Poulos v. McMahan

• Citation: 297 S.E.2d 451,250 Ga. 354
• Decision Date: 30 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 38962,38962
• Parties: POULOS v. McMAHAN.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 451

297 S.E.2d 451

250 Ga. 354

POULOS v. McMAHAN.

No. 38962.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 30, 1982.

James L. Ford, Atlanta, for Michael E. Poulos, a/k/a jeanson.

Charles E. Moore, Atlanta, for Betty S. McMahan.

MARSHALL, Presiding Justice.

The present case presents issues concerning the rights of an illegitimate child to inherit from its father under Georgia's intestacy laws. See Code Ann. §§ 113-904, 74-201, 74-103, 74-101; Code Chs. 74-99, 74-3. Questions concerning the constitutionality of these laws are presented.

This case began when the plaintiff, Floy Inez Poulos, as next friend of Michael E. Poulos, a/k/a Michael Edward Jeanson, filed a petition in the Fulton Probate Court seeking to caveat the probate of the will of Paul M. McMahan, who died on June 16, 1979.

In the petition, the plaintiff claims that the decedent was the natural father of Michael Poulos, who was born on November 24, 1973. It is further stated in the petition that the decedent's will does not contain any distribution in favor of Michael Poulos, and it is alleged that the will was the product of undue influence by the decedent's wife, who is the defendant herein.

The probate court ruled that Michael Poulos is in fact the child of the decedent, but the petition to caveat probate of the will was denied because of a lack of evidence of undue influence.

On appeal, the superior court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Michael Poulos, as an illegitimate child of the decedent, could not inherit from the decedent under the intestacy laws in effect at the time of the decedent's death. The plaintiff appeals, challenging the constitutionality of these intestacy laws.

1. On many occasions, the United States Supreme Court has been presented with the issue of whether a statutory discrimination against illegitimate children is constitutional. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.1973), summarily affd., 418 U.S. 901, 94 S.Ct. 3190, 41 L.Ed.2d 1150 (1974); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 94 S.Ct. 2496, 41 L.Ed.2d 363 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 93 S.Ct. 1700, 36 L.Ed.2d 543 (1973); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.Supp. 1226 (D.Md.1972), summarily affd., 409 U.S. 1069, 93 S.Ct. 689, 34 L.Ed.2d 660 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F.Supp. 588 (D.Conn.1972), summarily affd., 409 U.S. 1069, 93 S.Ct. 678, 34 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288 (1971); Glona v. Amer. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968). ¹

The Supreme Court's tergiversations on this issue are demonstrated in Labine, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288, supra; Trimble, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31, supra; and Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503, supra. See Note, The Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children in Georgia: The Role of a Judicial Determination of Paternity, 16 Ga.L.Rev. 170 (1981); Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978), 13 Ga.L.Rev. 620 (1979). In each of these latter three cases, the Court was presented with state statutes denying or circumscribing the rights of illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers' estates.

(a) In Labine, a 5-4 majority of the Court sustained the constitutionality of a Louisiana intestate-succession statute, ² allowing an illegitimate child to inherit from its father only if his property would otherwise escheat to the state. But see Levy, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436, supra; Glona, 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441, supra. ³

Paying great deference to "the power [of the State of Louisiana] to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there ...," Labine, 401 U.S., supra, at p. 538, 91 S.Ct., at p. 1021, the majority refused to hold the statute unconstitutional even though it admittedly discriminated against illegitimates.

Thus, the illegitimate child in Labine was not allowed to inherit from her father, even though he had formerly acknowledged her under the provisions of Louisiana law prior to his death.

(b) However, in Trimble, a 5-4 majority of the Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois intestate-succession statute requiring an illegitimate child to prove marriage of its parents and acknowledgment by its father in order to inherit from the father. ⁴

One of the stated purposes of the Illinois statute was to promote legitimate family relationships. ⁵ In accordance with its earlier decision in Weber, 406 U.S. 164 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768, supra, ⁶ the Court held that a state may not attempt to influence the actions of admittedly peccant parents by imposing sanctions against their innocent, albeit illegitimate, children. Trimble, 430 U.S., supra, at p. 769, 97 S.Ct., at p. 1464.

Another avowed purpose of the statute under review in Trimble was to establish an efficient method of disposing of property at death. The statute would serve this purpose, because there exist difficult problems of proving the paternity of an illegitimate child. These problems of proof are exacerbated by the putative father's death, and there is a consequent danger of spurious claims being asserted against putative fathers' estates.

The Trimble majority acknowledged that this might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than required for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally. Trimble, 430 U.S., supra, at p. 770, 97 S.Ct., at p. 1465. However, it was held that the Illinois statute was constitutionally flawed, because it excluded "some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men [whose] inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws." Id., at p. 771, 97 S.Ct., at p. 1465. The illegitimate child in Trimble fit into such a category, in that an Illinois court had entered a paternity order during the deceased's lifetime finding him to be the father of the child and ordering him to contribute to her support.

In Trimble, the Court indicated that to be constitutionally acceptable, a statute would have to "consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity," id., at pp. 770, 771, 97 S.Ct., at p. 1465, and thus would have to be "carefully tuned to alternative considerations." Id., at p. 772, 97 S.Ct., at p. 1466. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S., supra, at [250 Ga. 358] p. 513, 96 S.Ct., at p. 2766. ⁷

(c) However, in Lalli, a 3-2-4 plurality of the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that allowed illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers only if a court of competent jurisdiction had made an adjudication of paternity (referred to under New York law as an order of filiation) during the father's lifetime.

As in Trimble, the argument was made that the New York statute excluded significant categories of illegitimate children who could be allowed to inherit without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of their fathers' estates. As to this argument, the Court responded:

"We do not question that there will be some illegitimate children who would be able to establish their relationship to their deceased fathers without serious disruption of the administration of estates and that, as applied to such individuals, [the New York statute] appears to operate unfairly. But few statutory classifications are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes produce inequitable results. Our inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract 'fairness' of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.

"The Illinois statute in Trimble was constitutionally unacceptable because it effected a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The reach of the statute was far in excess of its justifiable purposes. [The New York statute] does not share this defect. Inheritance is barred only where there has been a failure to secure evidence of paternity during the father's lifetime in the manner prescribed by the State." Lalli, 439 U.S., supra, at pp. 272, 273, 99 S.Ct., at p. 527.

Finding that the purpose of the New York statute was "to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death," Lalli, supra, at p. 268, 99 S.Ct., at p. 524, the plurality in Lalli upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it "bear[s] an evident and substantial relation to the particular state interests this statute is designed to serve." Id. ⁸

2. Insofar as it is relevant to this case, Georgia law relating to the illegitimacy of children is as follows:

(a) An illegitimate child is rendered fully legitimate by the marriage of the mother and father, plus recognition by the father of the child as his. Code Ann. §§ 74-101, 74-201; Morris v. Dilbeck, 71 Ga.App. 470(2), 31 S.E.2d 93 (1944).

(b) In addition, for well over 100 years, there has been a statutory procedure under...