State v. Ashdown, 8456
| Citation | 296 P.2d 726,5 Utah 2d 59 |
| Decision Date | 30 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 8456,8456 |
| Parties | d 59 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Milda Hopkins ASHDOWN, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Utah |
J. Vernon Erickson, Richfield, for appellant.
E. R. Callister, Atty. Gen., Walter L. Budge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Milda Hopkins Ashdown was found guilty of murder in the first degree in the death of her husband, Ray Ashdown, by a jury which recommended life imprisonment. She appeals from the judgment entered in accordance with that verdict.
On July 5, 1955, Dr. R. G. Williams of Cedar City, Utah, received an emergency call from Mrs. Ashdown to attend her husband. When the doctor arrived, Mr. Ashdown was in a convulsive state and told the doctor that he had taken some bittertasting lemon juice about a half-hour before. He died immediately after the doctor's arrival and the doctor later conducted an autopsy, sending certain specimens to the state chemist for analysis. According to the chemist's report, the stomach contents when analyzed showed the presence of strychnine.
After the funeral of Ray Ashdown on July 9, Mrs. Ashdown was taken from the cemetery where her husband was buried to the City and County Building for questioning by the sheriff, his deputies, and the district attorney. Although she was accompanied to the building by her sister, she was questioned alone for a period of five and one-half hours. At that time, no complaint had been filed against her. Her father and an uncle appeared during the time of the questioning and requested that she be given an attorney or that they be allowed to enter the room where she was questioned. They were denied admittance and assured by a deputy that there was an attorney with her who would apprise her of her constitutional rights. After about four or more hours of questioning, Mrs. Ashdown confessed that she had put strychnine in lemon juice and had given it to her husband to drink. She then made a request for the first time for an attorney and was told by the men present that it was unnecessary at that point because the only thing she hadn't told them was where she had obtained the poison. Thereafter, she related where she had obtained it and on the following day, she signed a written confession.
The trial court ruled that any evidence secured after she had asked for counsel was inadmissible and the written confession was not introduced for consideration by the jury.
She here contends that the oral confession was obtained from her by means of coercion, duress, and promises of immunity and should not have been admitted. She charges that her limited education and hysterical condition and the length of time she was held without counsel or the advice of her family caused her to give evidence against herself which she would not have otherwise given. Further, she was influenced by the statements of the district attorney to the effect that he had been cleared of charges of murder in Europe through the efforts of investigating officials.
The trial court found that the defendant was advised of her constitutional rights before she made the statements of confession; that she did not ask for an attorney until after making those statements; that there were no threats nor promises of immunity, except that the district attorney informed her that if poison had been given by mistake it might make a difference between a prosecution for murder and manslaughter, and informed the defendant of the penalties for the two offenses; and that the method of examination and circumstances were not severe enough to amount to compulsion as that is contemplated by the constitutional provisions which provide that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. After ruling that the oral confession was admissible, the trial court submitted the issue of coercion, as affecting credibility, to the jury.
Although the burden of proof as to the voluntariness of the confession lies with the party seeking to use it as evidence, i. e., the prosecution, after the trial court has decided from the evidence that the confession was voluntarily made, the appellate court will not disturb that finding in the absence of a showing of abuse of its discretion where there is substantial evidence from which it could reasonably so find. State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542; III Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., Sec. 862. Some of the points upon which appellant relies as demonstrating coercion are refuted by the facts and uncontradicted evidence: (1) She complains that she did not have benefit of counsel at the time she made her confession. Ordinarily, a confession is not rendered inadmissible merely because it was made by the accused without counsel, Mares v. Hill, 118 Utah 484, 222 P.2d 811; State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289; and she made no request for counsel until after she had made the confession here admitted for the jury's consideration. She did request an attorney immediately after confession and the trial court carefully excluded all statements, including her written confession, made after that time. (2) She contends that she was not properly informed of her privilege against self-incrimination. Although she took the stand for the limited purpose of testifying as to circumstances surrounding her confession, she offered no evidence to dispute the testimony of the sheriff and his deputies that she was so informed within one-half hour of the beginning of the questioning, some four hours before she made any incriminating admissions. (3) She maintains that prolonged questioning without food or rest may have had the effect of limiting her ability to give a voluntary confession. The evidence shows that she was questioned from 4:00 p. m. until about 9:30 p. m. and that she gave her confession within the last hour. Her condition was not uncomfortable to the point of coercion during the questioning, although the weather was hot; the questioning was carried on by men whom she knew and who permitted her to discuss at will her family affairs much of the time. Under these circumstances, we do not feel that questioning for a period of five and one-half hours would tend to break her will or induce her to confess to a crime which she did not commit.
(4) Appellant is a person of limited education and was naturally emotionally upset at the time of the questioning. She had come to the court room immediately from the funeral and interment of her husband; there is some evidence that she was 'crying,' 'moaning,' and 'sobbing' intermittently during the questioning. Certainly the intelligence, character, and situation of the accused at the time of the confession is an important consideration. Manifestly, the will of a person who is of tender age or of weak intellect may be more easily overcome than that of one who is more mature or more intelligent. This, alone, however, will not render a confession inadmissible and if the confession was obtained in a manner and by such methods as are consistent with the proper detection of crime and determination of guilt, then our duty is to sustain the trial court. State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861. Therefore, this aspect of her confession should be considered in relation to the point which we consider the most difficult; that is, whether the statements of the district attorney were such as to imply a promise of immunity from prosecution or otherwise coerce the accused into confessing.
(5) The deputy sheriff, who was present at the questioning testified:
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Mrs. Ashdown took the stand for the purpose of giving testimony on this point only. She did not testify to any threats or third degree methods used upon her, but stated:
'A. Well, he said 'If you will tell us what happened, why it will go a lot easier on you.' He says 'I confessed and it was a lot easier on me; if I hadn't confessed I might not gotten off, I might have been facing the firing squad now."
As a result of the testimony of these two witnesses, the court called the district attorney, Patrick Fenton, as its own witness and questioned him as follows:
'Q. * * * Referring to the testimony of the sheriff and Deputy Wells, regarding conversations with the defendant in the courtroom at the City & County Building in the afternoon or evening of the 9th of July, there was some statement...
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Townes v. State
...was of tender age or weak intellect will not alone render the confession inadmissible in evidence as involuntary. State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 [ (1956) ]. Evidence tending to show a defendant's weak mentality, feeblemindedness, and mental stress does not affect the admissibi......
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McWhorter v. State
...was of tender age or weak intellect will not alone render the confession inadmissible in evidence as involuntary. State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 [1956], affirmed, 357 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 1354, 2 L.Ed.2d 1443 Ex parte Brown, 540 So.2d 740, 744 (Ala. 1989). See also Jackson v. St......
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...influences or promises' and still be deemed to be voluntary.") (citing State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981)); State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956), cert. granted, 353 U.S. 981, 77 S.Ct. 1286, 1 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 1354, 2 L.Ed.2d 1443 (......
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JONES v. State of Ala.
...was of tender age or weak intellect will not alone render the confession inadmissible in evidence as involuntary. State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah.2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 [1956], affirmed, 357 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 1354, 2 L.Ed.2d 1443 "Ex parte Brown, 540 So.2d 740, 744 (Ala.1989). See also Jackson v. St......