Atlantic Coast Line Co v. State of Florida State of Florida v. United States 8212 1935

• Decision Date: 29 April 1935
• Docket Number: Nos. 344,345,s. 344
• Citation: 55 S.Ct. 713,295 U.S. 301,79 L.Ed. 1451
• Parties: ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. STATE OF FLORIDA et al. * STATE OF FLORIDA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. Reargued and Submitted March 4—5, 1935
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

295 U.S. 301

55 S.Ct. 713

79 L.Ed. 1451

ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

v STATE OF FLORIDA et al.^* STATE OF FLORIDA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.

Nos. 344, 345.

Reargued and Submitted March 4—5, 1935.

Decided April 29, 1935.

[Syllabus from pages 301-303 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Carl H. Davis, of Wilmington, N.C., Robert C. Alston, of Atlanta, Ga., W. E. Kay, of Jacksonville, Fla., and Wm. Hart Sibley, of Atlanta, Ga., for Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

Mr. Henry P. Adair, of Jacksonville, Fla., for Brooks-Scanlon Corporation et al.

Mr. J. V. Norman, of Washington, D.C., for Wilson Lumber Co.

Messrs. Cary D. Landis, or Tallahassee, Fla., and August G. Gutheim, of Washington, D.C., for the State of Florida.

Mr. Theo. T. Turnbull, of Tallahassee, Fla., for Florida Railroad Commission.

The Attorney General, for the United States.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Freight charges were collected by a railroad carrier in accordance with an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission after the refusal of a United States District Court to declare the order void. Later the decree was reversed by this court without considering the evidence on the ground that the findings of the Commission were incomplete and inadequate. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. Still later the Commission upon new evidence and new findings made the same order it had made before; this court confirming its action after appropriate proceedings. Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077. The question now is whether restitution is owing from the carrier for the whole or any part of the rates collected from its customers while the first order was in force. The narrative must be expanded to bring us to an answer.

For many years, beginning with 1903, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company or its predecessor maintained a schedule of charges known as the Cummer scale for the transportation of logs in train and carload shipments within the state of Florida. In its inception this scale was established by agreement between the railroad company and one or more companies engaged in the sale of lumber. Later, in January, 1927, an order was made by the Railroad Commission of Florida whereby voluntary rates then in force, if not higher than the maximum rates approved by the Commission, were to be continued in effect as if officially prescribed. For the purpose of the present controversy, we assume that, by force of this order, the Cummer scale, even though less than compensatory, and even though voidable through appropriate action, must be deemed to have been fixed by law for intrastate transactions.

In May, 1926, the Public Service Commission of Georgia filed a complaint against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company with the Interstate Commerce Commission; the complaint being directed to the maintenance of the Cummer scale. In that proceeding the Railroad Commission of Florida intervened, and also important shippers affected by the challenged schedule. On August 2, 1928, the Interstate Commerce Commission made a decision (146 I.C.C. 717), amended and broadened on February 7, 1929, enjoining the maintenance of the schedule then in force on the ground (along with others) that the rates were so low as to result in unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. To avoid this discrimination, a new schedule was established. Florida and the intervening shippers brought suits in a federal District Court, made up of three judges in accordance with the statute (28 U.S.C. § 47 (28 USCA § 47)), to vacate the orders of the Commission and restrain enforcement. The District Court dismissed the bills. 30 F.(2d) 116; Id. (D.C.) 31 F.(2d) 580. Upon appeal to this court the decrees were reversed on the ground that the report of the Commission did not contain the necessary findings. 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. It was not enough to find that the intrastate rates were unreasonably low. 282 U.S. 194, at page 214, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. It was not enough to state the conclusion that interstate commerce was unjustly affected. 282 U.S. 194, at page 213, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291. It was necessary to find the facts supporting the conclusion, as, for instance, that the revenues of interstate commerce would probably be increased if the rates for intrastate hauls were established at a higher level. 'In the absence of such findings, we are not called upon to examine the evidence in order to resolve opposing contentions as to what it shows or to spell out and state such conclusions of fact as it may permit.' 282 U.S. 194, at page 215, 51 S.Ct. 119, 125, 75 L.Ed. 291. The Com- mission was to be free, however, to consider the facts anew and file its report in proper form. It 'is still at liberty, acting in accordance with the authority conferred by the statute, to make such determinations as the situation may require.' The mandate of reversal, giving effect to that decision, went down from this court on February 19, 1931, and on March 7, 1931 was filed in the court below.

