Jefferson City Bridge & Transit Company v. Blaser

• Decision Date: 07 December 1927
• Docket Number: 25906
• Parties: Jefferson City Bridge & Transit Company, Appellant, v. A. E. Blaser, Collector of the Revenue
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

300 S.W. 778

318 Mo. 373

Jefferson City Bridge & Transit Company, Appellant, v. A. E. Blaser, Collector of the Revenue

No. 25906

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 7, 1927

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Henry J. Westhues Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Irwin & Bushman and Julius Meyerhardt for appellant.

A bill in equity is the proper remedy to restrain an increase in taxes. Overall v. Ruenzi, 67 Mo. 203; St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Anthony, 73 Mo. 431; Arnold v Hawkins, 95 Mo. 570; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Apperson, 97 Mo. 300; Balle v. Zeigler, 84 Mo. 214; State ex rel. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 165 Mo. 516; State ex rel. Johnson v. Bank, 279 Mo. 228; Jacobs v. Hawthorne, 238 S.W. 443; School District v. Holt, 226 Mo. 406; State ex rel. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 190 U.S. 412; Johnson v. Wells-Fargo & Co., 239 U.S. 234; Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U.S. 535; Green v. Railroad Co., 244 U.S. 499; Raymond v. Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20.

D. W. Peters for respondent.

(1) The action of the Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization in making the assessment upon appellant's property, since it is conceded in appellant's petition that each body acted within its rightful jurisdiction, became and was the exercise of judicial power, and its finding has all the dignity of a judgment. State ex rel. v. Board of Equalization, 256 Mo. 455; Black v. McGonigle, 103 Mo. 192. (2) Since the action of the State Tax Commission as approved by the State Board of Equalization, became and was a final judgment, it is not subject to collateral attack. Lieber v. Lieber, 439 Mo. 1; State v. Ellison, 226 S.W. 563; State ex rel. v. Merchants & Miners Bank, 279 Mo. 428. (3) Appellant's sole ground for relief, according to its petition, is an excessive or unequal assessment. The courts either at law or in equity are powerless to give relief against the erroneous judgments of assessing bodies, except as they may be specially empowered by law so to do. State ex rel. v. Bank of Neosho, 120 Mo. 161. If all that appellant claims be true, this is merely a case of overvaluation and not an erroneous assessment, and under the law of this State mere overvaluation would be no defense to the suit on the tax bill, and neither a court of law nor equity would have power to relieve in such case. (4) Appellant's remedy was by certiorari to the Supreme Court from the ruling of the State Board of Equalization. R. S. 1919, sec. 12998; Ward v. Board of Equalization, 135 Mo. 309. (5) Appellant alleges that the action of the Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization amount to a fraud upon it. The rule is well settled in this and other states that that which will authorize a court of equity to enjoin a judgment or decree, is, the fraud must have been practiced in the procurement of the judgment or decree itself. A court of equity will not enjoin a judgment merely because it is founded on a cause of action vitiated by a fraud, unless the interposition of the fraud as a defense has been prevented by the fraud of the opposite party. Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1, 31.

OPINION

Atwood, J.

This is an appeal from the order and judgment of the circuit court in sustaining a demurrer and dismissing a bill in equity by the Jefferson City Bridge & Transit Company against A. E. Blaser, Collector of Revenue within and for Cole County, Missouri. The main purpose of this suit is to restrain respondent from collecting certain taxes alleged to have been illegally and fraudulently imposed upon appellant's property in Cole County by the State Tax Commission and the Board of Equalization of the State of Missouri. Our own jurisdiction is invoked by reason of certain constitutional questions raised and preserved by appellant, but before entertaining this appeal we should be satisfied that the cause is well within the purview of equity jurisdiction.

