Snyder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 663

Decision Date29 April 1935
Docket NumberNo. 663,663
Citation55 S.Ct. 737,295 U.S. 134,79 L.Ed. 1351
PartiesSNYDER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. *
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Henry M. Ward, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

The Attorney General and Mr. Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents further questions regarding the application to marginal transactions on the stock exchange of Article 58 of regulations No. 74, as well as some of those already considered in Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 55 S.Ct. 732, 79 L.Ed. —-, decided this day.

Snyder was the salaried secretary of an insurance company. During 1928, as in previous years, he made on his individual account, at different dates and different prices many purchases and sales on margin of United Gas Improvement Company stock. In his federal income tax return for the calendar year 1928 he reported, apparently, no profits from trading on the stock exchange. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that he had made large gains; determined that his net income was $197.495.85; and, after making the appropriate deductions, assessed a deficiency tax of $38,961.22. The large income computed by the Commissioner was the result of applying the sales made in 1928 against purchases in earlier years, in accordance with the 'First-in, first-out' regulation and sections 111—113 of the act (26 USCA §§ 2111—2113). The Board of Tax Appeals (29 B.T.A. 39) and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (73 F.(2d) 5) affirmed the Commissioner's determination. The facts found by the Board of Tax Appeals, upon which the case was submitted, are these:

Snyder traded in United Gas Improvement Company stock for profit through brokers on margin; and increased his holdings by the method known as 'pyramiding.' On January 1, 1928, there stood to his credit 5,300 shares; and his debit balances aggregated $501,865.59. He purchased during the tax year 10,600 shares and sold 7,900. At the close of the year, 8,000 shares stood to his credit, and his debit balances aggregated $932,822.67. Upon rises in the market, paper profits had been used to increase his holdings. Upon declines in the market, when his margin fell below the required percentage, the brokers reduced his debit balances by sufficient sales to make up the deficiency in the margin. The purchases and sales were effected by the brokers transferring so-called 'street certificates,' each for 100 shares, in the name of some stock exchange concern, endorsed by it in blank. At no time was any stock certificate delivered by the brokers to Snyder, or by him to them; nor was any certificate earmarked for him or his account. The certificates were inextricably mingled with other securities pledged with banks. They were at all times incapable of identification as having been bought or sold for the account of Snyder. The transactions between him and the brokers were reflected solely in entries in Snyder's account on the brokers' books; and no entry indicated that any particular lot theretofore purchased had been sold or retained. The only attempt at identification found by the Board, was the uncontradicted testimony of Snyder to the effect that 'in each case where a sale was made it was his intention to sell the last acquired stock first and shortly thereafter to buy back an equivalent amount in order to increase his margin and acquire additional shares of the stock.'

First. Snyder contends, in the alternative, that his intention to sell the last acquired stock first, constituted sufficient identification to make the 'First-in, first-out' rule inapplicable; or else that the regulation as applied to marginal transactions on the stock exchange is invalid, because there is no possible means, other than the trader's intentions, of identifying the shares sold. What has already been said in Helvering v. Rankin is enough to dispose of both of these contentions. It is there determined that shares traded on margin are capable of identification for the purposes of the regulation; but that the mere intention of the trader to sell particular shares, without further designation, does not constitute sufficient identification.

Second. Snyder contends that the 'First-in, first-out' regulation may not, consistently with the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1928, be applied to the facts of this case. The argument is that his market operations constituted a trade or business as those terms are used in section 22(a) of the act (26 USCA § 2022(a); that according to that section, and the applicable decisions of this Court, Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 150, 75 L.Ed. 383, Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 52 S.Ct. 568, 76 L.Ed. 1128, gross income from such business, as well as net in- come under section 23 of the act (26 USCA § 2023), must be computed entirely with respect to transactions within the taxable year; and that sections 111—113 (26 USCA §§ 2111—2113), upon which the government relies, are not applicable because they relate only to 'sales of property, including securities, held for investment,' and have no application to sales made in the course of a 'business of trading on the stock exchange.' On this assumption, Snyder argues that the income realized during the taxable year from his stock transactions is not the aggregate of the gains and losses on each sale of securities, measured by the difference between the sale and cost prices of the securities sold, but the profit or loss realized as a result of all market operations, purchases as well as sales, made during the taxable year. Such profit or loss, he now suggests, must be computed 'by taking the difference between the purchase price and the sales price of shares bought and sold during the year, deducting expenses, such as commissions, taxes and interest.' Thus computed, he concludes, his market operations resulted in a gross income of $43,692; and adding his salary, insurance commissions and dividends, and deducting the expenses of his stock operations (interest paid brokers) his net taxable income was $39,682, and his total tax $1,897.77.

Third. Neither in the findings of the Board of Tax Appeals, nor in the facts upon which the case was submitted to it, is there any support for the controverted allegation in Snyder's petition that his market operations constituted a 'business regularly carried on for profit.'1 It is true that a taxpayer may be engaged in more than one trade or business, as those terms are used in various provisions of the Revenue Acts; and that, in addition to other business activities, one may be 'regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling corporate stocks.' Compare Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404, 53 S.Ct. 205, 77 L.Ed. 389; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 53 S.Ct. 207, 77 L.Ed. 397; Washburn v. Com'r of Internal Revenue (C.C.A.) 51 F.(2d) 949. It is also true that the Department has ruled, and the Board has held, that a taxpayer who, for the purpose of making a livelihood, devotes the major portion of his time to speculating on the stock exchange may treat losses thus incurred as having been sustained in the course of a trade or business.2 Snyder, however, did not allege or attempt to prove that he had devoted the major part, or any substantial part, of his business day to his stock transactions. Nor were there any facts adduced to show that he might properly be characterized as a 'trader on an exchange, who makes a living in buying and selling securities.' Bedell v. Com'r of Internal Revenue (C.C.A.) 30 F.(2d) 622, 624; compare Mente v. Eisner (C.C.A.) 266 F. 161, 11 A.L.R. 496. Indeed, according to his petition, his intention throughout the year 1928, was, by 'taking advantage of the turns of the market,' not to draw out cash profits from his operations, but 'to increase the holdings of U.G.I. stock carried for his account by (his) brokers to as great an extent as the margin of his account permitted.' There is no substantial evidence in the record to sustain a finding by the Board, had there been one, to the effect that Snyder's market operations constituted a trade or business within the meaning of section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1928.

Fourth. The attack upon the Commissioner's method of computing income falls with the unsupported allega- tion that the stock transactions constituted a 'business regularly carried on for profit.' In his brief in support of his petition to this Court for certiorari, Snyder makes it clear, perhaps for the first time, that he is 'insistent upon the point that the operations constitute a trade or business or transaction entered into for profit, not in order to deduct losses, but to emphasize the controlling rule that the law requires the tax to be computed on the segregated transactions of the year.' But it is now too well settled for argument, that gains realized from sales of property purchased in previous years, measured, as prescribed by sections 111—113 of the 1928 Act, by the excess of proceeds of sale over cost, constitute income taxable in...

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