Arnold v. Willis

• Decision Date: 12 April 1895
• Citation: 30 S.W. 517,128 Mo. 145
• Parties: ARNOLD v. WILLIS et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

30 S.W. 517

128 Mo. 145

ARNOLD v. WILLIS et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

April 12, 1895.

RIGHTS OF HUSBAND — POSSESSION OF WIFE'S PROPERTY — RUNNING OF LIMITATIONS.

1. Rev. St. 1889, § 6869, providing that all property belonging to any married woman should be her separate property, and under her sole control, and section 6864, vesting a married woman with the power to sue and be sued as a feme sole, did not divest her husband of his right to the possession of her separate real estate, already vested in him under the law.

2. Where the right to the possession of the separate estate of the wife is vested in the husband, limitations will begin to run against him from the accrual of the right, in spite of the disability of the wife to sue, and though his interest is not liable for his sole debts, and his wife's joinder in a conveyance of the land is necessary.

Appeal from circuit court, Linn county; W. W. Rucker, Judge.

Action of ejectment by A. C. Arnold against Jennie Willis and J. H. Hays. From the judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

J. A. Arbuthnot and A. W. Mullins, for appellants. C. C. Bigger, for respondent.

BURGESS, J.

Ejectment for an undivided one-fourth interest in the S. ½ of lots 11 and 12 in block 4 in the original city of Brookfield, Mo. The petition is in the usual form; and the answer, general denial. Both parties claim title under one John W. Ricker, who on the 28th day of April, 1868, leased in writing said premises to his mother, Sarah Ricker, for and during the term of her natural life. John W. died June 18, 1870, childless and unmarried, leaving as his only legal heirs his mother, Sarah Ricker; his brother, Wilder D; his sister, Mary, who afterwards married one Lansing; and Martha Arnold, the wife of the plaintiff. The lease from John W. Ricker to his mother, although recorded in Linn county, was not acknowledged. On December 17, 1873, Mrs. Ricker, by general warranty deed of that date, sold and conveyed the property, as the "sole and only heir at law of John W. Ricker, deceased," to Mrs. Mary J. Spivey. Her son, Wilder D., and her daughter, Mary Lansing, joined in said deed. Mrs. Spivey immediately thereafter entered into the possession of said property, and so remained until September 10, 1884, when she sold and conveyed it, by deed of general warranty, to the defendant, Mrs. Willis, who has been in the actual, open, notorious, and adverse possession ever since, paying taxes and making valuable improvements. She first heard of plaintiff's claim in January, 1893. Mrs. Ricker, it seems, died some time during the year 1884. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and it is evident from the declarations of law given in behalf of plaintiff, and those asked by defendants which were refused, that the court tried the case on the theory that the plaintiff, in right of his wife, was entitled to the possession of the premises sued for, and that, as to him, the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court rendered judgment for plaintiff; hence this appeal.

Plaintiff's right to the possession of the interest of his wife in the lots accrued at the death of her mother, Mrs. Ricker, which terminated the lease from her son, John W., to her. As to when this occurred, the evidence was very unsatisfactory, but some time, it seems, about the year 1884. When it did transpire, plaintiff, by virtue of his marital rights under the statute then in force, became entitled to the possession of the lots, — his wife having the title in fee simple, and not as separate property, — and he had the right to sue therefor in his own name. Mueller v. Kaessman, 84 Mo. 318, and authorities cited; Bledsoe v. Simms, 53 Mo. 305; Wilson v. Geraghty, 70 Mo. 517; Flesh v. Lindsey, 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907. By section 6869, Rev. St. 1889, it is provided that all real estate and personal property belonging to any married woman, together with all increase and profits thereof, shall be and remain her separate property, and under her sole control; and as by section 6864, Rev. St., she is vested with power to sue and be sued at law or in equity, the rule, as theretofore announced, has since that revision been different, and she may now...