In the interval between February 8, 1929, the effective date of the new schedule, and March 7, 1931, the railroad company had made collections in accordance with the order of the Commission, discarding the Cummer scale. Indeed, the Florida commission, bowing to the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, had made an order in January, 1929, amended in April of that year, whereby the Cummer scale was declared to be suspended so long as the decree of the District Court remained in effect and unreversed. After the mandate of reversal, the Interstate Commerce Commission listened to new evidence, made a new set of findings, and prescribed the same rate that it had put into effect before. 186 I.C.C. 157; 190 I.C.C. 588. The basis of the decision was the unjust discrimination suffered by interstate commerce through losses of revenue resulting from the local rates. Once more the order of the Commission (dated July 5, 1932, but not effective till February 25, 1933) was assailed by Florida and by shippers through suits in the District Court. The bills were dismissed ((D.C.) 4 F.Supp. 477), and this court affirmed. 292 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077. Both the findings of the Commission and the evidence back of the findings were now held to be sufficient.

In the meantime, other proceedings had been taken in the District Court with a view to giving effect more completely to the mandate of reversal. In February and March, 1931, shippers of lumber, interveners in the earlier suits, petitioned for a decree of restitution to the extent of the difference between the rates that had been paid from February 8, 1929, to March 7, 1931, under the order of the Commission, and the lower rates that would have been paid if there had been adherence to the Cummer scale. At the same time the state of Florida and its Railroad Commission petitioned for like relief in behalf of other shippers and consignees. An answer having been filed by the railroad company, the District Court appointed a master to take evidence and report. After intermediate proceedings which it is unnecessary to summarize, the master made a final report in March, 1933, recommending a decree of restitution for part, but only part, of the overcharges claimed. He found that the Cummer scale was unjust and noncompensatory, and, if enforced against the will of the carrier, would result in confiscation. He found that for the years in controversy a substituted rate should be established, and established at such a figure as would avoid unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. He found that this end could be attained by the adoption of a schedule higher than the Cummer scale but lower than the one promulgated by the Commission as operative thereafter. He advised restitution in the sum of $99,941.77, which was 34 per cent. of the amount ($293,946.38) demanded by the claimants. The District Court confirmed the report; one judge dissenting. The prevailing opinion gives expression to the hesitation of the court in thus departing from the findings of the federal Commission. It observes, however, that there would be hardship to shippers and consignees in a sharp and sudden change of rates directed to a business in which freight charges are so large a part of the value of the product. 'If the ideal rates be those fixed by the Commission, the ideal might with reason and justice have been approached less precipitately.' The case is here on cross-appeals. Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 39 S.Ct. 237, 63 L.Ed. 517; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 49 S.Ct. 492, 73 L.Ed. 954. In No. 344, the appellant is the railroad company which declares itself aggrieved because restitution was not denied altogether. In No. 345, the appellants are the state of Florida and intervening shippers, who declare themselves aggrieved because restitution was not awarded on the basis of the Cummer scale.

Decisions of this court have given recognition to the rule as one of general application that what has been lost to a litigant under the compulsion of a judgment shall be restored thereafter, in the event of a reversal, by the litigants opposed to him, the beneficiaries of the error. Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., supra; Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151; Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co., 257 U.S. 6, 42 S.Ct. 2, 66 L.Ed. 101; cf. Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963, 15 L.R.A. 588, 28 Am.St.Rep. 589. Indeed, the concept of compulsion has been extended to cases where the error of the decree was one of inaction rather than action, as where a court has failed to set aside the order of a commission or other administrative body; the constraint of the order being imputed in such circumstances to the refusal of the court to supply a corrective remedy....