Crutchfield v. City of Warrensburg

• Decision Date: 23 April 1888
• Parties: J. M. CRUTCHFIELD, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF WARRENSBURG, Respondent.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

30 Mo.App. 456

J. M. CRUTCHFIELD, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF WARRENSBURG, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City.

April 23, 1888

APPEAL from Johnson Circuit Court, HON. CHARLES W. SLOAN, Judge.

Affirmed.

The case is stated in the opinion.

J. M CRUTCHFIELD, for the appellant.

I. Where one person renders services for another, that are of benefit to and accepted by the other, the law imposes upon the latter an obligation to render to the former a reasonable compensation for the value of the services. Bish. on Cont [Enlarged Ed.] secs. 217, 219, 238, and cases cited.

II. The law creates and implies contracts against corporations, the same as other persons. Bish. Cont., sec. 1020; 2 Field's Briefs, secs. 211-14; Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; Building Society v. Crowell, 65 Ill. 458; White v. Franklin, 22 Pick. [Mass.] 181; Parrish v. Wheeler, 22 N.Y. 494.

III. Where the services are fully performed by plaintiff, and nothing remains but a duty on defendant's part to pay the price agreed upon, plaintiff is not bound to sue on the written contract, but may sue on the common counts in assumpsit. Stout v. St. Louis Tribune Co., 52 Mo. 342.

IV. A statute requiring contracts to be in writing does not extend to implied contracts. Bish on Cont., secs. 193-9.

V. A party receiving the benefit of services rendered under an oral contract, even though required by law to be in writing must pay for them. McConnell v. Braner, 63 Mo. 461; Hoyle v. Bush, 14 Mo.App. 408; Bishop on Cont., sec. 1283.

VI. If a corporation's attorney, after his term of office has expired, continues in the management of a case in which the corporation is interested, without objection from, and with the knowledge of, the corporation and his successor, he may recover for his services. Dill. on Mun. Corp. [1 Ed.] sec. 399.

VII. If services beneficial to a municipal corporation are accepted by express corporate action, the corporation is liable. Dill. on Mun. Corp. [1 Ed.] secs. 383-4. And strong evidence of its assent is not required. Ib., sec. 386.

VIII. The statute of frauds, to be of any avail, must be specially pleaded. Donaldson v. Newman, 9 Mo.App. 285.

JOHN J. HYER, for the respondent.

I. The city is not liable on quantum meruit for attorneys' fees. Woolfolk v. Randolph Co., 83 Mo. 501; Wolcott v. Lawrence Co., 26 Mo. 275; Const. 1875, art. 4, sec. 48; Rev. Stat., 1879, sec. 5360.

II. The mayor and city attorney cannot bind the city. Thrush v. City, 21 Mo.App. 394; Keating v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 416.

III. The board of aldermen cannot act by resolution. They must act by ordinance. Therefore, their resolution paying for appellant's brief was no ratification. Rev. Stat., secs. 4939, 4944; Rumsey Mfg. Co. v. Schell City, 21 Mo.App. 175.

IV. One contracting with or performing services for a municipal corporation, does so at his peril, and must take notice of the powers of the agents with whom he contracts. Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Mister v. Kansas City, 18 Mo.App. 217; Keating v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 416.

V. As to ratification: Woodruff v. Railroad, 10 Cent. Rep. 442.

VI. There can be no equitable estoppel. The board of aldermen act ministerially, and its acts do not estop the corporation. They bear the same relation to the city that the county courts do to the county. Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203.

VII. It devolved on plaintiff to plead and prove a contract, i. e., an ordinance. Given v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149.

PHILIPS P. J.

This action was instituted in a justice's court, and based on an account for services rendered by plaintiff to said city, as an attorney in the case of City of Warrensburg v. Simpson, reported in 22 Mo.App. 695. The plaintiff recovered judgment in the justice's court, and the defendant appealed to the circuit court. In the latter court the cause was submitted to the court, without the intervention of a jury, on the following agreed statement of facts:

" It is agreed and stipulated by and between the parties aforesaid that the following are the facts in the above entitled cause:

1. That defendant is a city of the fourth class under the general laws of Missouri.

2. That plaintiff was city attorney for defendant from the twelfth day of April, 1885, until the twentieth day of April, 1886.

3. That at the ____ term of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and on the seventh day of March, 1886, this plaintiff as such city attorney entered an appearance in such court of appeals in a cause in which said city was plaintiff and appellee, and Robert Simpson et al. were defendants and appellants, and consented to a continuance of said cause until the ____ day of May, 1886.

4. That at said ____ day of May, 1886, said plaintiff, his time of office having then expired, entered his appearance, filed his brief, and rendered the service usual for attorneys in said court, for which he now brings this suit to recover a reasonable fee.

5. That said amount claimed, to-wit, twenty-five dollars, would be a reasonable fee for the services rendered in the cause, if plaintiff is entitled to recover.

6. That after the rendition of said services, and on the ____ day of June, 1886, the mayor and board of aldermen of said city by resolution ordered a warrant drawn in favor of Baldwin, Richards & Company, for the sum of ____ dollars, which sum included, among other things, payment to said firm for printing the brief of plaintiff in said cause of the City v. Simpson.

7. That on the ____ day of August, 1886, plaintiff presented to the mayor and board of aldermen his account for fees for said services, and payment thereof was refused.

8. That said cause of said city against Simpson et al. was a cause originating in the mayor's court of said city of Warrensburg, during the term of office of this plaintiff, wherein said defendant Simpson was fined in the sum of ______ dollars; that under the ordinance of said city a fee of two dollars and a half was taxed in favor of the plaintiff herein; that said cause was thereupon appealed to the Johnson criminal court, and the defendant Simpson was therein fined five dollars and costs, including an additional fee of five dollars taxed in favor of this plaintiff, the city attorney; that the decision in the court of appeals aforesaid, reported in volume ____, page ____, Court of Appeals Reports, and made a part hereof, affirmed the decision of the said criminal court; and that thereupon and since the institution of this suit, on the thirtieth day of November, 1886, said fine was collected by the then mayor of said city defendant; that the city board of aldermen paid for the printing of the brief (a copy of which is herewith filed) knowing that plaintiff had made the same after his term of office had expired; that plaintiff has never been paid for attending to the case in the court of appeals; that he attended to the case at the request of the mayor and city attorney; that plaintiff turned over to his successor all papers in said cause when his term ended, and that he was afterwards requested to prepare the brief and attend to this cause in the court of appeals; that the continuance of the case in the court of appeals was consented to as a matter of professional courtesy to S. P. Sparks, appellant's attorney, who had not time to attend to his side of the case at that time; that all services sued for in this case were rendered after plaintiff's term of office as city attorney ended, but that the mayor and city attorney claim that when they so requested plaintiff to conduct said case they did so as a matter of courtesy to plaintiff, and in so doing did not attempt or expect to bind the city herein, while plaintiff claims he had no notice of their said plan or intention not to bind said city. The parties to the above case by their attorneys agree that the foregoing are all the facts in the above cause, reserving expressly the right to object to their competency and relevancy and all references as to their legal effect."

The court held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and rendered judgment accordingly, from which plaintiff has appealed.

The agreed statement of the facts is equivalent to a special verdict. The only question is as to the law arising on the admitted facts.

The defendant is a city of the fourth class under the Revised Statutes. The whole legislative powers are vested in the mayor and aldermen. Their acts, as a municipal body, are evidenced by ordinances duly passed; without which the corporation is not bound, even where it...