296 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio 1973), 72-673, Stewart v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections

Docket Nº72-673.
Citation296 N.E.2d 676, 34 Ohio St.2d 129
Opinion JudgeC. WILLIAM O'NEILL, Chief Justice. O'NEILL, C.J.
Party NameSTEWART et al., Appellants, v. TRUMBULL COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellees.
AttorneyFrank R. Bodor, and Calvin J. Woodward, Warren, for appellants., John K. Mahaney, John L. Pogue and John T. Milligan, Warren, for appellees. Mr. Frank R. Bodor and Mr. Calvin J. Woodward, for appellants., Mr. John K. Mahaney, Mr. John L. Pogue and Mr. John T. Milligan, for appellees.
Judge PanelHERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE, WILLIAM B. BROWN qne PAUL W. BROWN, JJ., concur.
Case DateMay 23, 1973
CourtSupreme Court of Ohio

Page 676

296 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio 1973)

34 Ohio St.2d 129

STEWART et al., Appellants,

v.

TRUMBULL COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellees.

No. 72-673.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 23, 1973

Page 677

Syllabus by the Court

The privilege of local option for beer under R.C. 4305.14, and for intoxicating liquors under R.C. 4301.32, extends to any two or more contiguous precincts within a municipal corporation.

On August 5, 1970, a group of citizens filed with appellee board of elections local option petitions for the purpose of having electors of Ward 5, Precincts H and J, and Ward 6, Precincts A and B, in the city of Warren, Ohio, vote in the November 1970 general election upon whether to permit the sale of beer and intoxicating liquors within the district comprised of those precincts.

On August 28, 1970, appellants, Laura J. Stewart and Robert L. Stewart, as qualified electors, filed a written protest to the local option petitions with the appellee board on their own behalf and on behalf of various tavern owners in the area. In a hearing on the protest, appellants presented evidence respecting the character of the district.

On October 14, 1970, the board denied the appellants' protest and validated the petitions. Appellants appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which refused to enjoin the placing of the issue on the ballot, but did temporarily enjoin certification of the balloting results. The balloting resulted [34 Ohio St.2d 130] in a dry vote. Ultimately, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed the board's decision.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Further facts necessary to the decision of this appeal are discussed in the opinion.

Frank R. Bodor, and Calvin J. Woodward, Warren, for appellants.

John K. Mahaney, John L. Pogue and John T. Milligan, Warren, for appellees.

C. WILLIAM O'NEILL, Chief Justice.

Appellants cite two propositions of law to this court. In the first, appellants argue that the terms 'residence district,' as used in R.C. 4301.32, and 'residential district,' as used in R.C. 4305.14, limit the local option privilege to districts comprised of two or more contiguous precincts which are primarily residential in character. They argue that more than 50 percent of the land area in each precinct comprising the district must be devoted to residential purposes.

In the second, appellants argue that R.C. 4301.32(B), and paragraphs one and two of R.C. 4305.14 '* * * are unconstitutional on the grounds that the statute (sic) is void of legislative enactment lacking adequate standards or guidelines for determining uniformly the meaning of a residential district.'

This court has not previously interpreted the terms 'residence district' or 'residential district,' as they are used in R.C. 4301.32 and 4305.14. In interpreting those terms, the court must apply the ordinary principles of statutory construction in order to ascertain the legislative intent. That intent is primarily determined from the language of the statute itself. See, e. g., Katz v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 232, 141 N.E.2d 294. If the statute is determined to be ambiguous, the Revised [34 Ohio St.2d 131] Code provides additional tests for determining legislative intent. See R.C. 1.47 and 1.49.

Page 678

R.C. 4301.32 provides:

'The privilege of local option as to the sale of intoxicating liquors is hereby conferred upon the electors of the following districts:

'(A) A municipal corporation;

'(B) A residence district in a municipal corporation consisting of two or more contiguous election precincts, as defined by the petition...

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43 practice notes
  • 573 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio 1991), 90-1331, Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • July 10, 1991
    ...legislative intent, courts rely upon ordinary principles of statutory construction. Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 63 O.O.2d 227, 227-228, 296 N.E.2d 676, 677. Former R.C. 4511.19(B) and the implied consent statute were enacted in 1968 under Am.Sub......
  • 532 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1988), 87AP-1041, Hamilton v. Hamilton
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals of Ohio
    • August 2, 1988
    ...be assumed or presumed to have used the words of a statute advisedly. Vance, supra; Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 63 O.O.2d 227, 228, 296 N.E.2d 676, 677; Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 236-237, 36 O.O. 554, 556-557, 78 N.E.2d 370,......
  • 362 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 1977), 76-788, State v. Singer
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • May 18, 1977
    ...of the statute itself in attempting to ascertain the legislative intent. See Stewart v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections, (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676. In examining the actual language of a statute, words should be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning unless t......
  • 414 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio 1980), 80-8, Vance v. St. Vincent Hospital and Medical Center
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • November 26, 1980
    ...Legislative intent is primarily determined from the language of the statute itself. Stewart v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676. The General Assembly must be assumed or presumed to have used the words of a statute advisedly. Wachendorf v. Shave......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
43 cases
  • 573 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio 1991), 90-1331, Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • July 10, 1991
    ...legislative intent, courts rely upon ordinary principles of statutory construction. Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 63 O.O.2d 227, 227-228, 296 N.E.2d 676, 677. Former R.C. 4511.19(B) and the implied consent statute were enacted in 1968 under Am.Sub......
  • 532 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1988), 87AP-1041, Hamilton v. Hamilton
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals of Ohio
    • August 2, 1988
    ...be assumed or presumed to have used the words of a statute advisedly. Vance, supra; Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 63 O.O.2d 227, 228, 296 N.E.2d 676, 677; Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 236-237, 36 O.O. 554, 556-557, 78 N.E.2d 370,......
  • 362 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 1977), 76-788, State v. Singer
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • May 18, 1977
    ...of the statute itself in attempting to ascertain the legislative intent. See Stewart v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections, (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676. In examining the actual language of a statute, words should be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning unless t......
  • 414 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio 1980), 80-8, Vance v. St. Vincent Hospital and Medical Center
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • November 26, 1980
    ...Legislative intent is primarily determined from the language of the statute itself. Stewart v. Trumbull County Bd. of Elections (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676. The General Assembly must be assumed or presumed to have used the words of a statute advisedly. Wachendorf v. Shave......
  • Request a trial to view additional results