White v. Poor

Citation296 U.S. 98,80 L.Ed. 80,56 S.Ct. 66
Decision Date11 November 1935
Docket NumberNo. 36,36
PartiesWHITE, Former Collector of Internal Revenue, v. POOR et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

The

Attorney General and Mr. David E. Hudson, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Messrs. Alexander Wheeler and Harry L. Sampson, both of Boston, Mass., for respondents.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents questions similar to those in Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68, 80 L.Ed. 76, No. 14.

In 1919, Adelaide J. Sargent conveyed property to three trustees, who were herself, Arthur H. Sargent, her son, and a third person not connected with the family. Contemporaneously the trustees executed a declaration of trust by the terms of which they were to pay one-half the net income to Mrs. Sargent during her life and the other half until her death, and after that event the whole, in equal shares, to such of her three children as should be living at the time of each payment, and to the appointees of any deceased child, and, in default of appointment, to the living issue of a deceased child. The trust was to terminate upon the death of the last survivor of the settlor and her three children, and thereupon the corpus was to be divided in specified shares amongst the issue, next of kin, or appointees of the children. Each child was given a general power of appointment by will over one-third of the principal. Mrs. Sargent died January 22, 1931, leaving her three children to survive her. Her will was probated, and the respondents are her executors. The declaration of trust contains a power to terminate, in these words 'This trust may be terminated at any time either as to the whole or as to any part of the property held in trust hereunder, by the person or persons who shall then be trustees hereunder, such termination to be evidenced by a written declaration signed, sealed and acknowledged by them and duly recorded in the Registry of Deeds for the County of Suffolk, setting forth specifically the property as to which such termination is to take effect, and in that event the trusts declared hereunder shall as to such property be at an end and such property shall be paid over and conveyed, free and discharged of all trusts, to the said Adelaide J. Sargent, if she be then living, and if she be not then living one share shall be paid over and conveyed to each of her children who shall then be living, and a like share shall be paid over and conveyed to the appointees by will of each of her children who shall then have died making such appointment, or failing such appointment, to the issue of such deceased child then living, such issue taking by right of representation.'

No power was reserved by Mr. Sargent to modify the terms of the trust, and the recited power was never exercised.

The agreement directed that if any trustee should die, resign, or be unable to act, a successor should be appointed by the surviving trustees by a written instrument approved by the then living children of Mrs. Sargent. In 1920 the settlor resigned as trustee and a daughter was appointed to fill the vacancy. After serving for one year she resigned, and Mrs. Sargent was appointed to fill the vacancy thus occasioned, and continued as a trustee until her death. The decedent's son, who was a trustee, had a vested interest in an undivided share of the income and a power to appoint by will his share of the income and one-third of the corpus.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the value of the trust principal should be included in the gross estate. The...

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    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 29, 1940
    ...not change § 302(c) as it then stood. The day the St. Louis cases were decided, this court announced its opinion in White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 56 S.Ct. 66, 80 L.Ed. 80, construing § 302(d) of the Act of 1926. In order to make the section apply to such a situation as was disclosed in that c......
  • Comptroller of the Treasury v. Glenn L. Martin Co.
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    • March 31, 1958
    ...be absolute gifts are not material here.3 See also Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68, 80 L.Ed. 76, and White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 56 S.Ct. 66, 80 L.Ed. 80. ...
  • Walker v. United States, 10415.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 30, 1936
    ...296 U.S. 220, 56 S.Ct. 182, 80 L.Ed. ___; Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211, 219, 56 S.Ct. 180, 80 L.Ed. ___; White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 56 S.Ct. 66, 80 L.Ed. ___; Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68, 80 L.Ed. ___; Helvering v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 88......
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • April 6, 1942
    ...v. Allen, 3 Cir., 108 F.2d 961. The cases of Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68, 80 L.Ed. 76, and White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 56 S.Ct. 66, 80 L.Ed. 80, are relied upon in support of the contention that Section 302(d) distinguishes between a power to revoke derived from the dono......
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