Radford v. Folsom

Decision Date14 June 1880
Citation3 F. 199
PartiesRADFORD, Assignee, v. FOLSOM.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

BROWN D.J.

This is a bill brought by the complainant, as assignee of Simeon and Frank Folsom, to set aside two deeds and a mortgage executed by Frank Folsom and wife to Eliza Folsom, the defendant, upon the ground that these conveyances were made by said Frank Folsom and wife at a time when he was hopelessly insolvent without consideration, and for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, by placing the property beyond their reach. The first conveyance was a deed dated February 18, 1875 conveying to said defendant certain store property situated in the city of Council Bluffs, Iowa. The second was a deed dated October 5, 1875, and conveyed a certain house and lot in said city. The third conveyance was a mortgage bearing date February 1, 1876 conveying about 1,000 acres of farming lands in Pottawattamie county, Iowa, and purporting to secure the payment of a certain note of $4,000, given to the defendant by S. Folsom & Co., dated September 15, 1875.

A preliminary objection was taken at the hearing to the effect that the validity of these conveyances, and of the title of the defendant to the property in question, was now res adjudicata, by reason of certain proceedings in the circuit court of Pottawattamie county, Iowa. It seems that in June, 1871, Jeremiah Folsom deeded the real estate in question to his brother Simeon, taking back from him a bond to reconvey at the end of ten years, should certain conditions therein named be fulfilled. Afterwards Simeon conveyed to Frank under a power of sale said to be conveyed in said bond. Afterwards, and in 1872 or 1873, Frank, claiming to own the real estate by virtue of the deed from Simeon, and also claiming that Jeremiah had broken his covenant, began an action in the circuit court of Pottawattamie county, asking that his title to this real estate be quieted as against Jeremiah Folsom and his wife, whom he made defendants, and that he might be decreed to be the owner in fee of the premises.

Defendants answered, setting up in substance that the deed and bond constituted simply a security or mortgage, and not an absolute conveyance as between the parties, and that Frank had full notice of this fact, and consequently had no better title than Simeon. Defendants also filed a cross-bill, asking that the transaction be decreed to be a mortgage; that the same be redeemed, that an accounting might be had, and a time fixed within which the defendants might pay such sum and retain their title to the premises. To this answer and cross petition Frank Folsom replied, and the case was at issue. After the issues were thus joined, Frank conveyed a large portion of said real estate by two warranty deeds to Eliza F. Folsom, the defendant in this suit. Before the hearing Eliza filed an intervening petition, averring that she had become the owner of a portion of the premises described in the petition by purchase from Frank, and praying that her title might be established. Sometime thereafter the cause was argued upon the pleadings and proofs, and submitted to the court, and by the court taken under advisement. Subsequently, and before a decision was rendered, Frank Folsom was adjudicated a bankrupt in this court, and the plaintiff herein, having been appointed his assignee, appeared in the cause in Iowa, moved the court that the submission be set aside, and that he be substituted as party plaintiff for Frank Folsom; that all after proceedings in the cause be in his name, and that he be permitted to file the necessary pleadings in that behalf. The court refused to set aside the submission, but allowed him to be substituted as plaintiff, and to file an amendment to the petition setting up the fact of the bankruptcy of Folsom, and his appointment as assignee. This cause had already been commenced in this court. Afterwards, the court rendered a decree that the bond and deed were intended as a mortgage; that Frank Folsom took with notice; that his sister Eliza took pendente lite, and also with notice. In accordance with the prayer of the cross-bill the court directed an accounting, fixing the amount necessary to redeem, and provided that redemption might be made on or before June 1, 1880, which, if made, should then vest the property in the defendants free of any claim or lien in favor of the plaintiff or intervenor, and further provided that such redemption money should remain in court until the prospective rights of the plaintiff and intervenor should be determined; that if the redemption was not made, then the title to the land deeded by Frank to the intervenor should rest in her, and the residue in the plaintiff Radford, 'free and clear of any lien or claim of defendants, or either of them.'

The question now arises whether this decree vesting the title to a portion of the property in Frank, and to another portion in Eliza, estops the plaintiff in this suit from questioning the validity of the conveyance from Frank to Eliza made pending the legislation in Iowa. The general principles applicable to this class of questions are well settled.

When a question is distinctly put in issue, and tried and decided, the judgment operates as an estoppel as to that question in any subsequent suit between the same parties, whether the second suit be upon the same or upon some other cause of action. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Campbell v. Cross, 39 Ind. 155-158; Bank of the U.S. v. Beverly, 1 How. 134-135; Davis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 423. So, when an issue is made in a case and decided, whether with or without trial, the judgment is conclusive between the same parties in any subsequent action for the same cause, and as to all questions which were or might have been raised upon the first trial. Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. 418; Mallony v. Horan, 49 N.Y. 111. But, where a suit is tried and determined between parties, the mere fact that in that suit a question might have been raised, tried, and determined, does not prevent the raising of such question...

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5 cases
  • Reigler v. Sherlock
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • February 25, 1899
    ...104; 6 Ark. 178; 89 Pa.St. 363; 57 Ia. 672. The presumption is that both counts were passed upon. 17 Ore. 381; 102 Ill. 596; 105 Ill. 336; 3 F. 199; 60 Ia. 289; 34 La.Ann. 805; 81 197; 89 Pa.St. 363; 1 Black, Judg. § 101; 23 Conn. 585; 113 Ind. 127; 2 Black, Judg. § 611; 32 S.W. 353; 53 Ark......
  • Rauwolf v. Glass
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • January 3, 1898
    ...... Co., 55 F. 690; Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. 418;. Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U.S. 261; Nesbit v. Riverside Ind. Dist., 144 U.S. 610; Radford v. Folsom, 3 F. 199; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 344; Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. *784; Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U.S. ......
  • Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe Deposit Company of Philadelphia v. Fridenberg
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • May 18, 1896
    ...... Kelsey v. Murphy, 26 Pa. 78; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 1; Rockwell v. Langley, 19 Pa. 502; Phila. v. Girard, 45 Pa. 9; Radford v. Folsom, 3 F. 199; Kurtz v. Carr, 5 N.E. (Ind.). 692; Hasty v. Berry, 1 S.W. 8. . . If the. appellants have any cause of action ......
  • Garrett v. Greenwell
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • May 16, 1887
    ...... Berry, 1 S.W. 8; Nelson v. Bevens, 28 N.W. 331. And whether litigated or not, if disclosed in the pleading. Kurtz v. Carr, 5 N.E. 692; Radford v. Folsom, 3 F. 199; Brooks v. O'Harra, 8 F. 529. (2) The court erred in excluding the testimony of George. Vickery as to the words, actions and ......
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