Caldarola v. Calabrese

Decision Date31 July 2002
Docket NumberDocket No. 01-9053.
PartiesRocco CALDAROLA, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. Christopher CALABRESE, individually, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, Andrew J. Spano, C.O.W. County Clerk, individually, Robert S. Davis, individually, and Rocco Pozzi, individually, Defendants, William DeCiuceis, individually, and The County of Westchester, Defendants-Counter-Claimants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Matthew T. Miklave, New York City (Deborah S. Markowitz, Epstein, Becker & Green, New York City, of counsel), for Appellant.

Drita Nicaj, White Plains, N.Y. (Lovett & Gould, White Plains, NY, of counsel), for Appellee.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, MESKILL and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

MESKILL, Circuit Judge.

This interlocutory appeal by defendant-appellant Lieutenant Christopher Calabrese (Calabrese) requires us to address the intersecting legal themes of qualified immunity and the use of informants to support probable cause to arrest. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, McMahon, J., denied Calabrese's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff-appellant Rocco Caldarola's (Caldarola) claim for false arrest. The district court concluded that it could not determine the reliability of the private investigation firms on whose reports Calabrese relied in making his probable cause determination and declined to reach Calabrese's arguments that probable cause did, in fact, exist, and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the district court.

BACKGROUND

Caldarola, a Westchester County Department of Correction Officer, injured his thumb in the line of duty, filed a disability claim and, pursuant to Section 207-c of New York General Municipal Law, received medical and salary benefits for over a year. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 207-c. In January 1998, newly elected Westchester County Executive Andrew Spano (Spano) appointed Rocco Pozzi (Pozzi) Acting Commissioner of the Department of Correction and later formalized the appointment.

In an effort to determine whether some corrections officers might be abusing the job injury benefits program, Pozzi asked the head of the Department of Correction's Attendance Management Unit (AMU) to provide him with a list of corrections officers suspected of falsely claiming or exaggerating injuries. Caldarola's name was on the list provided to Pozzi. Members of the Department of Correction had heard unconfirmed rumors that Caldarola was operating a landscaping business while receiving benefits. If true, this likely would have constituted a violation of Section 207-c because Caldarola probably would have been able to return to his job. See id. (municipality shall pay officer injured on the job "the full amount of his regular salary or wages until his disability arising therefrom has ceased").

Pozzi proposed conducting limited surveillance to determine whether the corrections officers on the list were, in fact improperly receiving job injury benefits. To keep the investigations confidential, County Executive Spano authorized the use of private investigation firms to conduct the surveillance. The county selected the firms that were to do the investigations.

Louis D'Aliso (D'Aliso), the Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Public Safety, instructed Paul Stasaitis (Stasaitis), the commanding officer of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), to retrieve the investigatory files for five corrections officers from the Westchester County Attorney's Office. D'Aliso directed Stasaitis to review the files to determine if they detailed any criminal acts by the corrections officers. Stasaitis kept four files for himself and, with the permission of D'Aliso, assigned the Caldarola file to Calabrese, a lieutenant in charge of the major case squad (but not a member of the SIU).

Instead of revealing that Caldarola was operating a landscaping business, the information contained in the investigatory file led Calabrese to conclude that Caldarola had moved from New York to Connecticut. If true, Caldarola's move would have constituted a violation of Section 30 of the New York Public Officers Law. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 30(1)(d) (an office shall become vacant if the incumbent ceases to be an inhabitant of the state). At some point during his investigation, Calabrese spoke with Assistant District Attorney Mike Hughes (Hughes) to go over the investigative file that had been assembled on Caldarola. Calabrese recalled Hughes expressing concern that he needed "more probable cause" to effect a prosecution of Caldarola. Calabrese understood Hughes to mean that more evidence was necessary to secure a criminal conviction. Calabrese then requested from Stasaitis additional time to investigate Caldarola. Stasaitis denied his request.

When asked by Commissioner D'Aliso whether there was enough information to arrest Caldarola, Calabrese responded in the affirmative and, on July 12, 1999, he effected the arrest of Caldarola for grand larceny in the third degree. On July 16, 1999, Caldarola was suspended without pay pending a hearing on disciplinary charges. Caldarola filed a motion in state court seeking dismissal of the criminal charge because the prosecution could not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The district attorney did not oppose the motion. On February 10, 2000, the criminal charge was dismissed and, on February 18, 2000, the county withdrew the disciplinary charges and reinstated Caldarola with back pay.

On April 17, 2000, Caldarola filed this suit against Calabrese, Pozzi, Spano, two other individuals and Westchester County seeking money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e. g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). On May 24, 2000, in response to a motion to dismiss by the defendants, Caldarola voluntarily withdrew three of his claims, leaving only the claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. On June 22, 2000, pursuant to the same motion by the defendants, the district court dismissed without prejudice Caldarola's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Pozzi, Spano and another individual defendant. The only remaining claims were for false arrest and malicious prosecution against Calabrese, the county and one other defendant. On the remaining defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court found that there was no evidence of malice on the part of the defendants and dismissed the malicious prosecution charge. Caldarola v. DeCiuceis, 142 F.Supp.2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Finding that the private investigation firms could not be deemed reliable, the district court declined to decide whether the information contained in the investigative file established probable cause to arrest Caldarola. Id. The district court thus denied Calabrese's motion for summary judgment on Caldarola's false arrest claim, and Calabrese timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review

As the analysis required for summary judgment is a legal one, we "review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 746 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir.1999)). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The party against whom summary judgment is sought, however, "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. Qualified Immunity
A.

"Qualified immunity is `an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). The principle of qualified immunity serves important practical purposes in our system. It shields government officials from liability for their performance of discretionary actions and offers them the benefit of avoiding costly, time-consuming and, ultimately unsuccessful litigation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.2000).

When considering the issue of qualified immunity we must first determine whether — viewed in the light most favorable to the injured party — the facts alleged demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If so, we must determine whether that right was clearly established. In other words, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (noting that a court should determine "not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred"). This inquiry is, in essence, a determination "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151; see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (stating that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law"). If the law was clearly established that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right,...

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