Board of County Com'R of Sweetwater v. Geringer

Decision Date31 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 01-8071.,01-8071.
Citation297 F.3d 1108
PartiesBOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SWEETWATER COUNTY, Wyoming and Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jim GERINGER, Governor of Wyoming, in his official capacity; Cynthia M. Lummis, Wyoming State Treasurer, individually and in her official capacity; and Max Maxfield, Wyoming State Auditor, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, West & Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, WY, for Plaintiff-Appellant Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, Wyoming (Harold V. Moneyhun, Sweetwater County & Prosecuting Attorney, Green River, WY, for Plaintiff-Appellant Board of Commissioners of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, with him on the briefs).

Harry D. Ivey, Assistant Attorney General of Wyoming (Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General of Wyoming, Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General of Wyoming, and Douglas J. Moench, Assistant Attorney General of Wyoming, on the brief), Cheyenne, WY, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EBEL, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

The Appellants in this case, the Board of Commissioners of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, and the Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, Wyoming (collectively, "Sweetwater County"), appeal a decision by the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dismissing their suit against Wyoming's governor, treasurer, and auditor (collectively, "Wyoming"). Before the district court, Sweetwater County sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Wyoming from enforcing legislation that directs funds generated from lands granted to the state by the federal government "for a hospital for miners who shall become disabled or incapacitated to labor[ ] while working in the mines of the state," Wyoming Act of Admission, ch. 664, § 11, 26 Stat. 222 (1890), to a "state miner's [sic] hospital board" (Hospital Board), which is charged with overseeing health services for miners in the state, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-6-101(a), 30-6-102. Sweetwater County contended that this new arrangement violated a federal trust created by the Act of Admission and ran afoul of provisions in the Wyoming Constitution. After hearing arguments on Sweetwater County's request for a preliminary injunction, the district court held that the Wyoming Act of Admission did not establish a trust for a state miners' hospital. As a result, the district court concluded that Sweetwater County's suit did not present a question of federal law, dismissed the purported federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Sweetwater County's remaining state law claims.

Sweetwater County subsequently appealed to this court the district court's interpretation of the Wyoming Act of Admission. Because we conclude that, even assuming a trust exists, Sweetwater County lacks standing, we DISMISS this action.

I. Background

In 1890, the state of Wyoming entered the Union pursuant to the Wyoming Act of Admission. In this legislation, Congress granted 30,000 acres of federal land to the state "for a hospital for miners who shall become disabled or incapacitated" while working in mines within the state, and declared that the land should not be sold for less than $10 per acre. Wyoming Act of Admission § 11.

Less than a year after entering the Union, Wyoming set to work building a miners' hospital. On January 10, 1891, the Wyoming legislature passed legislation calling for the location of the hospital to be chosen by popular vote during the November 1892 general election. In the ensuing election, Wyoming's citizens chose the town of Rock Springs, located in Sweetwater County, to be the home of the miners' hospital; following the election, the state legislature enacted legislation calling for the construction of a miners' hospital in Rock Springs. A few years later, the state renamed the facility "The Wyoming General Hospital" and declared that "[t]he object of said hospital shall be to provide sustenance, care and medical and surgical attention for all miners who shall become disabled or incapacitated to labor while working in the mines of the state ... and to such other persons as may be admitted under the laws, rules, and regulations established for the government thereof."

For the next fifty years, the state continued to operate and oversee the Wyoming General Hospital. In 1947, however, the Wyoming legislature transferred ownership and responsibility for the hospital to Sweetwater County. The transferring legislation specified that all income generated from the original 1890 land grant would "be paid to said county to be used" for the care of disabled and incapacitated miners, as long as the hospital served disabled and incapacitated miners. 1947 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 64, §§ 2-3. The hospital was then renamed Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, and, from 1947 until 2001, served as the state's miners' hospital.

In 2001, however, the state legislature enacted a bill creating a "State Miner's Hospital Board." See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-101 et seq. Under this legislation, the Hospital Board, comprised of members of the Sweetwater County Memorial Hospital Board, citizens of Sweetwater County and another county, and a member from another county hospital's board, assumed primary responsibility for addressing miners' health care needs in the state. The legislation specifically charged the Hospital Board with developing a comprehensive health care plan for miners, contracting with providers for health care services for miners, and developing regulations for determining miners' eligibility for health services. See id. § 30-6-102(b). Most importantly, the legislation declared that the Hospital Board, and only the Hospital Board, would receive money from the lands granted to the state for a miners' hospital. Id. § 30-6-102(a). In essence, it appears that the legislation implicitly repealed portions of the 1947 legislation directing that Memorial Hospital receive all income from the miners' hospital land grant and explicitly allowed the state to contract with various parties to provide health services to miners.

The present suit then followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Wyoming argues that, even if we assume the existence of a land trust, Sweetwater County lacks standing to bring the present suit because it is neither a trustee nor a beneficiary of the alleged trust. Although the district court, having concluded that the Admission Act did not create a land trust, did not base its subject matter jurisdiction ruling on standing, standing is a "threshold issue in every case," Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 523 (10th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), which a federal appellate court may raise "at any time," regardless of whether the district court expressly addressed the question. Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 492 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Standing Law

"The standing inquiry requires us to consider `both constitutional limits on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.'" Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 573 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Constitutional standing derives from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which restricts federal courts' jurisdiction to suits involving an actual case or controversy. Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir.2001) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). To satisfy constitutional standing requirements, a plaintiff must demonstrate the presence of three elements:

(1) "injury in fact" — meaning "the invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct" — meaning that the "injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant"; and (3) "a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision" — meaning that the "prospect of obtaining relief from ... a favorable ruling is not too speculative."

Buchwald, 159 F.3d at 493 (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ("To satisfy the `case' or `controversy' requirement of Article III, which is the `irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered `injury in fact,' that the injury is `fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.") (quoting, inter alia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). At its core, we have explained, constitutional standing requires a court "to ask not only whether an injury has occurred, but whether the injury that has occurred may serve as the basis for a legal remedy in the federal courts." Schaffer, 240 F.3d at 883.

In addition to satisfying the prerequisites for constitutional standing, a plaintiff must also meet, generally speaking, the requirements of prudential standing, a judicially-created set of principles that, like constitutional standing, places "limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (describing prudential standing as "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction"). Under a prudential...

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