Murphy v. Arlington Cent. School

• Decision Date: 16 July 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 00-7358.
• Citation: 297 F.3d 195
• Parties: Pearl MURPHY and Theodore Murphy, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

297 F.3d 195

Pearl MURPHY and Theodore Murphy, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 00-7358.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued March 13, 2002.

Decided July 16, 2002.

Jeffrey Schiro, (Raymond G. Kuntz, on the brief), Bedford Village, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellant.

Richard A. Acito, Astoria, N.Y., for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Karen Norlander, Scott M. Goodspeed, Ruberti, Girvin, & Ferlazzoo, Albany, N.Y., for Amicus Curiae New York State Council of School Superintendents.

Jay Worona, Albany, N.Y., for Amicus Curiae New York State School Boards Association.

Thomas E. Chandler, Mark L. Gross, U.S. Department of Justice, (Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Judith Winston, General Counsel, Suzanne Sheridan, U.S. Department of Education, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae United States of America.

Before: McLAUGHLIN, LEVAL, and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.

SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge.

This case has its genesis in a dispute over the appropriate educational placement for plaintiffs' disabled son. The Murphys, parents of Joseph Murphy, a "child with a disability" within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("the IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Haight, J.) for an injunction requiring Defendant-appellant Arlington Central School District Board of Education ("Arlington") to assume financial responsibility for their child's tuition at Kildonan, a private school, during the pendency of administrative proceedings brought to determine Joseph's proper academic placement for the 1999-2000 school year. The district court, applying the IDEA's stay-put provisions, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), held that, because Kildonan is Joseph's current educational placement, Arlington was obligated to pay for Joseph's schooling until such time as Joseph's placement was changed in accordance with the IDEA. On appeal, Arlington argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies. Arlington also contends that § 1415(j) does not provide a basis for the prospective injunctive relief awarded by the district court, that the district court erred in determining that Kildonan is Joseph's current educational placement and that the district court abused its discretion in not ordering the pro se plaintiffs, appearing on behalf of their son, to retain counsel.

We hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter as plaintiffs' claim fell within a recognized exception to the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, even though the district court should not have permitted plaintiffs to represent their minor son pro se, we do not find reversible error. Because Arlington's substantive challenges to the district court's order have been resolved in favor of plaintiffs by an intervening Second Circuit decision, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Some understanding of the IDEA's statutory framework is essential to put this dispute in its proper context. Congress enacted the IDEA "`to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.'" Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68, 119 S.Ct. 992, 143 L.Ed.2d 154 (1999) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)) (alterations in original). The "centerpiece" of the IDEA's education delivery system is the "individualized education program," or "IEP." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). The IEP, the result of collaborations between parents, educators, and representatives of the school district, "sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Id. Concerned that parental input into the creation of the IEP would not be sufficient to safeguard a child's right to a free and appropriate education, Congress also included within the IDEA procedural safeguards that enable parents and students to challenge the local educational agency's decisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. New York has implemented a two-tier system of administrative review. N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404 (McKinney 1999). First, parents are entitled to a review of the IEP before an impartial hearing officer. Id. at § 4404(1). Next, parties aggrieved by the outcome of the due process hearing may pursue an appeal before a state review officer ("SRO"). Id. at § 4404(2). Ordinarily, appeal may be taken to either the state or federal courts only after the SRO has rendered a decision.

During the pendency of these administrative proceedings, the IDEA mandates that "unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of such child...." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). "[I]mplicit in [this provision] is the requirement that a school district continue to finance an educational placement made by the agency and consented to by the parent before the parent requested a due process hearing. To cut off public funds would amount to a unilateral change in placement, prohibited by the Act." Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir.1982)

In July 1998, Arlington prepared Joseph's IEP for the upcoming school year. Under Arlington's IEP, Joseph was assigned to Arlington High School. Objecting to his placement, plaintiffs instead enrolled their son at Kildonan, a private school that specializes in the education of disabled students. Joseph remained at Kildonan for the entirety of the 1998-99 school year.

On September 3, 1998, plaintiffs invoked the IDEA's due process procedures. Plaintiffs challenged Arlington's placement of their son as inadequate to serve his special educational needs and sought reimbursement for the cost of Joseph's tuition at Kildonan for the 1998-1999 year. The hearing officer rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs in July 1999 and awarded plaintiffs the costs of Joseph's tuition. Arlington appealed this decision to the SRO in August of 1999. In August 1999, while the SRO's decision was still pending, plaintiffs brought a pro se action in federal court, seeking a temporary restraining order requiring Arlington to fund Joseph's tuition during the pendency of the action before the SRO. The district court was unable to determine on the record before it whether it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' action before the state administrative process had come to a close. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 980164 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.28, 1999) ("Murphy I"). On December 14, 1999, before the district court had settled the jurisdiction issue, the SRO affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. The SRO held that Kildonan was the appropriate placement for Joseph and ordered defendant to reimburse plaintiffs for all tuition expenses incurred for the 1998-1999 school year. Even though an appeal from the SRO's decision is currently pending in the state court, Arlington remitted Joseph's tuition for the 1998 school year to plaintiffs. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' case as moot. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 2000 WL 10255 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.5, 2000) ("Murphy II").

While this conflict wound its way through the state administrative system and the courts, another school year loomed ahead. Defendant again proposed an IEP placing Joseph at Arlington High School, and plaintiffs again rejected this plan and unilaterally enrolled their son at Kildonan for the 1999 2000 school term. Plaintiffs invoked their right to an administrative review of Arlington's 1999 IEP and requested reimbursement for Joseph's tuition for the 1999 school year, thereby setting in motion the same process that had recently been completed with respect to the 1998 school year.

While continuing to pursue their administrative remedies, plaintiffs filed a motion before the district court seeking an order to compel defendant to pay Joseph's tuition for the 1999 2000 school year during the pendency of the administrative process. The district court held that the SRO's decision constituted an "agreement" by the state that Joseph's current educational placement was Kildonan. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 86 F.Supp.2d 354, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ("Murphy III"). Pursuant to the IDEA's stay-put provisions, the district court entered an order requiring Arlington to finance Joseph's education at Kildonan from December 13, 1999, the date the SRO issued its decision with respect to tuition reimbursement for the 1998 school year, until such time as Joseph's educational placement changes.

DISCUSSION

"We review the District Court's entry of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion, which may be found where the Court, in issuing the injunction, relied on clearly erroneous findings of fact or an error of law." S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.2001).

We begin by addressing the jurisdictional issue. Before an aggrieved individual may bring an action in state or federal court for a violation of the IDEA, he or she must seek recourse from the administrative procedures established by the statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies ordinarily deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over any IDEA claims. Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir.1995). It is undisputed that plaintiffs have not sought an administrative ruling on whether Arlington must fund Joseph's private schooling until the issue of his placement for the 1999 school year is resolved. Arlington contends that the district court...