Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Torres
| Citation | 300 S.W.2d 947,157 Tex. 189 |
| Decision Date | 03 April 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. A-6178,A-6178 |
| Parties | The OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Alice TORRES et vir, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
L. W. Anderson, Dallas, for petitioner.
Barnes & Barnes, Terrell, Johnson, Guthrie & Stanfield, Dallas, for respondent.
Respondent brought this suit against petitioner to recover on a judgment which had been rendered against her in another suit in favor of C. B. Anderson and wife. The basis for the present suit is the claim by respondent that the petitioner had issued its property damage and public liability policy of insurance on an automobile at a time when the automobile was the community property of respondent and her former husband, William E. Rush, Jr. It is the contention that such a policy is a joint policy of the husband and wife, and either party may recover thereon to the extent of his or her interest therein.
Respondent further contends that where, as here, a divorce decree is entered and the judgment vests the husband's community interest in the property in the wife, and thereafter the policy is renewed in the name of the former husband, the former wife is still entitled to assert whatever rights she had in the original and renewal policies. The original policy covered the period from May 5, 1952 to May 5, 1953 and covered a 1950 Chevrolet Sedan. The respondent and her husband were legally divorced on April 10, 1953. The judgment awarded the title to the 1950 Chevrolet to the respondent.
The petitioner contends that a renewal policy on this automobile was prepared by petitioner's agent on May 5, 1953 in the name of William E. Rush, Jr., but was never delivered or sent through the mails and remained in the agent's office; that at the time of the issuance of said renewal policy the said William E. Rush, Jr., had no insurable interest in the automobile and therefore the policy was ineffective; that on June 3, 1953, the date of the accident in which the automobile was involved, and the accident which gave rise to the cause of action of the Andersons against the respondent, the said William E. Rush, Jr., was not the owner of the automobile and had no insurable interest therein; that the respondent was attempting to recover upon a policy of insurance to which she was a complete stranger, the policy having been issued after the parties were divorced and after ownership of the automobile had been completely changed and the title thereto and possession thereof was vested in the wife.
Petitioner filed its motion for summary judgment wherein the above matters were alleged and sworn to as well as other allegations not necessary to mention. The respondent answered the motion. The trial court after considering the motion and reply thereto, as well as the affidavits accompanying the motion and those opposing same, the pleadings and admissions of the parties, reached the conclusion that there was a complete 'absence of a genuine issue of any material fact in that the said plaintiff, Alice Torres, acquired complete title to the automobile in question on April 10, 1956, by virtue of a divorce decree and accordingly the plaintiff, Alice Torres, did not have any insurable interest in the alleged renewal policy issued by the defendant on May 5, 1953 and at the time the accident occurred on June 3, 1953, and * * * that there was an absence of a genuine issue of any material fact in that the alleged renewal policy was never delivered or accepted by the plaintiff, Alice Torres.' Accordingly, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment and entered its judgment that respondent take nothing by virtue of her suit. The Court of Civil Appeals has reversed the trial court and remanded the cause to that court for a trial on its merits. 296 S.W.2d 561.
The respondent vigorously contends that the motion for summary judgment and the supporting affidavits do not conclusively show a violation of the sole ownership clause of the policy. A...
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Allstate Insurance Company v. McKenzie
...F.2d 246; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Powers, D.C., 113 F.Supp. 126; Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Mahaffey, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W. 861; Ohio Cas. Co. v. Torres, Tex., 300 S.W. 2d 947. The appellee relying entirely upon such cases as Insurance Company of Texas v. Stratton, Tex.Civ.App., 287 S.W.2d 320 and......
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Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 9241
...stated. The judgment is reversed and judgment is here rendered that James Pitts take nothing. 1 Cases such as Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Torres, 157 Tex. 189, 300 S.W.2d 947 (1957) and Duren v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 32 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1979, no writ) are not in point because while i......