Von Meding v. Strahl

Citation319 Mich. 598,30 N.W.2d 363
Decision Date05 January 1948
Docket NumberNo. 92.,92.
Partiesvon MEDING et al. v. STRAHL et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Berrien County, in Chancery; Fremont evans, judge.

Suit by William von Meding and Ilse von Meding against Charles Strahl and others, to quiet title to lands and to restrain defendants from using the lands. From an adverse decree, plaintiffs appeal.

Decree in accordance with opinion.

Before the Entire Bench.

Charles W. Gore, of Benton Harbor, and Henry Glenn Ross, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.

A.E. Brown, Barr, Lott and R.E., of St. Joseph, for appellees above named.

John A. Brown, of Chicago, Ill., pro se.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Plaintiffs-appellants von Meding seek to quiet title to lands in Berrien county in themselves and to restrain many neighboring property owners, including appellees, from using such lands. The lands can be more readily identified by reference to the map hereto attached. For purposes of this opinion it is unnecessary to give the long legal descriptions of the respective parcels. The property to which plaintiffs claim exclusive title free from all easements claimed by appellees consists of the property marked “C” together with a 20-foot wide lane beginning at the southeasterly part of “C” and extending 135.5 feet to the east and then 1050 feet to the south of “C” until it runs into parcel “D”. Parcel “C” and the lanes referred to have been distinguished on the map by shaded lines. There is another lane 250 feet in length west of parcels “D” and “E”, which appears to be a continuation of the 1050-foot strip. It is not involved in this litigation. Appellees own various parcels designated by the letters “D” to “L”, and the numerals 1 to 11. In this opinion we shall refer to the lane in question as the “shaded strip.”

IMAGE

The record is meagre and complicated but it would appear that the land consists mainly of sand. It is located not far from Lake Michigan and has little value except as sites for summer homes. Appellants acquiredthe property by warranty deed dated February 15, 1941, running to them jointly. The deed contained the limitation that it was subject to all easements of record for right of way to the beach and the free use of the beach of parcel “C” extending along the shores of Lake Michigan. Appellants knew when they purchased the property that certain of the defendants claimed easements. The present action was begun on December 26, 1941. The trial judge stated in his opinion that plaintiff von Meding was motivated by a somewhat selfish desire for exclusiveness and seclusion to which, of course, he is entitled as far as his title permits.

It appears that the shaded strip had been used for many years for ingress and egress to and from the beach, and that steps had been built and the way cleared by people in the vicinity so that they could make free use of the shaded strip to the beach on which parcel “C” borders. Appellants knew of this condition when they bought. It appears that the shaded strip had been used by residents to reach the beach for over 20 years prior to the time title was acquired by appellants. To avoid any misunderstanding, none of the appellees claim that they require the shaded strip as a way of necessity, even though it probably saved many of them very long distances in order to reach the beach in any other way. We can readily see how bathers would be put to great inconvenience if deprived of this use. However, there is no claim that mere convenience establishes any right to the strip. The claims of the various defendants against whom appellants seek to quiet title differ, though many of them involve the same questions and in that case can be grouped together.

We need not discuss the rights of certain defendants who were defaulted and as to whom the trial court properly decreed that plaintiffs were entitled to a decree. Plaintiffs also concede on appeal that defendants Wilson and Carlson, owners respectively of parcels “D” and “E”, are entitled to an easement as claimed, and the decree of the lower court therefore is affirmed as to them.

The trial court after a long hearing decreed that certain defendants were entitled to easements appurtenant, some by reason of valid grants of such rights, and others by reason of prescriptive user. Plaintiffs appeal from this determination.

Defendants Flanagan are the owners of parcel “F”, and the trial court held that they had acquired an easement appurtenant to this parcel by grant. In December, 1921, Alexander N. Knaute acquired title to parcel “F” from Ada L. Vreeland. At that time Knaute also owned parcel “C”. It is appellants' contention that the merger of title to both the dominant estate (“F”) and the servient estate (“C”) in Knaute extinguished any easement which may have been appurtenant to parcel “F” in parcel “C” and the shaded strip prior to the time of such merger of title. We are of the opinion that they are correct in this contention.

“The union of dominant and servient estates in the same owners extinguishes prior easements. One cannot ahve an easement in one's own land.” Dimoff v. Laboroff, 296 Mich. 325, 328, 296 N.W. 275, 276, citing Bricault v. Cavanaugh, 261 Mich. 70, 245 N.W. 573, and Morgan v. Meuth, 60 Mich. 238, 27 N.W. 509. This is the universal rule. Walsh, Commentaries on Law of Real Property, Vol. 2, p. 682, § 254, and authorities there cited.

