Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles

Citation80 L.Ed. 9,56 S.Ct. 23,296 U.S. 10
Decision Date11 November 1935
Docket NumberNo. 34,34
PartiesBORAX CONSOLIDATED, Limited, et al. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES. *
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

[Syllabus from pages 10-12 intentionally omitted] Messrs. A. W. Ashburn and Gurney E. Newlin, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners.

Mr. Loren A. Butts, of Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The city of Los Angeles brought this suit to quiet title to land claimed to be tideland of Mormon Island situated in the inner bay of San Pedro now known as Los Angeles Harbor. The city asserted title under a legislative grant by the state. St. Cal. 1911, p. 1256; 1917, p. 159.1 Petitioners claimed under a pre-emption patent issued by the United States on December 30, 1881, to one William Banning. The District Court entered a decree, upon findings, dismissing the complaint upon the merits and adjudging that petitioner, Borax Consolidated, Limited, was the owner in fee simple and entitled to the possession of the property. 5 Fed.Supp. 281. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree. 74 F.(2d) 901. Because of the importance of the questions presented, and of an asserted conflict with decisions of this Court, we granted certiorari, June 3, 1935.

In May, 1880, one W. H. Norway, a deputy surveyor, acting under a contract with the Surveyor General of the United States for California, made a survey of Mormon Island. The surveyor's field notes and the corresponding plat of the island were approved by the Surveyor General and were returned to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The latter, having found the survey to be correct, authorized the filing of the plat. The land which the patent to Banning purported to convey was described by reference to that plat as follows: 'Lot numbered one, of section eight, in township five south, of range thirteen west of San Bernardino Meridian, in California, containing eighteen acres, and eighty-eight hundredths of an acre, according to the Official Plat of the Survey of the said Lands, returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General.'

The District Court found that the boundaries of 'lot one,' as thus conveyed, were those shown by the plat and field notes of the survey; that all the lands described in the complaint were embraced within that lot; and that no portion of the lot was or had been tideland or situated below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean or of Los Angeles Harbor. The District Court held that the complaint was a collateral, and hence unwarranted, attack upon the survey, the plat, and the patent; that the action of the General Land Office involved determinations of questions of fact which were within its jurisdiction and were specially committed to it by law for decision; and that its determinations, including that of the correctness of the survey, were final and were binding upon the state of California and the city of Los Angeles, as well as upon the United States.

The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this view as to the conclusiveness of the survey and the patent. The court held that the federal government had neither the power nor the intention to convey tideland to Banning, and that his rights were limited to the upland. The court also regarded the lines shown on the plat as being meander lines and the boundary line of the land conveyed as the shore line of Mormon Island. The court declined to pass upon petitioners' claim of estoppel in pais and by judgment upon the ground that the question was not presented to or considered by the trial court, and was also of the opinion that the various questions raised as to the failure of the city to allege and prove the boundary line of the island were important only from the standpoint of the new trial which the court directed. 74 F.(2d) 901, page 904. For the guidance of the trial court the Court of Appeals laid down the following rule: The 'mean high tide line' was to be taken as the boundary between the land conveyed and the tideland belonging to the State of California, and in the interest of certainty the court directed that 'an average for 18.6 years should be determined as near as possible by observation or calculation.' 74 F.(2d) 901, pages 906, 907.

Petitioners contest these rulings of the Court of Appeals. With respect to the ascertainment of the shore line, they insist that the court erred in taking the 'mean high-tide line' and in rejecting 'neap tides' as the criterion for ordinary highwater mark.

