Patterson v. Graham

• Decision Date: 24 March 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 460,140 Ill. 531
• Parties: PATTERSON et al. v. GRAHAM.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

140 Ill. 531

30 N.E. 460

PATTERSON et al.

v.GRAHAM.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.

Action of forcible detainer by Michael Graham against Charles T. Patterson and William Wayman. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

E. A. Sherburne, for appellants.

Johnston & Gray, for appellee.

WALKIN, J.

On the 10th day of September, 1886, appellee leased to appellants the following described property, to-wit: ‘The building known as ‘Number One Hundred and Forty-Two (142) South Halstead Street;’' the lease providing that said building was ‘to be occupied for a music store, and for no other purpose whatever.’ The term was to be from September 15, 1886, to April 30, 1890; the rent for the whole term to be $2,827.50, payable monthly, in installments, on the first day of each month. These installments for the months of July, August, and September, 1888, being unpaid, appellee, on October 13th following, demanded payment thereof from appellants, and gave them notice that, unless the same was paid, on or before the 20th of that month, their lease would be terminated. On the 22d of the same month, in pursuance of that notice, this suit in forcible detainer was begun before a justice of the peace, the complaint being in the usual form in that action, except that it read, ‘Michael Graham, by W. D. Keerfoot & Co., complains,’ etc., and is signed, ‘Michael Graham, by W. D. Keerfoot & Co., Agents.’ The defendants failed to appear before the justice of the peace, and judgment was then entered against them for the possession of said premises. On appeal to the circuit court of Cook county, the case was tried without a jury, and judgment again rendered for the plaintiff, and that judgment has been affirmed by the appellate court.

Appellants insist here, (on the same brief and argument filed in the appellate court,) first, that the circuit court erred in not dismissing the suit for want of a proper complaint. This contention is based upon the assumption that, under our statute, forcible detainer can only be begun by filing a complaint in the name of the party claiming possession, in his own proper person. Hence it is said the complaint in this case, being by an agent, gave the court no jurisdiction. The position is without force. There is nothing in the present statute requiring the complaint to be sworn to, or even signed, by the plaintiff. The language is: ‘On complaint in writing by the party or parties entitled to possession of such premises being filed,’ etc. Rev. St. 1891, c. 57, § 5. The complaint is a mere pleading, and no reason is perceived or suggested why it should be made by the complainant in person rather than by an agent or attorney.

It was shown on the trial that on the 16th day of December, 1889, while the suit was pending in the circuit court, the attorney of appellants gave the key to the leased premises to the attorney of appellee, and afterwards paid him a small amount of rent for the month of December, 1889. Appellants' second contention is that this terminated the plaintiff's right of action, on the principle that, if one releases his cause of action between the commencement of a suit and the final trial, he cannot...