Doe v. Miller
| Decision Date | 09 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:03-CV-90067.,3:03-CV-90067. |
| Citation | 298 F.Supp.2d 844 |
| Parties | John DOE I, John Doe II, and John Doe III, on their own behalf and as representatives of the class of sex offenders in the State of Iowa, Plaintiffs v. Tom MILLER, Iowa Attorney General and J. Patrick White, Johnson County Attorney as representative of the class of all county attorneys in Iowa, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Philip B. Mears, Esq., Iowa City, IA, Randall C. Wilson, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.
J Patrick White, Esq., Iowa City, IA, Gordon E. Allen, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
Writing in dissent from an en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals more than thirty years ago, former Chief Circuit Judge Donald Lay observed:
The denial of due process in parole revocation simply mirrors society's overall attitude of degradation and defilement of a convicted felon. It is sad 20th Century Commentary that society views the convicted felon as a social outcast. He has done wrong, so we rationalize and condone punishment in various forms. We express a desire for rehabilitation of the individual, while simultaneously we do everything to prevent it. Society cares little for the conditions which a prisoner must suffer while in prison; it cares even less for his future when he is released from prison. He is a marked man. We tell him to return to the norm of behavior, yet we brand him as virtually unemployable; he is required to live with his normal activities severely restricted and we react with sickened wonder and disgust when he returns to a life of crime.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 953 (8th Cir.1971) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
Societal attitudes towards convicted persons have changed little in the three decades since Morrissey. A convict who has served his or her sentence still faces the social stigmas and discrimination that Judge Lay described. Yet, in some instances, the crimes perpetrated by certain classes of offenders are so offensive to human dignity and so atrocious that many would be comfortable using any means necessary to prevent even the possibility of re-offense. The present case asks the Court to examine the limits of this supposition as the class of Plaintiffs represented includes those who society would deem among the most deplorable of offenders, those convicted of committing sexual offenses against minors. To what extent, then, may the State go to protect its children from those whom it suspects might prey upon them?
"Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation." Connecticut v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) (plurality opinion)). "The victims of sex assault are most often juveniles," and "when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sex assault." Id. (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 32-33, 122 S.Ct. 2017).
In 2002, the State of Iowa responded to this threat by enacting Iowa Code § 692A.2A. The Act prohibits a person who has committed a criminal offense against a minor from residing within two thousand feet of a school or child care facility. Three named Plaintiffs initially brought this action against the Iowa Attorney General and a proposed defendant class consisting of all of Iowa's County Attorneys ("the State"). Plaintiffs' Complaint asks the Court to declare § 692A.2A unconstitutional on a number of theories, and Plaintiffs further request that the Court permanently enjoin the State from enforcing the law. By Order dated July 25, 2003, the Court certified this action as a class action. The Plaintiff class includes all individuals defined as a "person" by Iowa Code § 692A.2A(1), currently living in the state of Iowa, or who might wish to live in the state of Iowa, and excluding those individuals currently being prosecuted under Iowa Code § 692A.2A in the Iowa state courts. The Court also certified Plaintiffs' proposed Defendant class, which includes all ninety nine of Iowa's County Attorneys, with J. Patrick White, the Johnson County Attorney, serving as class representative. Upon certifying both Plaintiff and Defendant classes, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to temporarily enjoin enforcement of Iowa Code § 692A.2A until the Court ruled on Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties, however, agreed to forego a preliminary injunction hearing and to proceed directly to trial with Defendants consenting to the Court's injunction remaining in effect throughout the litigation process.
Plaintiffs' challenge to Iowa Code § 692A.2A is that the law infringes upon a number of constitutional rights, including Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights of family privacy and freedom to travel, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to procedural due process. Plaintiffs further contend that Iowa Code § 692A.2A is an unconstitutional ex post facto law when applied to those class members who committed their crimes before July 1, 2002. Defendants counter that the Act is a lawful exercise of the State's police power and a constitutional effort to protect children from dangerous individuals. The Court heard testimony and received evidence from both sides during a two-day bench trial on December 15 and December 16, 2003. At the Court's behest, both sides filed post-trial briefs on January 9, 2004, and the matter is now fully submitted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court now sets forth its findings of fact and separate conclusions of law thereon as detailed below.
On May 9, 2002, Iowa Governor Thomas Vilsack signed Senate File 2197 into law. Effective July 1, 2002, Senate File 2197, now codified at Iowa Code § 692A.2A, states in full:
692A.2A Residency restrictions—child care facilities and schools.
4. A person residing within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility does not commit a violation of this section if any of the following apply:
a. The person is required to serve a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility, or other correctional institution or facility.
b. The person is subject to an order of commitment under chapter 229A.
c. The person has established a residence prior to July 1, 2002, or a school or child care facility is newly located on or after July 1, 2002.
d. The person is a minor or a ward under a guardianship.
Where applicable, the Act restricts the area in which a person may reside to places that are not within two thousand feet from a school or child care facility.2 Residence is defined as "the place where a person sleeps, which may include more than one location, and may be mobile or transitory." Iowa Code § 692A.1(8). As the restriction is limited to one's residence, § 692A.2A does not otherwise prohibit an individual's presence within the restricted zone; affected persons are free to travel, work, or generally move about within any area. The Act contains no time frame regarding when a person committed his or her crime, but does include a limited "grandfather clause," whereby an individual who has established a residence prior to July 1, 2002 is exempted from the area restrictions. See Iowa Code § 692A.2A (4)(c). The text of § 692A.2A also indicates that sex offender who establish legal residences after July, 1 2002 will be exempted from new restricted areas caused by the creation of a new school or child care facility after the effective date. See id. Finally, § 692A.2A gives no indication as to how long the restriction will apply to any given individual.
"Child care facility," as the term is used in § 692A.2A, is defined at Iowa Code § 237A.1. Iowa Code § 692A.1(2). Under § 237A.1, a child care facility is "a child care center, preschool, or a registered child development home." Iowa Code § 237A.1(5). The same code section defines a "child care center" as "a facility providing child care or preschool services for seven or more children, except when the facility is registered as a child development home," and "preschool" as "a child care facility which provides to children ages three through five, for periods of time not exceeding three hours per day, programs designed to help the children to develop intellectual skills, social skills, and motor skills, and to extend their interest and understanding of the world about them." Iowa Code § 237A.1(4), (13). A "child development home" is "a person or program registered under section 237A.3A that may provide child care to six or more children at any one time." Iowa Code § 237A.1(7).
Currently, the only available list of child care facilities is a database maintained by the Iowa Department of Human Services ("DHS"). Plaintiffs' witness Jodi Caswell, a DHS administrator responsible for overseeing the registration of child development homes, explained that the database is maintained at the state central offices and is not published. Plaintiffs' contend that they received a copy of...
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