Plaintiff prayed for "an order of this court perpetually enjoining and restraining the defendant from collecting, or attempting to collect, said taxes levied and assessed against the property of the plaintiff by the said State Tax Commission and as equalized and fixed by the State Board of Equalization for the year of 1922, or any part of said year; that the increase in the valuation of plaintiff's property for the year of 1921 made by the said State Tax Commission and approved by the State Board of Equalization be declared null and void and the taxes alleged to be due based upon said increase be cancelled, set aside and for naught held; and that the said A. E. Blaser, Collector of Revenue for and within Cole County, Missouri, be ordered to accept said sum of $ 1596.36 paid into court in full for all taxes due or owing from the plaintiff to the State of Missouri for the year 1922, and that he be enjoined and restrained in making application for, or proceeding to obtain, judgment against the property of plaintiff, or any part thereof, and from selling the same, and from asking that a special fieri facias be issued against said property; and that a temporary restraining order or injunction may issue pending the hearing of this cause, and that said writ of injunction may be made perpetual upon final hearing hereof;" and concluded with the usual prayer for general relief. It is apparent that the prayer "that the increase in the valuation of plaintiff's property for the year of 1921 made by the said State Tax Commission and approved by the State Board of Equalization be declared null and void," is only incidental to the principal relief sought, namely, injunction against any enforcement of the tax levied thereon.

A general rule, based upon consideration of public policy and the necessary finality of judicial decisions, is that where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter in the particular case, its judgment, unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not open to collateral attack or impeachment, by parties or privies, in any collateral action or proceeding whatever. [1 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.) sec. 245.] A state board of equalization acts judicially in determining what property is to be assessed for taxation, and in fixing the amount of the assessment, its action comes within the rule. [Same authority, sec. 250; 3 Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.) sec. 1199; 37 Cyc. 1108; 34 C. J. 519; State ex rel. v. Vaile, 122 Mo. l. c. 47.] The word "collateral" as here used is the antithesis of "direct," and is therefore broad enough to embrace any independent proceeding. A direct attack is one the sole object of which is to deny and disprove the apparent validity of the judgment, while one that has an independent purpose and contemplates some other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important or even necessary to its success, is a collateral attack upon the judgment and falls within the rule. Despite the apparent clarity of this distinction courts have not always spoken with consistency in applying the rule. For instance, in State ex rel. Van Hafften v. Ellison, 285 Mo. l. c. 314, in an equitable proceeding to cancel special tax bills we said:

"A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment, whether interlocutory or final, in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling the judgment. [Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 55, 17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.) p. 848.] The impeaching of the injunction orders may be necessary in order for the plaintiff to obtain the relief he asks, but nevertheless, the present attack on them is collateral, and not direct. [23 Cyc. pp. 1062, 1063, and cases cited in note 67.]"

Also, in 1 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.), sec. 253, it is said:

"A bill in equity seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment at law, by execution or otherwise, constitutes a collateral attack upon the judgment, and cannot be maintained on account of any mere errors or irregularities, but only upon a showing that the judgment is void. There are cases, however, holding that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment on the ground of a total want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant -- as, where no process was ever served on him -- is a direct attack on the judgment, and not collateral."

Also, in 15 Ruling Case Law, 730, sec. 182, it is said:

"An equitable action in reference to a judgment, even when such judgment is one obtained in a court of another jurisdiction, is considered an independent original suit, and a bill in equity for relief against a judgment is generally deemed a direct method of attacking it, and in this respect resembles a petition for a new trial or a writ of error coram nobis. It has been said, however, by some courts, that a suit in equity to enjoin a judgment at law may be regarded as a collateral attack, subject to the limitation that the rules applicable to collateral attacks are not in all respects applicable to it. For example, in an ordinary collateral attack, it is not permissible to contradict judicial recitals or to disprove official returns of the service of process, but in equity such recitals may be contradicted and such returns may be proved to be false."

Also, 15 Ruling Case Law, 839, sec. 312: "A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to amend, correct, reform, vacate, or enjoin the execution of the same in a proceeding instituted for that purpose."

In Vanfleet on Collateral Attack, sec. 3, it is said: "Any proceeding provided by law for the purpose of avoiding or correcting a judgment, is a direct attack which will be successful upon showing the error; while an attempt to do the same thing in any other proceeding is a collateral attack which will be successful only upon showing a want of power."

In Section 2 of the same work the author also states that "bills in equity or complaints and ...