300 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1957), A-6178, Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Torres
|Citation:||300 S.W.2d 947, 157 Tex. 189|
|Party Name:||The OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Alice TORRES et vir, Respondent.|
|Case Date:||April 03, 1957|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Texas|
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1957.
[157 Tex. 190] L. W. Anderson, Dallas, for petitioner.
Barnes & Barnes, Terrell, Johnson, Guthrie & Stanfield, Dallas, for respondent.
Respondent brought this suit against petitioner to recover on a judgment which had been rendered against her in another suit in favor of C. B. Anderson and wife. The basis for the present suit is the claim by respondent that the petitioner had issued its property damage and public liability policy of insurance on an automobile at a time when the automobile was the community property of respondent and her former husband, William E. Rush, Jr. It is the contention that such a policy is a joint policy of the husband and wife, and either party may recover thereon to the extent of his or her interest therein.
Respondent further contends that where, as here, a divorce decree is entered and the judgment vests the husband's community interest in the property in the wife, and thereafter the policy is renewed in the name of the former husband, the former wife is still entitled to assert whatever rights she had in the original and renewal policies. The original policy covered the period from May 5, 1952 to May 5, 1953
and covered a 1950 Chevrolet Sedan. The respondent and her husband were legally divorced on April 10, 1953. The judgment awarded the title to the 1950 Chevrolet to the respondent.
The petitioner contends that a renewal policy on this automobile was prepared by petitioner's agent on May 5, 1953 in the name of William E. Rush, Jr., but was never delivered or [157 Tex. 191] sent through the mails and remained in the agent's office; that at the time of the issuance of said renewal policy the said William E. Rush, Jr., had no insurable interest in the automobile and therefore the policy was ineffective; that on June 3, 1953, the date of the accident in which the automobile was involved, and the accident which gave rise to the cause of action of the Andersons against the respondent, the said William E. Rush, Jr., was not the owner of the automobile and had no insurable interest therein; that the respondent was attempting to recover upon a policy of insurance to which she was a complete stranger, the policy having been issued after the parties were divorced and after ownership of the automobile had been completely changed and the title thereto and possession thereof was vested in the wife.
Petitioner filed its motion for summary judgment wherein the above matters were alleged and sworn to as well as other allegations not necessary to mention. The respondent answered the motion. The trial court after considering the motion and reply thereto, as well as the affidavits accompanying the motion...
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