Eastman v. University of Michigan

Decision Date08 September 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-2424,92-2424
Citation30 F.3d 670
Parties93 Ed. Law Rep. 121 Susan A. EASTMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN; The Board of Regents of the University of Michigan; James J. Duderstat; Neal D. Nielsen; Virginia Latta Smith; Paul W. Brown; James L. Waters; Deane Baker; Nellie M. Varner; Philip H. Power; Shirley McFee; Alfred A. Stuart; Paul W. Wright; Virginia Nordby; Sandra M. Dunn, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Mark Granzotto (argued), Neal Bush, Detroit, MI, Thomas W. Kielty, Sacramento, CA (briefed), for plaintiff-appellant.

Cindy H. Wilder (briefed), Debra A. Kowich (argued), University of Michigan, Office of Gen. Counsel, Ann Arbor, MI, for defendants-appellees.

Before: BOGGS and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

Susan Eastman brought this Sec. 1983 suit against the University of Michigan and various of its officers, alleging that the University's residency requirement for in-state tuition purposes violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Because the record is insufficiently developed for us to determine conclusively what the University's residency rules are, we reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.

I

Eastman attended the University from September 1980 through May 1982. During that time, the University classified her as a "non-resident" student. In September 1982, she left school and moved to California with her husband to look for work. She had not yet graduated. Eastman, who is originally from Pennsylvania, asserts that in 1989 she and her husband, who is from Nebraska, decided to return to Michigan and make it their permanent home. While living in California, Eastman applied in September 1989 to the University's school of art and was readmitted as a non-resident student in October 1989 for winter term 1990. In November 1989, Eastman's husband received a job offer from a Michigan law firm. Eastman says that, without that offer, they would not have returned to Michigan. In January 1990, when the University's winter 1990 term began, Eastman and her husband moved to Michigan, after having resided in California and, briefly, New York for the preceding eight years. Eastman's husband worked for the law firm from April 1990 until September 1990. He then clerked for a federal district judge in Michigan, beginning in September 1990.

On September 24, 1990, the University received Eastman's Application for Resident Classification for University Purposes for fall term 1990. At that time, Eastman had been physically present in Michigan for about nine months (from January through September 1990). On November 21, the University informed her that it was "unable to render a decision on the merit" of her application because she had not "physically resided in Michigan on a continuous basis for at least one year immediately preceding the first day of [fall term 1990 classes]," as required by the University's Residence Regulations. Eastman appealed the assistant registrar's decision to the University's Residency Appeal Committee. The Committee found that she had failed to meet the requirement of residence for one year and therefore upheld the assistant registrar's "decision not to rule on the merit of [her] case." Eastman then filed suit in September 1991. She seeks to have part of the regulations declared unconstitutional and requests an injunction ordering the University to review the merits of her residency application. 1

The Residence Regulations, adopted by the University in 1974, define a non-resident as "one whose domicile is elsewhere." The Regulations contain the presumption that "normally a student comes to the University of Michigan for the primary or sole purpose of attending the University rather than to establish a domicile in Michigan." Therefore, the Regulations provide that a student enrolled as a non-resident shall remain classified as a non-resident throughout her attendance as a student unless she demonstrates that she has established a Michigan domicile. The Regulations further state that no student shall be eligible for classification as a resident unless she is "domiciled in Michigan and has resided in Michigan continuously for not less than one year immediately preceding the first day of classes of the term for which classification is sought" (emphasis added). To be considered domiciled in Michigan, the student must be in "continuous physical presence" in the state and intend to make Michigan her "permanent home, not only while in attendance at the University, but indefinitely thereafter as well." The Regulations do not indicate whether resident status, if granted, is applied retroactively to the time that domicile was established.

The assistant registrar, in his affidavit, stated that "[i]n reviewing a student's residency status, [he] first determine[s] whether the student came to the State of Michigan for the sole or primary purpose of attending the University rather than to establish a domicile in Michigan." The assistant registrar bases his decision on the student's Application for Admission, her Application for Resident Classification, and "information obtained through verification of the information provided by the student." A student who is determined not to have come to the state for the sole or primary purpose of attending the University is considered a resident and is not required to meet the one-year residency requirement. The assistant registrar stated that, in Eastman's case, he concluded that she was a non-resident when admitted because she had applied, been admitted, and had accepted her admission before her husband had interviewed for and accepted a job in the state. He therefore determined that she was ineligible for classification as a resident until she had been in Michigan for one year.

After some discovery and a hearing before the magistrate judge, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and granted summary judgment to defendants. Eastman appeals to this court, arguing that summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact and because she had not been afforded adequate discovery.

II

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists. EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir.1990). Eastman contends that the University's regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We evaluate such a challenge under a "rational basis" standard of review. To pass constitutional muster, the regulations must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1842 n. 7, 75 L.Ed.2d 879 (1983); Hooban v. Boling, 503 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 920, 95 S.Ct. 1585, 43 L.Ed.2d 788 (1975).

A brief discussion of the related concepts of domicile and residence may be useful before examining the constitutionality of the University's regulations. Generally, an individual's "domicile" is his "true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment." It is the place to which he returns whenever he is absent. Black's Law Dictionary 484 (6th ed.1990). See also Martinez, 461 U.S. at 331, 103 S.Ct. at 1844. "Residence," in contrast, requires both physical presence and an intention to remain some indefinite period of time, but not necessarily permanently. Black's Law Dictionary at 1308-09; Martinez, 461 U.S. at 330-31, 103 S.Ct. at 1843-44. Thus, domicile is an individual's permanent place of abode where he need not be physically present, and residence is where the individual is physically present much of the time. An individual consequently may have several residences, but only one domicile.

Confusion results when, for example, "bona fide resident" is used in place of "domiciliary," under the definitions above, as some courts (including this one) have done. See, e.g., Hooban, 503 F.2d at 651; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2237, 37 L.Ed.2d...

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