Casteel v. Pieschek, s. 91-1227

Citation3 F.3d 1050
Decision Date23 August 1993
Docket NumberNos. 91-1227,92-1378,s. 91-1227
PartiesJohn CASTEEL, Mark S. Hinton, and Timothy A. Nesja, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Leon R. PIESCHEK, Sheriff of the Brown County Jail, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Charles D. INGRAM, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael L. BECHER, Sheriff of Clark County, Indiana, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Katherine W. Delahunt, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Chicago, IL (argued), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Daniel E. Moore, Jeffersonville, IN, Raymond J. Pollen, Mark A. McClendon (argued), Riordan, Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, Milwaukee, WI, for defendants-appellee.

Before POSNER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge. *

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

The Casteel and Ingram appeals were consolidated to consider two questions regarding county jail inmates' constitutional right of access to courts: the extent to which the requirements set out in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) for prison authorities must also be met by county jail officials, and the applicability of the prejudice requirement under DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442 (7th Cir.1988). Both cases involve individual capacity claims against public officials, 1 however, and therefore we must first resolve the qualified immunity question of whether Bounds' applicability to county jails was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations, and whether reasonable officials could believe the defendants' actions complied with the access-to-courts requirements. Because the record is insufficiently developed to decide this preliminary issue, we reverse and remand both cases.

I.

All four of the plaintiffs were held in county jails pending the outcome of various criminal proceedings against them. They allege that, while they were detained in the two county jails, the defendants deprived them of their constitutional right of access to courts. 2

A. The Casteel Record

The Casteel plaintiffs are convicted felons serving time in a Wisconsin state prison. Between 1985 and 1987, John Casteel (who sometimes refers to himself by the Muslim name "Tayr Kilaab al Ghashiyah (Khan)" but we will use his original and shorter name for ease of identification), Mark Hinton, and Timothy Nesja were held at the Brown County Jail in Green Bay, Wisconsin, for periods of up to seven months. On November 16, 1987, the Casteel plaintiffs filed their pro se complaint against several Brown County Jail officials. They alleged that the Brown County Jail had no law library, that they were denied materials such as pens and carbon paper with which to prepare legal documents, and that they had no access to anyone trained in the law. The legal claims they expressed an interest in pursuing while detained at the Brown County Jail include conditions of confinement claims, divorce and child custody proceedings, and claims regarding the denial of freedom to practice their religion, denial of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and undue restrictions on their visitation rights. After reviewing their complaint and organizing their claims into five categories, the district court granted their motion for appointment of counsel, Casteel R. 28, but there is no evidence that any appointment was ever made.

The Brown County Jail serves as a holding facility for the Brown County Circuit Court, housing prisoners who must appear in the circuit court for proceedings. The plaintiffs lived in the jail as pre-trial detainees, and at least Casteel and Nesja returned for additional proceedings after their convictions. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings against them, the three plaintiffs apparently had access to criminal counsel. Defendant Lauran O'Connor, the current commander of the Brown County Jail, asserted that the jail inmates have weekly access to the law library within the Brown County Circuit Court complex. He also maintained that the prisoners are given a set of jail rules that includes a statement about requesting library materials. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that the defendants did not inform them of any procedure to gain access to legal materials, and that their attempts to obtain legal materials or assistance were thwarted.

On September 11, 1989, after noting that Casteel could not serve as counsel for the other two petitioners because he is not a lawyer, the court required Hinton and Nesja to proceed pro se by signing all documents or to provide the court with the name of the attorney representing them. Casteel R. 42. Hinton signed his name to papers filed with the court from that point, but Nesja did not respond. On January 4, 1990, the Magistrate recommended dismissing Nesja for failure to prosecute. Twelve days later, Nesja filed an objection, claiming that he had not responded to the court's order because he had not received it. He began signing substantive pleadings filed after January. The district court, in its opinion of January 8, 1991, dismissed Nesja for failure to prosecute. The court emphasized Nesja's failure to provide the court with a change of address notice, despite having notified another court handling an unrelated matter.

Also on January 8, 1991, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. Rejecting the access-to-courts claim, the district court accepted the defendants' assertion that the inmates knew the procedures to access legal materials and did not consider whether a weekly request system was adequate to afford meaningful access to courts. In addition, the court did not compare the degree of access required from prison officials to that owed by county jail officials, and did not address the circumstances under which a showing of prejudice is required. In a footnote, the court ruled in the alternative that qualified immunity barred the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants.

B. The Ingram Record

Charles Ingram, a Kentucky state prisoner, was detained at the Clark County Jail in Jeffersonville, Indiana from September through November of 1991, while awaiting disposition of additional criminal charges against him. The record does not reveal whether he was represented by criminal defense counsel during his stay at the county jail. Ingram filed a complaint against the Clark County sheriff on December 2, 1991, alleging that he was denied meaningful access to courts while he was held in Clark County. Specifically, Ingram complained that the law library was inadequately stocked with legal materials and that the amount of time inmates were allowed in the law library was insufficient. On January 28, 1992, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the claim was frivolous.

II.

We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo,Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 925 F.2d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.1991), and we will affirm the district court's ruling on any basis supported by the record. Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Company, 996 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.1993). At this stage, we draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. "The non-moving party must identify specific facts to establish that there is a genuine triable issue." Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir.1993).

The Casteel defendants asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in their answer. 3 As the Supreme Court has made clear, qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from liability for damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 529, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). "[T]herefore, the availability of immunity in a given case should be decided as early as possible in litigation." Maxwell at 467 (citing Hunter v. Bryant, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). See alsoHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (qualified immunity is a "threshold" question).

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "public officials performing discretionary functions are protected against suits from damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510, 511 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "In determining whether the right alleged to have been violated was 'clearly established,' the constitutional right must be identified in a particularized sense with respect to the circumstances of the alleged violation." Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 309 (7th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). In other words, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established "before the defendant acted or failed to act." Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988)). This requires the plaintiff to offer either a closely analogous case or evidence that the defendants' conduct is so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts. SeeRice, at 1173-74; McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.1992) (holding a gun to the head of a child and threatening to pull the trigger is plainly excessive force, so closely analogous case is not needed to put police officer on notice). To determine the applicability of qualified immunity, the defendants' actions must be compared to what a reasonable official would believe was...

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