Ingels v. Morf

• Decision Date: 01 March 1937
• Docket Number: No. 456,456
• Citation: 81 L.Ed. 653,57 S.Ct. 439,300 U.S. 290
• Parties: INGELS, Director of Motor Vehicle Department, et al. v. MORF et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

300 U.S. 290

57 S.Ct. 439

81 L.Ed. 653

INGELS, Director of Motor Vehicle Department, et al.

v MORF et al.

No. 456.

Argued Feb. 5, 1937.

Decided March 1, 1937.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.

Messrs. Frank W. Richards, of Los Angeles, Cal., Amos M. Mathews, of Sioux City, Iowa, U.S. Webb, of San Francisco, Cal., and James S. Howie, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from page 291 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Ralph K. Pierson, of Compton, Cal., and Byron J. Walters, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought by appellee in the District Court for Southern California, three judges sitting, to restrain appellants, state officers, from enforcing the provisions of the Caravan Act, Cal.Stat. 1935, c. 402, (page 1453), as a forbidden burden on interstate commerce, and as an infringement of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. From a decree granting the relief prayed, the case comes here on appeal under sections 238(3), 266, Judicial Code, as amended (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 345(3), 380).

The challenged statute defines 'caravaning' as the transportation, 'from without the State of any motor vehicle operated on its own wheels, or in tow of another motor vehicle, for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale * * * to any purchaser' located within or without the state. Sections 2 and 3 prohibit caravaning without attaching to each vehicle so transported a special permit issued by the State Motor Vehicle Department, for which a fee of $15 is exacted. A permit is valid only for the trip or trips specified in it, and for a period of ninety days (section 4). Section 6 directs that the fees collected be paid into the general fund in the state treasury, and declares that they are 'intended to reimburse the State treasury for the added expense which the State may incur in the administration and enforcement of this act and the added expense of policing the highways over which such caravaning may be conducted, so as to provide for the safety of traffic on such highways where caravaning is being conducted.'

Appellee, a resident of Los Angeles, California, carries on his business there as a dealer in automobiles. He purchases used automobiles in other states and transports them from the place of purchase to points on the California boundary line, thence over state highways to Los Angeles, and sometimes to other places, where he offers them for sale. He conducts from 20 to 25 per cent. of the total movement in such traffic. Some of his vehicles are coupled together in twos, and move in caravans or fleets, sometimes aggregating more than 30 cars. He gave testimony, which appellants sharply challenge, that from 30 to 40 per cent. move singly and not in company with any other vehicle. A permit is required for each car, whether it moves alone or as part, of a fleet. The District Court found that such movement of vehicles in caravans of more than four create special traffic difficulties, but that the movement of four or less 'constitutes no police problem'; that there is considerable like traffic carried on wholly within the state, for which the fee of $15 is not exacted and for which no similar or other fee is required; and that the demanded fee for each car moving in the interstate traffic is excessive and bears no reasonable relation to the increased cost of policing. It concluded, as the appellee contends here, that the statute denies to appellee due process and equal protection, and places a forbidden burden on, and discriminates against, interstate commerce.

We find it necessary to consider only the contention that the licensing provisions burden interstate commerce. We do not discuss appellants' suggestion that, contrary to the finding below, there is no evidence of comparable traffic moving intrastate, and hence no discrimination against interstate commerce by the failure of the act to exact a fee of those engaged in intrastate commerce. It is not denied that the permit fee, imposed upon those engaged in interstate commerce, burdens this commerce, but appellants urge that it is a permissible charge for the use of the state highways and for the cost of policing the traffic, including the cost of administering the Act.

In Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 56 S.Ct. 756, 80 L.Ed. 1245, recently before this Court, the Caravaning Act of New Mexico, containing some features similar to the present act, was likewise assailed as burdening interstate commerce by the imposition of a fee, of $7.50 for each vehicle moving by its own power, and $5 for each vehicle towed by another when moving in caravan. The statute made the privilege of using the highway conditional upon payment of the fee. The fees collected were devoted in part to highway purposes. We held that the fees were a charge for the use of the highways, not shown by the taxpayer to be unreasonable, which the state might lawfully demand. Compare Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 624, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 249, 250, 48 S.Ct. 230, 231, 72 L.Ed. 551.

To justify the exaction by a state of a money payment burdening interstate commerce, it must affirmatively appear that it is demanded as reimbursement for the expense of providing facilities, or of enforcing regulations of the commerce which are within its constitutional power. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 169, 170, 48 S.Ct. 502, 504, 72 L.Ed. 833, 62 A.L.R. 45; Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186, 51 S.Ct. 380, 381, 75 L.Ed. 953; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259, 39 S.Ct. 265, 63 L.Ed. 590; Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 267, 56 S.Ct. 194, 196, 80 L.Ed. 215. This may appear from the statute itself, Morf v. Bingaman, supra; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557, 47 S.Ct. 702, 703, 71 L.Ed. 1199, or from the use of the money collected, to defray such expense. Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169, 173, 54 S.Ct. 142, 144, 78 L.Ed. 247; see Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168, 169, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm., 295 U.S. 285 289, 55 S.Ct. 709, 710, 79 L.Ed. 1439; compare Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, supra, 276 U.S. 245, 249, 48 S.Ct. 230, 72 L.Ed. 551.

Here appellant does not show that the fees collected are used to meet the cost of the construction or maintenance of its highways. Section 6 of the challenged act, which directs that the permit fees be paid into the general fund of the state...