1. The controversy is limited by settled principles governing the title to tidelands. The soils under tidewaters within the original states were reserved to them respectively, and the states since admitted to the Union have the same sovereignty and jurisdiction in relation to such lands within their borders as the original states possessed. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410, 10 L.Ed. 997; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229, 230, 11 L.Ed. 565; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471, 478, 13 L.Ed. 220; Weber v. State Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65, 66, 21 L.Ed. 798; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 15, 26, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331. This doctrine applies to tidelands in California. Weber v. State Harbor Commissioners, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U.S. 1, pages 29, 30, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331; United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 404, 405, 23 S.Ct. 606, 47 L.Ed. 865. Upon the acquisition of the territory from Mexico, the United States acquired the title to tidelands equally with the title to upland, but held the former only in trust for the future states that might be erected out of that territory. Knight v. United Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 183, 12 S.Ct. 258, 35 L.Ed. 974. There is the established qualification that this principle is not applicable to lands which had previously been granted by Mexico to other parties or subjected to trusts which required a different disposition—a limitation resulting from the duty resting upon the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (9 Stat. 922), and also under principles of international law, to protect all rights of property which had emanated from the Mexican government prior to the treaty. San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 671, 11 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed. 1096; Knight v. United Land Association, supra, Shively v. Bowlby, supra. That limitation is not applicable here, as it is not contended that Mormon Island was included in any earlier grant. See De Guyer v. Banning, 167 U.S. 723, 17 S.Ct. 937, 42 L.Ed. 340.

It follows that if the land in question was tideland, the title passed to California at the time of her admission to the Union in 1850. That the federal government had no power to convey tidelands, which had thus vested in a state, was early determined. Pollard v. Hagan, supra; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, supra. In those cases, involving tidelands in Alabama, the plaintiffs claimed title under an inchoate Spanish Grant of 1809, an act of Congress confirming that title, passed July 2, 1836, and a patent from the United States, dated March 15, 1837. The Court held that the lands, found to be tidelands, had passed to Alabama at the time of her admission to the Union in 1819, that the Spanish grant had been ineffective, and that the confirming act of Congress and the patent conveyed no title. The Court said that: 'The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy.' Pollard v. Hagan, supra. See, also, Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U.S. 1, at pages 27, 28, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331; Mobile Transportation Company v. Mobile, 187 U.S. 479, 490, 23 S.Ct. 170, 47 L.Ed. 266; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 260, 261, 33 S.Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 820, Ann.Cas. 1913E, 710.

2. As to the land in suit, petitioners contend that the General Land Office had authority to determine the location of the boundary between upland and tideland and did determine it through the survey in 1880 and the consequent patent to Banning, and that this determination is conclusive against collateral attack; in short, that the land in controversy has been determined by competent authority not to be tideland and that the question is not open to re-examination. Petitioners thus invoke the rule that 'the power to make and correct surveys belongs to the political department of the government and that, whilst the lands are subject to the supervision of the General Land Office, the decisions of that bureau in all such cases, like that of other special tribunals upon matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, are unassailable by the courts, except by a direct proceeding.' R.S., §§ 453, 2395—2398, 2478, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 751 754, 1201 (43 USCA §§ 2, 751—754, 1201); Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691, 698, 699, 9 S.Ct. 203, 32 L.Ed. 566; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U.S. 573, 585, 11 S.Ct. 380, 34 L.Ed. 1063; Knight v. United Land Association, supra; Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U.S. 240, 250, 252, 15 S.Ct. 822, 39 L.Ed. 966; Russell v. Maxwell Land-Grant Company, 158 U.S. 253, 256, 15 S.Ct. 827, 39 L.Ed. 971; United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 487, 488, 41 S.Ct. 378, 65 L.Ed. 736.

But this rule proceeds upon the assumption that the matter determined is within the jurisdiction of the Land Department. Cragin v. Powell, supra. So far as pertinent here, the jurisdiction of the Land Department extended only to 'the public lands of the United States.' The patent to Banning was issued under the pre-emption laws which expressly related to lands 'belonging to the United States.' Rev. St. §§ 2257, 2259. Obviously these laws had no application to lands which belonged to the states. Specifically the term 'public lands' did not include tidelands. Mann v. Tacoma Land Company, 153 U.S. 273, 284, 14 S.Ct. 820, 38 L.Ed. 714. 'The words 'public lands' are habitually...

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