Egan v. Knewel

Decision Date01 April 1924
Docket Number1017.
PartiesEGAN v. KNEWEL, Sheriff.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

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W. G Rice, of Deadwood, S.D., and Robert Healy, of Fort Dodge Iowa, for plaintiff.

Buell F. Jones, Atty. Gen., and Byron S. Payne, of Pierre, S.D. for defendant.

REEVES District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

1. As a postulate to the consideration of this case, it should be noted that in a habeas corpus proceeding, as here, the whole inquiry is limited to an examination of fundamental and jurisdictional questions, as the habeas corpus writ cannot be employed as a substitute for a writ of error. Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 23 L.Ed. 787; Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, loc. cit. 448, 31 Sup.Ct. 44, 54 L.Ed. 1101, 21 Ann.Cas. 849; Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, loc. cit. 505, 35 Sup.Ct. 649, 59 L.Ed. 1071; Bens v. U.S. (C.C.A. 266 F. 152; Murray v. U.S. (C.C.A.) 273 F. 522; Collins v. Morgan, 243 F. 495, 156 C.C.A. 193; Biddle v. Luvisch (C.C.A.) 287 F. 699; Ex parte Salinger (C.C.A.) 288 F. 752, loc. cit. 754; Ex parte Joly (D.C.) 290 F. 858.

While upon habeas corpus the inquiry only extends to the power and authority of the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions, yet in ascertaining a jurisdictional fact, and whether the judgment is wholly void, the court will pursue its inquiry through the record of the proceedings. It was said in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, loc. cit. 92, 43 Sup.Ct. 265, 267 (67 L.Ed. 543):

'It does not seem to us sufficient to allow a judge of the United States to escape the duty of examining the facts for himself, when, if true as alleged, they make the trial absolutely void.'

2. By section 4725 of the Revised Code of 1919 of South Dakota it is provided that:

An 'information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: * * * '4. That the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or, though without the jurisdiction of the court, is triable therein.'

Obviously the information being considered does not meet the test of sufficiency prescribed by this statute. It cannot be sustained upon the most favorable inferences. It charges in substance that the Firemen's Insurance Company, a corporation of Newark, N.J., was empowered to do business in the state of South Dakota, and in pursuance of its authority insured certain property of the petitioner, located in Minnehaha county; that the property was destroyed by fire, and that thereafter petitioner presented a false claim to its agents. It is not alleged where petitioner presented the false and fraudulent claim and proofs in support thereof.

A reasonable inference would be that such claim and proofs were presented to the company at Newark, N.J. This would be the more reasonable inference, absent an allegation that the agents of the company were located in South Dakota, and moreover, even with such an allegation as to the residence of the agents, under this statute, the information should have charged that the presentation of the false and fraudulent claim and proofs in support thereof were made somewhere within the jurisdiction of the court, or an allegation, as provided by the statute, 'though without the jurisdiction of the court, is triable therein. ' Though by section 4715, South Dakota Revised Code of 1919, all technical forms of pleading in criminal actions have been abolished, yet the lawmakers plainly and unequivocally provided that an information, to be sufficient, must yield the inference that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. This is the equivalent of an allegation that the indictment or information must affirmatively show the jurisdiction of the court.

Apart from the jurisdictional question, the place of the alleged offense should be charged with such clearness and certainty as to afford full notice of the charge, and thereby enable the accused to make his defense with reasonable knowledge, and to plead the judgment rendered upon the information in bar of any second charge for the same offense. It is a general principle of the law that the place must be alleged with such certainty that it may be seen that the court has jurisdiction of the offense. This is the rule reinforced by section 4725 of the South Dakota laws. It follows from the foregoing that the information, challenged in the state court and here, stands condemned by statute and is insufficient. Being insufficient, it cannot sustain a judgment, and all proceedings tending thereto are void.

3. It is the contention of the learned Attorney General, who appears for the respondent, that, even if the information did not contain proper jurisdictional averments, yet all questions thereon were foreclosed against the petitioner by his failure to file a formal demurrer. The court cannot so hold. It is provided by section 4771, South Dakota Revised Code of 1919, that the defendant may demur to an information when it appears upon the face thereof, among other things, 'that the court is without jurisdiction of the offense charged. ' By section 4779, South Dakota Revised Code of 1919, it is provided that objections, under said section 4771, can only be taken by demurrer 'except that the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the indictment or information or that it does not describe a public offense, may be taken at the trial under the plea of 'not guilty' and in arrest of judgment.'

From the above, it is very evident that the lawmakers had in mind the fundamental proposition that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, agreement, or waiver, and that therefore a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court could be made at any stage...

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4 cases
  • In re Egan
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 17, 1928
    ...sitting in place of Hon. James D. Elliott, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. See Egan v. Knewel (D. C.) 298 F. 784. It is to be observed that this trial in the federal court did not in any wise involve the fact question of whether or not the petitio......
  • United States v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • April 12, 1924
  • In re Egan
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 17, 1928
    ...Judge, sitting in place of Hon. James D. Elliott, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. See Egan v. Knewel (DC) 298 F. 784. It is to be observed that this trial in the federal court did not in any wise involve the fact question of whether or not the pet......
  • Ex parte Jackson
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • January 7, 1930
    ... ... other county, the court is without jurisdiction to put the ... accused on trial. See Egan v. Knewel (D. C.) 298 F ... 784; Ex parte Brinkman, 93 W.Va. 351, 116 S.E. 757; Scott and ... Roe, Habeas Corpus, 290. Where an accused is charged ... ...

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