Ford v. Moore
Decision Date | 02 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 01-10317.,01-10317. |
Citation | 296 F.3d 1035 |
Parties | Michael Anthony FORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael W. MOORE, Robert A. Butterworth, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Robert S. Tulin, Plant City, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Patricia Ann McCarthy, Office of Atty. Gen./Dept. of Legal Affairs, Michele J. Taylor, Florida Atty. Gen., Tampa, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK,* District Judge.
This case involves the habeas corpus time limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 ( ). AEDPA sets forth a one-year statute of limitations for a prisoner to apply for federal habeas relief from the judgment of a state court. The limitations period is tolled, however, while a properly filed state post-conviction petition or other collateral review attacking the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. At issue in this matter is whether AEDPA's statute of limitations is tolled when a state collateral attack does not present a federally cognizable claim. Upon review, we conclude the limitations period is tolled in such circumstances.
On or about July 17, 2000, Appellant Michael Anthony Ford filed a federal habeas petition challenging his State of Florida conviction. In his petition, Appellant alleged the following facts:
On January 7, 1994, Appellant was convicted of attempted robbery with a firearm and attempted first degree murder with a firearm in Polk County, Florida. Appellant was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment for the attempted robbery conviction and 27 years' imprisonment for the attempted murder conviction. The sentences were to run consecutively.
Following his convictions, Appellant filed a direct appeal in the Florida state courts. Appellant's conviction was affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeals for the State of Florida on August 18, 1995.
After exhausting his right to direct appeal, Appellant commenced collateral challenges to his conviction and sentence. On November 15, 1995, Appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.1 In his motion, Appellant argued his sentence was unconstitutional because it exceeded statutory limitations, he was denied the right to testify on his own behalf, and he received ineffective assistance from counsel. The motion was denied on November 26, 1996. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals for the State of Florida affirmed. Although Appellant sought rehearing, his request was denied and the mandate issued on November 2, 1998.
Following denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for relief, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800.2 The Rule 3.800 motion was filed on March 9, 1999. In his motion, Appellant alleged his sentence was unconstitutional because it exceeded statutory limitations. The motion was denied on May 10, 1999. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals for the State of Florida affirmed. Its mandate was issued on November 23, 1999.
On July 12, 2000, Appellant executed a pro se petition in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, Appellant raised the same claims presented in his earlier Rule 3.850 motion.3 The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. Although the district court determined AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), was tolled during the pendency of Appellant's Rule 3.850 motion the court concluded the statute of limitations was not likewise tolled during the pendency of Appellant's Rule 3.800 motion because the Rule 3.800 motion did not present a federally cognizable claim. Appellant timely filed this appeal.
We review de novo a district court's determination that a petition for federal habeas corpus relief is time-barred under section 2244(d). Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000).
Under AEDPA, a prisoner in state custody generally must apply for a federal writ of habeas corpus within one year after the judgment of the state court becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000). The one-year limitations period, however, is tolled while "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." Id. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, Appellant pursued both direct and collateral review in state court. The parties agree the one-year limitations period was tolled during Appellant's direct appeal and his Rule 3.850 collateral challenge. At issue is whether the statute of limitations also was tolled during Appellant's Rule 3.800 collateral challenge. If the time Appellant's Rule 3.800 motion was pending qualifies for tolling under AEDPA, Appellant's federal habeas petition was timely; otherwise it was not.
The State of Florida4 concedes Appellant's Rule 3.800 motion was "properly filed" as required by AEDPA's tolling provision. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 363-64, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000).5 The State also concedes Appellant's Rule 3.800 motion constituted an application for collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment. Nevertheless, the State asserts the Rule 3.800 motion did not toll AEDPA's statute of limitations because the action did not contain a federally cognizable claim.6 In resolving this issue, we begin by scrutinizing the language of AEDPA's tolling provision. Then, we examine the cases discussing the provision.
As with any question of statutory interpretation, we begin by examining the text of the statute to determine whether its meaning is clear. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 760, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2172, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989); United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir.1999). "In construing a statute we must begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself." United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc) (quoting Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir.1997)). We do this because we "presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said." Steele, 147 F.3d at 1318.
The relevant tolling provision of AEDPA provides: "The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The phrase "judgment or claim" is not defined by the statute, but its meaning is not ambiguous.
As is apparent from the full text of section 2244(d), the term "judgment" is distinct from the term "claim." Section 2244(d)(1), which precedes the tolling provision, states: "A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (emphasis added). Then, in sections 2244(d)(1)(A) and (D), the limitations period is statutorily prescribed to run from either "the date on which the judgment became final" or "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Reading the text of section 2244(d) in its entirety, it is clear Congress understood the ordinary meaning of the term "judgment," and that such term was not synonymous with "claim."
The language of the statute expressly provides tolling for any properly filed collateral challenge relating to a judgment. By its own terms, the statute does not limit tolling solely to collateral attacks which contain federally cognizable claims. Rather, the statute specifically provides tolling for any post-conviction petition for relief with respect to the pertinent judgment. Construing AEDPA's tolling provision to apply only to state challenges involving a federal claim renders the term "judgment" superfluous. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir.2001) (); United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.1991) (). To give effect to the clear language of the statute, we must conclude AEDPA's statute of limitations is tolled while a state post-conviction petition or other collateral review attacking the pertinent judgment is pending regardless of whether the basis of the attack is grounded in federal or state law.
Since its enactment in 1996, only three circuits have directly addressed the issue of whether AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state post-conviction petition or other application for collateral review that does not contain a federally cognizable claim.7 The Sixth Circuit, relying primarily on the federal habeas exhaustion provision and principles of comity, concluded AEDPA's limitations period is tolled only if a prisoner includes in his state post-conviction petition a federal or constitutional law issue which also is raised in his federal habeas petition. See Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.1999). The...
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