment with minimum supervision and had never been a management problem. Appellant had requested that he be returned to the State Board of Corrections as he was soon going to be eligible for parole. Since it was felt that appellant had reached maximum benefits from his hospitalization, he was discharged.

In December, 1972, appellant, now on parole, voluntarily re-admitted himself to Central State, complaining that his nerves were bad. Appellant was found to be suffering from a "mild to moderate" degree of psychiatric impairment, but no hallucinations, delusions, or other symptoms of psychosis were noted and appellant was found to be well oriented as to time, place, person and situation. The diagnosis was the same: paranoid personality # 301.0. Appellant was discharged in January, 1974.

Appellant was re-admitted on June 4, 1975, for evaluation following his arrest for the murder of Brenda Watson. He exhibited indications of both visual and auditory hallucinations. The examining psychiatrist concluded that appellant had deteriorated since his previous diagnosis and was now overtly psychotic. The provisional diagnosis was "Schizophrenia, paranoid type # 295.3." Based upon this evaluation, appellant's special plea of insanity was sustained. See Code Ann. § 27-1502.

Appellant remained at Central State until February 10, 1977. After being placed on medication and given intensive treatment, his condition had improved to the point that he was no longer psychotic. He was returned to the custody of the court for the final disposition of his case.

Appellant, however, decompensated in the Gwinnett County jail, and another psychiatric examination was ordered. He was found to be psychotic again, and a second special plea of insanity was sustained in July, 1977. Appellant returned to Central State.

By April, 1980, appellant's hallucinations had abated, and he was able to relate to staff and other patients in an acceptable manner. In a staff conference, it was decided that appellant had improved to the extent that he could be sent back to court. A third special plea of insanity was tried before a jury on April 8, 1981, and appellant (b) In support of his insanity defense, appellant relied upon his prior history of mental illness, testimony from his mother that he did not know right from wrong on the date of the offense, testimony from his original attorney that when he first talked to appellant nine days after the offense, appellant did not know right from wrong, and a letter written by psychiatrist Julius Ehik (admitted without objection), who had examined appellant at the Gwinnett County jail October 14, 1980. Dr. Ehik concurred in the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. He stated: "Considering the type of illness and findings indicated in his chart and my present examination, it is my opinion that the probability certainly exists that [appellant was] psychotic at the time of the alleged offense and that he acted upon delusions and therefore could not distinguish between right and wrong at that time."

was found to be competent to stand trial. He was tried in June, 1981.

The State did not rely merely upon the presumption of sanity but introduced considerable evidence that appellant was sane at the time of the offense. Compare, Brooks v. State, 247 Ga. 744, 279 S.E.2d 649 (1981).

Various lay witnesses who had the opportunity to observe appellant before and shortly after the offense testified that in their opinion, appellant was sane and knew right from wrong at the time he was observed. See, Gee v. State, 239 Ga. 583(2), 238 S.E.2d 356 (1977); Flanagan v. State, 103 Ga. 619(4), 30 S.E. 550 (1898). These witnesses included a bartender at the Mark Inn lounge, where appellant had been a regular customer for four months, who saw appellant with Brenda Watson the evening of May 12, 1975; the proprietor of a tire store who had gone to school with appellant, who saw appellant on May 14, 1975, when he came to buy two tires; two of the arresting officers; various jail personnel who observed appellant immediately after his arrest; and the two officers who interrogated appellant.

In addition, it was shown that appellant told the officer who took his personal history upon his arrest for the murder of Brenda Watson that "he wasn't worried about this charge; he would plead insanity and in a few years he would be out."

In 1973, appellant told his wife's niece that if he got in any trouble, "all he would have to do is make out like he was crazy" and "nothing would happen to him other than being placed back in Milledgeville."

In 1976, appellant met Anita Tucker at the Gwinnett County jail. She was charged with murder. Appellant told her that if she played crazy she would only serve two years in a mental hospital. He advised her to look wild and talk in circles as if she didn't know what day it was. Two years later, appellant saw Ms. Tucker at the dental clinic at Central State Hospital. He asked her what sentence she got. She told him life. He winked and said, "What did I tell you."

Dr. Jose M. Delatorre, the director of the forensic services division at Central State Hospital, was asked by the court in September, 1980, for his opinion of appellant's sanity at the time of the offense. Dr....