American Dental Ass'n v. Shalala
Citation | 3 F.3d 445 |
Decision Date | 27 August 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-5038,92-5038 |
Parties | , 62 USLW 2142 AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.Civ. No. 90-2673).
Melvin C. Garbow, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Andrew T. Karron and Patricia H. Anderson, Washington, DC.
Sylvia T. Kaser, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Stuart M. Gerson, Acting Atty. Gen., Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, at the time the briefs were filed, and Barbara C. Biddle, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC.
Bennett Boskey, Ellis Lyons, and Edward A. Groobert, Washington, DC, filed a brief for amicus curiae, American Optometric Assn.
Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, D.H. GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge MIKVA.
The American Dental Association and others (referred to collectively as "ADA") appeal a district court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS" or "the Department") in an action challenging HHS regulations implementing the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.
The Health Care Act requires any "entity" which makes payments in settlement of (or in satisfaction of a judgment in) a medical malpractice claim to report the payments to a central data bank established by the Department. The district court held that regulations requiring any "person or entity" to report, and including fee refunds in the class Although the Act does not define the term "entity," its language and structure indicate clearly that Congress did not intend the statutory term "entity" to include individual practitioners. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to HHS for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[303 U.S.App.D.C. 232] of payments that must be reported, represent reasonable interpretations of the reporting provisions of the Act. ADA claims error, arguing that the regulations impermissibly enlarge the class of payors that must report and the type of payments that must be reported.
Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("the Health Care Act" or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 11101-11152, to improve the quality of medical care and to restrict the ability of incompetent doctors and dentists to move from state to state and thereby evade discovery or disclosure of their damaging or incompetent performance. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 11101(1), (2). The Act directs HHS to establish a national data bank for the collection and dissemination of malpractice information. The Act further requires that
[e]ach entity (including an insurance company) which makes payments under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report ... information respecting the payment and circumstances thereof.
Id. Sec. 11131(a). The Act also provides that failure to report as required is subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000. Id. Sec. 11131(c).
The HHS regulation implementing the reporting requirements of the Health Care Act requires that "[e]ach person or entity ... which makes a payment under an insurance policy, self-insurance, or otherwise" must report. 45 C.F.R. Sec. 60.7 (emphasis added). ADA argued below that this regulation violates the statute in two respects. First, it expands the class of "payors" required to report from any "entity" to any "person or entity"--thus sweeping in individual doctors and dentists who are not required to report under the Act. Second, it enlarges the class of payments that must be reported to include "non-insurance" types of payments such as fee refunds.
The district court upheld the HHS regulation on cross-motions for summary judgment, holding that "[t]he interpretation of the statute that plaintiffs endorse would undermine the purpose of the Act...." American Dental Association v. Sullivan, No. 90-2673, 1991 WL 277332 (D.D.C. December 12, 1991). This appeal followed.
We evaluate an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers under the familiar two-step test of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. We proceed to Chevron 's second step, and approve any reasonable agency construction of the statute, only if the statute is silent or ambiguous on the disputed point. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782; accord Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171, 109 S.Ct. 2854, 2863, 106 L.Ed.2d 134 (1989); Atlanta College of Medical and Dental Careers v. Riley, 987 F.2d 821, 827 (D.C.Cir.1993); Wolverine Power Co. v. FERC, 963 F.2d 446, 449-50 (D.C.Cir.1992).
We resolve this dispute at the first step of the Chevron analysis. The Health Care Act reveals unmistakably that Congress did not intend to encompass any individual doctor or dentist as an "entity" that must report to the National Practitioner Data Bank. The Act does not define "entity," but the term as used in the Act refers uniformly to groups and organizations. Whenever the Act discusses individual persons, words such as "physician," "doctor," "dental surgeon," "individual," and "person" are consistently employed. Moreover, the phrase "person or The statute invariably employs the term "entity" to describe organizations and groups that are involved in the evaluation of medical practitioners. For example, "health care entity" is defined as follows:
(ii) an entity (including a health maintenance organization or group medical practice) that provides health care services and that follows a formal peer review process ..., and
(iii) ... a professional society (or committee thereof) of physicians or other licensed health care practitioners that follows a formal peer review process....
42 U.S.C. Sec. 11151(4)(A). Thus, "entity" refers in a single statutory definition to hospitals, health maintenance organizations, group medical practices, and professional societies. Elsewhere throughout the Act, "entity" often appears shortly after "health care entity" as a shorthand reference to the longer term. See, e.g., id. Secs. 11111(b); 11112(b)(3)(A)(ii); 11133(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(C), (a)(2), (c)(1); 11137(c).
The Health Care Act also uses "entity" in reference to other groups and organizations, such as state boards of medical examiners, see id. Secs. 11132(b), 11133(c)(2) (); insurance companies, see id. Sec. 11131(a) (); and, again, hospitals, see id. Sec. 11151(5) (). We have reviewed each and every use of the term "entity" in the Act--the Congress's unvarying practice is to use the term to refer to groups and organizations. We will not attribute a different meaning to the term in the section requiring all entities to report malpractice payments. See Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, OWCP, 461 U.S. 624, 633, 103 S.Ct. 2045, 2050, 76 L.Ed.2d 194 (1983) (); Wolverine Power, 963 F.2d at 450.
The Health Care Act uses terms other than "entity" whenever referring to individuals, whether or not they are doctors or dentists. A "physician" is defined in the Act as "a doctor of medicine or osteopathy or a doctor of dental surgery or medical dentistry legally authorized to practice ... or any individual who ... holds himself or herself out" as such. Id. Sec. 11151(8). "The terms 'licensed health care practitioner' and 'practitioner' mean ... an individual (other than a physician) who is licensed or otherwise authorized by the States to provide health care services." Id. Sec. 11151(6). The Act also makes ample use of the word "person" to refer to individuals. See, e.g., id. Secs. 11111(a)(2) (); 11111(a)(1)(B)-(D) ( ). These defined terms are used repeatedly throughout the Act--but neither appears in Sec. 11131(a), which sets out the Act's general reporting requirement. We find great significance in the fact that Congress chose to use only the term "entity" in setting out the requirement to report malpractice payments. See Wolverine Power, 963 F.2d at 451 ( ).
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