296 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2002), 01-4831, U.S. v. Fareed

• Citation: 296 F.3d 243
• Party Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jameel Asmar FAREED, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit Albert Monte Reid, Defendant-Appellant.
• Case Date: July 10, 2002
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

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296 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2002)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jameel Asmar FAREED, Defendant-Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Albert Monte Reid, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 01-4831, 01-4837.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

July 10, 2002.

Argued May 9, 2002.

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ARGUED:

William Stimson Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Thomas Norman Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellants.

Lawrence Patrick Auld, Office of the United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Paul A. Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINS wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ joined.

OPINION

WILKINS, Circuit Judge.

Jameel Asmar Fareed and Albert Monte Reid (collectively, "Appellants") contend that the district court lacked authority to impose additional supervised release terms to follow the service of prison sentences that resulted from Appellants' violation of conditions of previously imposed supervised release terms. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Fareed pled guilty in 1992 to one count of possession with the intent to distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001). He was sentenced to 97 months imprisonment and four years of supervised release, and his supervised release term began on March 27, 1999. He was subsequently convicted in North Carolina Superior Court for attempting to traffic in cocaine and maintaining a place for controlled substances. Because Fareed committed these offenses during his supervised release term, the probation office sought revocation of his supervised release.

Reid pled guilty in 1993 to one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999). He was sentenced to 75 months imprisonment and five years supervised release, and his supervised release term began on May 18, 1998. He was subsequently convicted in North Carolina Superior Court on five counts of maintaining a place for controlled substances and five counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. As was the case with Fareed, because these offenses occurred during his

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supervised release term, the probation office sought revocation of his supervised release.

The district court conducted a hearing for both Appellants and revoked their respective supervised release terms under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1988), which requires that a defendant found to have possessed a controlled substance shall have his supervised release term terminated and shall receive a prison sentence of not less than one-third of the length of the supervised release term. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (governing imposition and modification of supervised release terms). The district court sentenced each Appellant to 18 months in prison.¹ Additionally, over Appellants' objections, the court imposed a 30-month supervised release term on each. Appellants argued that the district court lacked authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), as that statute existed at the time they committed their federal offenses in 1992, to impose additional supervised release terms following the prison terms. The district court agreed that the plain language of § 3583(g) did not authorize imposition of additional supervised release terms but concluded that Congress made a "mistake" in wording § 3583(g) as it did. J.A. 32.

II.

We review legal issues concerning sentences de novo. See United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989). Prior to its 1994 amendment, § 3583 provided several situations in which a supervised release term could be altered, three of which are relevant here.² Under § 3583(e)(1), courts were authorized in certain circumstances to "terminate" a supervised release term "and discharge the person released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release." And, under § 3583(e)(3), courts were authorized to "revoke" a supervised release term and to "require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release" if the person was found to have violated a condition of his supervised release. Finally, under § 3583(g), if the violator was found to have possessed a controlled substance, the court was required to "terminate" the supervised release term and "require the defendant to serve in prison not less than one-third of the term of supervised release."

Appellants argue that the district court exceeded its authority when it imposed supervised release terms to follow their new prison terms. The parties agree that Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), answers the question of whether a defendant

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sentenced under § 3583(g)³ may receive an additional term of supervised release, so it is on that opinion that we focus our attention. In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered whether § 3583(e)(3) authorized imposition of an additional supervised release term upon revocation of the initial term. Contrasting the word "revoke," as used in (e)(3), with "terminate,"...