U.S. v. Chavis
| Decision Date | 22 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-3791.,00-3791. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeremy Lee CHAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Michael J. Burns (briefed), Asst. U.S. Attorney, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Larry Wayne Thomas (briefed), Thomas & Dixon, Columbus, OH, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: DAUGHTREY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; SIMPSON, District Judge.*
The defendant, Jeremy Chavis, appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of causing another person to make false statements to a federally licensed firearms dealer and one count of simple possession of in excess of five grams of cocaine base. On appeal, Chavis contends: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt as to the drug offense, (2) that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the two counts of conviction pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), (3) that the district court erred in determining Chavis's relevant conduct for the purposes of sentencing, and (4) that the district court erred in refusing to apply a downward adjustment to Chavis's sentence for his partial acceptance of responsibility for the firearms charge. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
On August 19, 1999, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against the defendant, Jeremy Chavis. Count One charged Chavis with causing another person to make a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer on or about September 13, 1997, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count Two charged Chavis with unlawfully possessing in excess of five grams of cocaine base with the intent to distribute on or about June 9, 1999, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
On October 7, 1999, Chavis filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) to sever the counts in the indictment. Oral argument was held on the motion on October 25, 1999. The court denied the motion at that time, and the case proceeded to a consolidated trial on both counts.1
At Chavis's trial, Lorrie Chmielewski testified that Chavis and Donald Langbein, Chavis's cousin, asked her to purchase firearms for them in September of 1997. Chavis, who was only eighteen years old at the time, was not old enough to purchase a handgun. Chavis requested that Chmielewski purchase the guns and fill out the necessary background check because she was over twenty-one years old and did not have any felony convictions.
According to Chmielewski, on September 6, 1997, Chavis drove to a gun store in Columbus with Chmielewski, Langbein, and Chavis's girlfriend. Chmielewski testified that Chavis supplied her with some crack cocaine before driving to the gun store. At the store, Chavis and Langbein picked out the guns that they wanted. Chmielewski filled out the required background-check form, using her own name, date of birth, address, and social security number. Chmielewski also paid a deposit for the guns with money supplied by Chavis and Langbein. Chmielewski told the sales person at the store that she was buying the guns for herself. She was given a receipt for the guns, which she gave to Chavis.
After the background check was completed, Chmielewski returned to the gun store with Chavis, Langbein, and Chavis's uncle. Chmielewski filled out a Firearms Transaction Record at that time, on which Chmielewski affirmed that she was the actual buyer of the guns. Chmielewski carried the guns out of the store and gave them to Chavis and Langbein upon arriving at Chavis's grandmother's house. Chmielewski stated that she received a quantity of crack cocaine from Langbein at that time in exchange for her services.
Nearly two years later, on June 9, 1999, Columbus Police Officer Jeremy Ehrenborg was conducting a bicycle patrol of a public housing complex in Columbus. During his patrol, Ehrenborg saw Chavis standing behind a short brick wall. According to Officer Ehrenborg, he was not looking for Chavis on that night. Ehrenborg testified that when Chavis noticed him approaching, Chavis threw his arms back and dropped a small bag. Ehrenborg testified that he immediately went to pick up the bag, which he found about ten feet from Chavis, and noticed that it contained a substance resembling crack cocaine.
At Chavis's trial, Heather Crock, a criminologist at the Columbus police crime laboratory, testified regarding her examination of the substance recovered during the arrest. Crock stated that the substance was crack cocaine and that it weighed 5.1 grams at the time she examined it. At the time of trial, however, the substance weighed only 4.13 grams. Crock testified that such a loss of weight over time was not abnormal. She stated that weight loss could be attributed to evaporation of water contained in the substance. Crock also testified that a small portion of the material was destroyed as a result of testing. Special Agent Daniel Ozbolt, of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, testified at Chavis's trial that a quantity of 5.1 grams suggested that the crack was intended for distribution, rather than personal use.
Chavis testified in his own defense. He admitted to asking Chmielewski illegally to purchase a handgun for him. Chavis denied supplying Chmielewski with any crack cocaine, however. He testified that he gave Chmielewski only the money for the gun and that it was Langbein who gave her the crack cocaine. Chavis also denied possessing a bag of crack cocaine at the time of his arrest by Officer Ehrenborg. Chavis stated that the area where he was arrested was located near a house where crack cocaine was sold, and that people selling or purchasing drugs frequently walk through the area where he was standing that night.
Judith Griffith also testified for the defense. She stated that she was standing with Chavis on the night he was arrested by Officer Ehrenborg. Griffith stated that there were several other people in the same general area. According to Griffith, the police searched the area with a flashlight after handcuffing Chavis and placing him in a police car. Griffith testified that the police found the bag of crack cocaine on the ground some distance from where she and Chavis had been standing.
Chavis made a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case, and renewed the motion at the close of all the evidence. On both occasions, the motion was denied. Chavis also requested an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple possession of five grams of crack cocaine. Chavis did not renew his motion to sever the counts at the conclusion of the evidence. The jury found Chavis guilty of the firearms count and simple possession of in excess of five grams of cocaine base. Chavis was acquitted of possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute.
At sentencing, Chavis argued that his offense level should be based only on the handgun he purchased for himself and not the handgun purchased by Langbein. The court overruled this objection, concluding that both handgun purchases were reasonably foreseeable results of Chavis's and Langbein's jointly undertaken criminal activity. Chavis also argued that he should receive a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The court overruled this objection because, although Chavis admitted to his participation in illegally purchasing a handgun, he denied possessing crack cocaine and denied his responsibility for one of the handguns. The court then determined that Chavis's total offense level should be set at twenty-seven, and that his criminal history category was III. Based upon this determination, the court sentenced Chavis to eighty-seven months' imprisonment. Chavis filed a timely notice of appeal.
Chavis first contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict that he possessed in excess of five grams of crack cocaine. Chavis argues that a jury could not have found a quantity of more than five grams in light of the fact that the cocaine base weighed only 4.13 grams at the time of trial. Chavis also claims that the testimony of Crock was too inconsistent and speculative to support the jury's verdict.
"This court will reverse a judgment for insufficiency of evidence only if this judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence upon the record as a whole...." United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir.1992) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that a jury verdict must be upheld if, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). "In addressing sufficiency of the evidence questions, this Court has long declined to weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury." United States v. Ferguson, 23 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 259, 130 L.Ed.2d 179 (1994). This standard places a "very heavy burden" upon a defendant making a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 424 (6th Cir.2000).
Applying this standard, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Chavis of possessing in excess of five grams of cocaine base. Crock testified that she weighed the cocaine base found by Officer Ehrenborg and determined its weight to be 5.1 grams at the time of her analysis. Crock stated that she believed that measurement to be accurate to a reasonable scientific certainty. Sh...
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