Carrington v. Starbucks Corp., D072392

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Citation241 Cal.Rptr.3d 647,30 Cal.App.5th 504
Decision Date27 November 2018
Docket NumberD072392
Parties Kileigh CARRINGTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.

30 Cal.App.5th 504
241 Cal.Rptr.3d 647

Kileigh CARRINGTON, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.

D072392

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed November 27, 2018


Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Jonathan P. Slowik, Gregory W. Knopp, and Rex S. Heinke, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Sullivan Law Group, Eric K. Yaeckel, William B. Sullivan, San Diego, and Andrea J. Torres-Figueroa, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GUERRERO, J.

30 Cal.App.5th 507

Kileigh Carrington filed a complaint against her former employer, Starbucks Corporation, asserting a representative cause of action under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) ( Labor Code, § 2698 et seq. ),1 claiming Starbucks failed to properly provide meal breaks or pay meal period premiums for certain employees in violation of sections 226.7 and 512. In a bifurcated bench trial on plaintiff's action, the trial court determined Starbucks was liable for these violations and imposed penalties of $150,000, with 75 percent thereof payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25 percent payable to Carrington and the employees she represented in the action. The trial court entered

30 Cal.App.5th 508

judgment in Carrington's favor. Starbucks appeals, contending Carrington failed to prove she is an aggrieved employee and failed to prove a representative claim. We conclude there was no legal error and find that substantial evidence supports the judgment; accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint

In her complaint, Carrington alleged that Starbucks implemented a meal period policy under which employees who worked

241 Cal.Rptr.3d 653

slightly more than five hours were not provided meal breaks within the first five hours of work and were not paid meal period premiums when meal breaks were not timely provided, in violation of sections 512, subdivision (a), and 226.7, subdivisions (a) and (b). As a result, Starbucks failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of section 226 and failed to provide employees with all wages earned and unpaid at termination in violation of sections 201, 202, and 203. Carrington sought civil penalties and unpaid wages under sections 2699, subdivision (a), and 558, subdivision (a), and an award of attorney fees and costs under section 2699, subdivision (g)(1). Carrington attached to her complaint two letters she previously sent to the LWDA and Starbucks providing written notice of her claims, as required under section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(1).

II. Starbucks's Summary Judgment Motions

Starbucks moved for summary judgment on Carrington's claims, arguing that Carrington's meal break claim failed because, although her time records reflected she twice started a break after working more than five hours and was not paid a meal premium, Carrington could not recall the details surrounding those shifts, including which supervisors or managers were working or why she did not begin her breaks until more than five hours had elapsed. Starbucks argued that her lack of memory regarding the specific instances of these shifts, coupled with Starbucks's policy to provide employees scheduled to work shifts longer than five hours with compliant meal periods, indicated summary judgment should be awarded in Starbucks's favor. The court denied summary judgment, finding that Carrington created triable issues as to whether Starbucks failed to provide timely meal breaks with her declarations that Starbucks's standard policy was that no one could take a break without receiving permission and her manager or shift supervisor always dictated when she could take a break.

Starbucks subsequently filed a "motion regarding trial of representative claim," contending a representative PAGA action was not appropriate because

30 Cal.App.5th 509

no uniform policy or practice could explain why employees took a late break; as such, individualized inquiries into each late meal break were required. Starbucks submitted more than 100 declarations from various California employees in support of this motion. The court denied the motion, finding it was one "for summary judgment or adjudication in disguise," and Starbucks had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for summary judgment motions. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)

III. Trial

A. Carrington's Case

1. Starbucks's Person Most Knowledgeable

Carrington's primary witness at trial was Maryann J., Starbucks's vice president of partner resources2 for the retail operations, west division, whom Starbucks had previously designated as its person most knowledgeable on Starbucks's meal period policies and practices applicable in California. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.230.)

Maryann testified that partners are required to document their daily time by punching or clocking in and out at the start and end of their shifts, and at the start and end of their breaks, using either the store's point of service system (cash

241 Cal.Rptr.3d 654

register) or the manager's back office laptop. Starbucks retains records documenting the employees' punches. Maryann testified that these records were tied to each partner's partner number and would accurately reflect each partner's punches in and out of the system.

Store managers were authorized to edit partners' time records and used a "punch communication log" to document any such changes. These changes are incorporated into the time records retained by Starbucks.

Maryann testified that, during the limitations period, Starbucks used two different computerized scheduling systems to schedule partner shifts: the ALS and GLS systems. The GLS system was the primary system Starbucks used to create work schedules. Maryann explained that the "system will generate meal breaks on the schedule if a partner is scheduled more than five hours." The meal breaks will always be scheduled to start before the beginning of the fifth hour.3 Maryann testified that the scheduling system will not schedule a meal break for a partner scheduled to work exactly five hours or less in a

30 Cal.App.5th 510

workday.4 She admitted that there are occasions when a store partner is scheduled to work less than five hours but ultimately works more than five hours. On such occasions, the computerized scheduling system does not schedule a meal period.

Maryann testified that Starbucks uses the computerized scheduling system to generate "daily coverage reports" which are posted in stores to communicate to partners when they should take breaks. There is no other documentation provided to the partners to give them notice of a scheduled meal period. Maryann testified that, ordinarily, a store manager would print out a daily coverage report and the shift supervisor would put it on a clipboard, modifying it throughout the day to record adjustments to the day's schedule. As modified, the daily coverage reports remained within the individual stores; Starbucks maintains no formal record of any changes.

Maryann confirmed that the "partner guide" Starbucks provides to every newly-hired partner states, " ‘All partners in nonexempt jobs receive an uninterrupted, 30-minute meal break if scheduled to work a shift of a minimum duration.’ " She explained that, in California, a shift of minimum duration is a work shift scheduled to be in excess of five hours. She stated that "[a] shift scheduled to be five hours directly would not be eligible for a meal break period."

Maryann confirmed that Starbucks's "partner resources manual"—a reference guide provided to managers to provide them with in-depth explanations of Starbucks's policies—similarly provided, " ‘[a]n unpaid ... uninterrupted meal break of 30 minutes' duration will be provided to each nonexempt partner ... if scheduled to work a shift of minimum duration.’ " Maryann acknowledged that a partner's meal period could be impacted in a number of circumstances, such as a sudden customer rush or a store partner calling in sick for a scheduled shift. In instances where a partner's meal break was required to be cut short, Starbucks's policy was to either provide

241 Cal.Rptr.3d 655

the partner with a "proper" meal break or pay a meal break premium.5

30 Cal.App.5th 511

Maryann testified that Starbucks provided its California store managers with the "SM 100 Partner Resources Practices California Work Rules Supplement" as a training tool with respect to the company's California-specific meal period policies and practices. That document states the following policies:

"The following circumstances will result in payment of a break penalty:

[¶] ... [¶]

"The partner is scheduled for a shift of five (5) hours or less, but is directed by a shift supervisor, assistant store manager, or store manager to work more than five hours and the partner is not provided a meal break before the end of the fifth hour.

"The
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