302 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1962), 14538, Cox v. General Elec. Co.
|Citation:||302 F.2d 389|
|Party Name:||Vivian Beatrice COX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||April 26, 1962|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit|
Malcolm M. Heber, Royal Oak, Mich., and Peter F. Cicinelli, Saginaw, Mich., (Eugene D. Mossner, Saginaw, Mich., on the brief), for appellant.
Konrad D. Kohl, Detroit, Mich., of counsel, Carl F. Davidson, Detroit, Mich., for appellee.
Before CECIL, Circuit Judge, BOYD, District Judge, and STARR, Senior District Judge.
STARR, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant brought this action to recover damages for injuries to her arm sustained while she was using an automatic washing machine manufactured by the defendant-appellee. She appeals from a judgment for appellee entered on a jury verdict of no cause of action.
In her complaint appellant claimed that the appellee was negligent in the design and construction of the washing machine, in that it had failed to equip the machine with a safety braking device which would bring the tub or braking device which would the mechanism on the machine indicated that it was 'off,' or when the lid was lifted. She also claimed that appellee was negligent in failing to adequately warn her of the fact that the tub or basket of the machine continued to spin rapidly after the machine showed 'off' and after the lid was lifted.
It appears that prior to commencement of the trial appellant proposed to offer in evidence in the trial the fact that subsequent to her accident the appellee had made certain changes in its washing machines by installing a braking device, which brought the spinning tub or basket to a stop when the machine was shut off, and a locking device on the top cover, which prevented its being opened until the tub or basket had ceased rotating. The district court ruled that this proposed evidence, relative to the changes appellee made in its washing machines subsequent to the accident, was not admissible, on the ground that such evidence was not proof of its alleged negligence before and at the time the accident happened. Appellant contends that she should have been allowed to show these changes that the appellee made in its machines subsequent to the accident, not as evidence of its negligence, but as evidence of the practicability or feasibility of incorporating such safety devices on its automatic...
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