Camp v. O'hara

• Decision Date: 31 March 1860
• Citation: 30 Ga. 170
• Parties: CAMP. v. MATHESON & O'HARA et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 Ga. 170

CAMP. v. MATHESON & O'HARA et al.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

MARCH TERM, 1860.

In Equity, in Butts Superior Court. Decision by Judge Cabaniss, at Chambers, 1oth September, 1859.

This was a hill by Nathan F. Camp, against Matheson & O'Harra and others, creditors of complainants, for an injunction to restrain defendants from selling and disposing of certain goods, or a remnant of a stock of goods, bought by defendants, through their agent, from the complainant, and by him turned' over and delivered to them in payment and satisfaction of their claims against him; and further, to enjoin them from dismissing their actions at law, pending for the recovery of those claims, and from transferring said claims.

Judge Cabaniss, to whom the bill was presented for his sanction, and for an order for the injunction prayed, refused the same, and, passed the following order:

"In chambers, Sept. 18th, 1859. The injunction prayed for in the within bill is refused, on the grounds that there is no equity in the bill to authorize an order and prevent the plaintiffs in the common law actions from dismissing theirsuits if they see proper to do so; nor to authorize an. order for the arrest of defendants, and to stop the sale of the goods which have been turned over to the agent of defendants to pay their demands against complainant; and further, it is refused because the 9th rule in equity has not been complied with."

To which refusal to grant the injunction prayed for, counsel for complainant excepted, and assigns as error said refusal.

The facts stated in the bill, and relied upon as constituting its equity and grounds for the injunction, are sufficiently recited and set out in the following opinion of the court.

L. T. Doyal, for plaintiff in error.

J. J. Floyd, contra.

By the Court.—Lumpkin, j., delivering the opinion.

This is the second time this case has been before this court, and whether we look to the bill alone, or to the bill and the agreement which is appended, we see nothing to require the interposition of a court of equity.

The case is simply this: In 1836, the complainant, who was a merchant, found himself in failing circumstances. He owed debts in New York and Charleston to a large amount; and besides these, there were others which had already gone into judgment against him in Butts county. A Mr. Alamong presents himself as the agent of the city debts, amounting to $5,095.25. Suits had already been brought up on a portion of these claims. He entered into a contract with Mr. Camp to take his stock of goods for the demands which he held. It was further stipulated that if the goods, or any part of them, should be seized and sold by the outstanding judgments, in that event the suits then pending at the instance of the city creditors were to proceed to judgment and be enforced...