Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus

• Decision Date: 08 December 1885
• Citation: 3 N.E. 818,104 Ind. 133
• Parties: Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

104 Ind. 133

3 N.E. 818

Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends

v.Garrigus.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed December 8, 1885.

Appeal from Marion superior court.

Finch & Finch, for appellant.

Shepard & Martindale and L. C. Garrigus, for appellee.

ZOLLARS, J.

Appellee brought this action to recover from appellant $1,500, which he claims is due him under the charter, constitution, and by-laws of the order. The order was incorporated under section 3502, Rev. St. 1881. Some of its principal objects, as declared in the articles of incorporation, are to unite its members in bonds of fraternity, aid, and protection; to improve the condition of the members morally, socially, and materially; and to establish a relief fund, from which members, who have complied with all its rules and regulations, or persons by such members lawfully designated, or the legal heirs of such members, may receive a benefit in a sum not exceeding $3,000, which shall be paid, either when a member reaches the age of 75 years, or when, by reason of disease or accident, such member becomes permanently disabledfrom following his usual or some other occupation, or upon satisfactory evidence of the death of such member, and when all the conditions regulating such payment have been complied with. Among the general officers designated in the articles are a supreme councilor, a supreme recorder, a supreme treasurer, and a supreme medical examiner. Among the powers named in the articles, it is declared that the association shall have power to make and change its own constitution and laws, and to grant, revoke, and change constitutions for all grand and subordinate councils of the order, and to finally decide all matters and appeals pertaining to the order which shall be properly presented to it. The constitution adopted by the order provides for the same general officers, declares the same objects, and asserts the same powers. It is there declared that the order shall have power to grant charters for grand councils in any state, territory, or country not under the jurisdiction of a grand council; that it shall have exclusive power to grant charters to subordinate councils, which shall be, until the formation of a grand council, under the immediate and direct jurisdiction of the order, the supreme council of the Order of Chosen Friends. There is another provision that the decisions of the supreme council on all matters pertaining to the order, and on all appeals properly presented, shall be final. The duties of the supreme medical examiner are defined as follows:

“The supreme medical examiner shall carefully examine all reports and papers relating to the permanent disability of a member of the order, and render a decision thereon. He shall examine and report on all medical examinations referred to him, and perform such other duties as the laws and usages of the order require. He shall submit, at each annual session of the supreme council, a written report of all his official acts during the recess.”

It is further provided that grand councils shall have no control of the relief fund. Among the committees provided for by the by-laws of the order, is a committee on grievances. The duties and powers of this committee, as fixed by the by-laws, are as follows:

“The committee on grievances and appeals shall examine all cases of grievances coming before the supreme council, by appeal or otherwise, and report their opinion, together with a distinct statement of all questions at issue, to the supreme council.”

The relief fund laws adopted by the order provide for the creation of a relief fund. One section of these laws provides that, upon permanent disability, one-half of the amount named in the relief fund certificate held by the member shall be paid to him at once. Another section is as follows:

“Should a member become permanently disabled from following his or her usual or other occupation, by reason of disease or accident, on receipt of the proper notice the supreme council shall order a board of three physicians (who shall be members of the order, if possible) to be selected by the subordinate council, whose duty it shall be to make a careful examination of the member's condition, report as to the permanency of the disability, and, upon their recommendation, and the approval of the supreme medical examiner, the member shall be entitled to one-half the benefit: provided, that where the disability is caused by accident, and is patent to the eyes of all, the examination by the board of physicians may be dispensed with,” etc.

Another section provides that, upon the receipt of the proper notice of the permanent disability of a member, the supreme recorder shall draw an order on the supreme treasurer in favor of such member for the amount, and forward the same to the treasurer of the subordinate council of which the disabled person is a member. Another section provides that the treasurer of the subordinate council shall deliver the order to the member, and receive from him his relief fund certificate.

Basing his claim upon these provisions of the articles of incorporation, the constitution, by-laws, and relief fund laws, appellee charges in his complaint that the supreme council instituted and established a subordinate council in the state of Kentucky, known as “Logan Council, No. 12,” of which he was and is a member, holding a relief fund certificate for $3,000; that in May, 1883, without any agency, fault, or negligence on his part, he received a pistol-shot wound in the elbow, which permanently disabled him from following his usual or other occupation, and that his disability was and is patent to the eyes of all. He, however, through the Logan council, notified the supreme council, and it in turn notified the Logan council, to appoint a board of physicians to examine the injury. The board was appointed, and reported in favor of allowing and paying to appellee $1,500,-the one-half of the amount named in his relief fund certificate. Appellant has refused and still refuses to pay the amount.

Appellant answered this complaint in four paragraphs, the first, of which is a general denial. The second is based upon the theory that, as there was no grand council in the state of Kentucky, Logan Council, No. 12, was under the immediate jurisdiction of the supreme council; that the provisions of the articles of incorporation, the constitution, by-laws, and relief fund laws of the supreme council, above referred to and set out, were intended to and do afford the members of the order an adequate tribunal within the order for the settlement of such controversies. It alleges that the report of the board of physicians was referred to the supreme medical examiner, who decided against allowing appellee's claim; that he might have appealed from this adverse decision to the supreme council, but did not do so, and that therefore he cannot prosecute this action. In short, the theory of the plea is that he did not first exhaust the remedies provided within the order, and cannot, therefore, have recourse to a court of law. The third paragraph of the answer charges that appellee should not recover in this action for the reason, among others, that he became engaged in an affray with a party or parties, whose names are unknown to the defendant, during which (he) the plaintiff received a pistol-shot wound in the right arm, said wound being inflicted willfully and intentionally by said third party or parties, and that the same was therefore not accidental. It is further charged that appellee was not thereby permanently disabled from following his usual occupation. There are many other averments in this paragraph, but the above are the real questions presented thereby. The fourth paragraph is based upon the theory that under the provisions of the articles of incorporation, etc., above referred to and set out, the supreme council is made the arbiter and court of appeals for the final settlement of all controversies between the order and the members. It is alleged that appellee called for the appointment of a board of physicians; that they were appointed, and reported in favor of his claim; that this report was referred to the supreme medical examiner; that the supreme medical examiner decided against the claim, and reported his decision to the supreme council; and that, upon the receipt of such report, the supreme council refused to allow appellee's claim.

The second and fourth answers present these questions: First. Do the constitution, by-laws, and relief fund laws provide a tribunal within the order, to which a member may appeal, in a case like this? Second. If there is such a tribunal, and a mode of appeal thereto provided, must a member, in a case like this, take such appeal and exhaust his remedies in such courts of the order before resorting to a court of law to enforce his rights? Third. If the supreme council, as such appellate court, passes upon such a claim adversely, is the decision so final and conclusive that the member may not resort to a court of law? All of these questions were exhaustively examined and ruled in the negative in the case of Bauer v. Samson Lodge K. of P., 102 Ind. 262; S. C. 1 N. E. Rep. 571. The by-laws and regulations involved in that case more clearly define the tribunals within the order, and the mode of appeal thereto, than do the by-laws, etc., involved in the case before us. Here, when a matter has been referred to the board of physicians, and they have passed upon it, their report goes to the supreme medical examiner for his examination and decision. He is to report his official acts to the supreme council. So far as we can discover, there is no mode provided in the by-laws, or otherwise, by which a member, in a case like this, can appeal from the decision of the supreme medical examiner, or invoke the decision of the supreme council in approval or disapproval of the decision of that officer. However that may be, it is very...