Subsequently, on February 15, 1932, Knaute conveyed parcel “C”, including the shaded strip, to one Collins, a predecessor in title to plaintiffs, by quitclaim deed without reserving to himself an easement for the benefit of parcel “F”. Thus, Collins' title was not subject to a servitude with respect to parcel “F”, as the rule is that where an owner who has used a roadway or pathway over one part of his land for the benefit of another part conveys the part over which the road passes, an easement for the benefit of his remaining land can only arise where there are apt words of reservation in the conveyance. No implication of a right of way can arise from proof that land granted cannot be conveniently occupied without it, since an implied easement cannot rest upon convenience. Dimoff v. Laboroff, 296 Mich. 325, 296 N.W. 275;Burling v. Leiter, 272 Mich. 448, 262 N.W. 388, 100 A.L.R. 1312.

Thus, when Knaute conveyed parcel “F” to defendants' predecessor in title, Payne, in 1938, no easement of way was appurtenant to parcel “F”, and no such easement passed with the conveyance.

Flanagans set forth a claim to an easement appurtenant to parcel “F” by virtue of a purported grant of an easement over parcel “C” executed by defendants Wilson on August 27, 1938. It does not appear from the record that the Wilsons had any interest in parcel “C” at the time of this grant other than an easement of way appurtenant to parcel “D”, of which they were then the owners. They had no legal right or authority to convey to the Flanagans or to any one else any rights in parcel “C”, or the strip. A right or way cannot very well by granted by deed, estoppel, or otherwise, by anyone but the landowner. Tapert v. Detroit, G.H. & M.Ry., 50 mich. 267, 15 N.W. 450.

The Flanagans contend in the alternative that they have acquired an easement appurtenant to parcel “F” by prescriptive use. This claim is not sustained by the record. Although the Flanagans may have used said shaded strip and the beach prior to the time they acquired title to parcel “F”. Until February, 1932, title to both the dominant and servient estates was in Knaute. Needless to say, one may not acquire prescriptive rights in his own lands. Plaintiffs' bill was filed in 1941, and the required 15-year period of adverse user could not possibly have elapsed subsequent to the severance of the dominant and servient estates from single ownership. The trial court was in error in awarding an easement to defendants Flanagan with respect to parcel “F”.

Defendants Hillstrom are the owners of parcel “G”, and the trial court held that they were entitled to an easement appurtenant to this parcel. It appears that from February 6, 1912, to August 9, 1932, title to parcel “G” was in one John Erdman. The Hillstroms allege in their answer to the bill of complaint that John Erdman occupied parcel “G” continuously during his period of ownership, but we can find nothing in the record or reference in the briefs to the effect that during this period Erdman asserted any rights to the claimed easement or used the way under claim of right. On August 9, 1932, Erdman conveyed parcel “G”' to Alexander N. Knaute by a warranty deed which contained no mention of an easement. Knaute had previously been the owner of parcel “C”, but had parted with his interest therein prior to the time he acquired title to parcel “G”. On September 10, 1932, Knaute and his wife executed a mortgage to Erdman, the instrument purporting to mortgage and convey not only parcel “G”, but also a right of way over parcel “C”, describing the right of way by metes and bounds. This mortgage was recorded, and was subsequently foreclosed. The land was sold at foreclosure sale to Erdman, and on August 14, 1935, Erdman received a sheriff's deed to the property described in the mortgage, said deed conveying “all the said lands and tenements hereinbefore described, with the appurtenances and all the estate, right, title and interest which the said mortgagor (Knaute) had in the said lands and tenements and every part thereof, on the 10th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundreed thirty-two, that being the date of said mortgage; or at any time thereafter * * *.”

On January 9, 1937, Erdman executed a warranty deed to defendants Hillstrom conveying parcel “G” “with the use of a right of way to beach, same right of way described as an easement,” over the shaded strip. This deed was recorded on January 11, 1937. It appears from the record that defendants Hillstrom have used the shaded strip as a right of way to the beach...

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  • Morse v. Colitti
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 18 Octubre 2016
    ...take a share in the easement as long as an unreasonable burden is not imposed upon the servient estate. See von Meding v. Strahl, 319 Mich. 598, 611, 30 N.W.2d 363 (1948) ; Walker v. Bennett, 111 Mich.App. 40, 44, 315 N.W.2d 142 (1981). "Generally, a mere increase in the number of persons u......
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    ...the claimant can show privity of estate. Stewart v. Hunt , 303 Mich. 161, 164, 5 N.W.2d 737 (1942) ; see also von Meding v. Strahl , 319 Mich. 598, 614, 30 N.W.2d 363 (1948). Privity of estate may only be established in very limited circumstances. The first is when the deed includes a descr......
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