302 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002), 02-10010, U.S. v. Rayo-Valdez
|Citation:||302 F.3d 314|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bulmaro RAYO-VALDEZ, aka Bulmaro Valdez Rayo, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Case Date:||August 12, 2002|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|
Susan B. Cowger, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Karl Anthony Rupp, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def., Ira Raymond Kirkendoll, Fed. Pub. Def., Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, DUHE and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DUHE, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction for illegal re-entry into the United States after deportation. Because we hold that sexual abuse of a minor is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, and a prior aggravated felony is not an element of the crime of illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Bulmaro Rayo-Valdez ("Rayo-Valdez") was removed from the United States in 1999. He unlawfully reentered this country, and was found in April 2001. Rayo-Valdez was indicted on a charge of illegally re-entering the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). He pled guilty.
The presentence report ("PSR") detailed Rayo-Valdez's prior crimes. In April 1991, he pled guilty to several counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years old. The crimes occurred on three different occasions in 1989 and 1990. Rayo-Valdez twice digitally penetrated the female sexual organ of a child, and once penetrated the anus of a child. Although the PSR does not specify the statute on which Rayo-Valdez's conviction for these crimes rested, it appears to have been Section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code. That law authorizes a conviction for "Aggravated Sexual Assault" against one who "(B) intentionally or knowingly . . . (i) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of a child by any means . . . and . . . (2) . . . (B) the victim is younger than 14 years of age . . . ."1
Before sentencing, Rayo-Valdez objected to the categorization of his prior conviction as a "crime of violence", which resulted in a recommended sentence enhancement. At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard argument and overruled the objections. Rayo-Valdez was sentenced to 84 months in prison, a three-year term of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. He timely appealed.
Rayo-Valdez claims that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence for prior conviction for a "crime of violence", arguing that his conviction for sexual assault of a young child is not a "crime of violence" under the recently amended U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. This is an issue of first impression. We review the application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Goynes, 175 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1999).
The district court enhanced Rayo-Valdez's offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The applicable version of that guideline provides:
If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States after,
(A) *** (ii) a crime of violence; *** increase [the offense level] by 16 levels[.]
The commentary provides a two-pronged definition of "crime of violence":
(I) means an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; and
(II) includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.
Id., comment, application note 1(B)(ii).
Rayo-Valdez argues that because the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" is not a necessary element of his sexual abuse of a minor offense under Texas Penal Code § 22.021, his sentence cannot be enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.
We disagree. The language of § 2L1.2 says that "crime of violence" means that which is in subparagraph I, and includes that which is in subparagraph II. Sexual abuse of a minorforcible or notconstitutes a crime of violence.2 So do all the other offenses listed in subparagraph II, regardless of their elements under various state laws.
Because such interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 is an issue of first impression, to reach this conclusion we consider it by way of analogy to similar language in other contexts.
(1) U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2
In United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit construed U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which defines "crime of violence" for purposes of applying a career-offender enhancement.3 The DeLuca
court held the express listing of extortion was a "formidable obstacle" to an argument that it should not be considered a "crime of violence", even if the particular extortion statute does not require use of force. Id. at 8. The First Circuit held that "the wording of the guideline tells us unequivocally that the Sentencing Commission believed that extortion, by its nature, should be classified as a crime of violence. A defendant who seeks to exclude a specifically enumerated offense from the sweep of...
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