People v. Huff, Docket No. 78-4352
Citation | 101 Mich.App. 232,300 N.W.2d 525 |
Decision Date | 04 November 1980 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 78-4352 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Russell HUFF, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Derrick A. Carter, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., George B. Mullison, Pros. Atty., Neil P. Wackerly, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and BEASLEY and DENEWETH, * JJ.
Defendant, William Russell Huff, was convicted by a jury of larceny in a building in violation of M.C.L. § 750.360; M.S.A. § 28.592. After being sentenced to five years probation, with the first six months in the county jail, he appeals as of right.
Defendant's chief argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in responding to his motion in chambers to prohibit any reference to a previous conviction for a similar offense. The trial court ruled:
On trial, defendant did testify and the assistant prosecutor did ask him whether he had been convicted of a felony in another county in 1975.
In this case, a woman in a laundromat placed her wallet on a washing machine. She saw defendant walk past her in the aisle and then, while she was loading clothes in the washer, she saw defendant's hand reach out to the machine where her wallet was and then noticed her wallet was gone. She immediately went to where she had placed her wallet and when she found it was gone, she complained to the laundry manager. When defendant came out of the rest room where he had gone, the manager asked him if he had taken the wallet. He denied that he had. While the proofs pointed strongly toward defendant, they were not overwhelming. In some respects, the case could be said to hinge upon a one-on-one credibility issue.
The issue is, under the circumstances of this case, did the trial judge abuse his discretion by permitting the prosecution to impeach defendant by asking defendant whether he had been convicted of a felony in another county in 1975, but leaving with defendant the option of whether or not to specify the felony. We hold there was no abuse of discretion and affirm.
On January 5, 1978, effective March 1, 1978, the Supreme Court adopted the Michigan Rules of Evidence, Rule 609 of which, entitled Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, covers the issue raised by defendant. Since defendant's trial commenced April 25, 1978, MRE 609 controls. While the preamble provides that these rules of evidence are binding on Michigan courts, the Court invites challenge as to the wisdom of any rule, providing:
Since defendant did not avail himself of this procedure, we assume defendant accepts and we find he is bound by MRE 609. Specifically, we hold this is not a case where defendant attacks and seeks to amend MRE 609 so as to preclude absolutely any and all use of prior convictions to impeach as to credibility. We interpret MRE 609 to require the trial judge to exercise his discretion to decide whether the probative value of admitting evidence of previous convictions on the issue of credibility outweighs any possible prejudicial effect. MRE 609 provides:
"(2) the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect." 1
Applying MRE 609 here, we note defendant's prior conviction of larceny in a building meets both requirements of MRE 609(a)(1), i. e., the maximum sentence exceeds one year and it is an offense involving theft and, perhaps, dishonesty. In addition, the prior larceny conviction occurred within the 10-year period delineated in MRE 609(b).
The discretion vested in the trial court to determine whether the probative value of admitting evidence of a prior conviction on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect is, however, hedged in by limitations. E. g., in the within case, the trial court interpreted People v. Baldwin 2 to preclude admission in evidence for impeachment purposes of a conviction of a similar offense.
While a fair inference from Baldwin may be as the trial court indicated, the narrow holding was that it is reversible error for a trial court to hold, in exercising the discretion described in People v. Jackson, 3 that a previous conviction for an identical or similar offense is a factor favoring admission of such impeachment evidence. Baldwin holds nothing more. This is one limitation upon the trial court's discretion.
In applying MRE 609(a), the underlying propositions should be remembered.
In a criminal case, a prior felony conviction is not substantive evidence that the defendant committed the offense for which he stands trial; thus, a prosecutor may not offer evidence that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony as part of his case in chief. The reason for this conclusion is that while a person who has previously committed a felony is more likely to commit a subsequent felony than one who has not, the mere probability is not, under the law, substantive evidence of commission of the offense. Thus, as part of a prosecutor's case in chief, such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial.
In this connection, it is well to remember that from time immemorial a basic police technique in solving crime has been to investigate those within the area at the time of the offense who are known to have committed similar crimes. The reason behind the investigative procedure is plain enough, namely, that a person who has been convicted of committing a felony is far more likely to repeat and commit another crime than someone who has...
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