297 U.S. 278 (1936), 301, Brown v. Mississippi
|Docket Nº:||No. 301|
|Citation:||297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682|
|Party Name:||Brown v. Mississippi|
|Case Date:||February 17, 1936|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued January 10, 1936
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
Convictions of murder which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of the State by torture of the accused are void under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 279, 285. 173 Miss. 542, 158 So. 339; 161 So. 465, reversed.
HUGHES, J., lead opinion
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether convictions which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of the State by brutality and violence are consistent with the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Petitioners were indicted for the murder of one Raymond Stewart, whose death occurred on March 30, 1934. They were indicted on April 4, 1934, and were then arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Counsel were appointed by the court to defend them. T rial was begun the next morning, and was concluded on the following day, when they were found guilty and sentenced to death.
Aside from the confessions, there was no evidence sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the jury. After a preliminary inquiry, testimony as to the confessions was received over the objection of defendants' counsel. Defendants then testified that the confessions were false, and had been procured by physical torture. The case went to the jury with instructions, upon the request of defendants' counsel, that, if the jury had reasonable doubt as to the confessions' having resulted from coercion, and that they were not true, they were not to be considered as evidence. On their appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State, defendants assigned as error the inadmissibility of the confessions. The judgment was affirmed. 158 So. 339.
Defendants then moved in the Supreme Court of the State to arrest the judgment and for a new trial on the ground that all the evidence against them was obtained by coercion and brutality known to the court and to the district attorney, and that defendants had been denied the benefit of counsel or opportunity to confer with counsel in a reasonable manner. The motion was supported by affidavits. At about the same time, defendants filed in the Supreme Court a "suggestion of error" explicitly challenging the proceedings of the trial, in the use of the confessions and with respect to the alleged denial of representation by counsel, as violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The state court entertained the suggestion of error, considered the federal question, and decided it against defendants' contentions. 161 So. 465. Two judges dissented. Id., p. 470. We granted a writ of certiorari.
The grounds of the decision were (1) that immunity from self-incrimination is not essential to due process of law, and (2) that the failure of the trial court to exclude the confessions after the introduction of evidence showing their incompetency, in the absence of a request for such exclusion, did not deprive the defendants of life or liberty without due process of law, and that, even if the trial court had erroneously overruled a motion to exclude the confessions, the ruling would have been mere error reversible on appeal, but not a violation of constitutional right. Id., p. 468.
The opinion of the state court did not set forth the evidence as to the circumstances in which the confessions were procured. That the evidence established that they were procured by coercion was not questioned. The state
After the state closed its case on the merits, the appellants, for the first time, introduced evidence from which it appears that the confessions were not made voluntarily, but were coerced.
Id., p. 466. There is no dispute as to [56 S.Ct. 463] the facts upon this point, and, as they are clearly and adequately stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Griffith (with whom Judge Anderson concurred) -- showing both the extreme brutality of the measures to extort the confessions and the participation of the state authorities -- we quote...
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