United States v. Raynor Same v. Fowler v. 12 8212 15, 1937

Decision Date03 January 1938
Docket NumberNos. 146,147,s. 146
PartiesUNITED STATES v. RAYNOR. * SAME v. FOWLER. Argued Nov. 12—15, 1937
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

and Brien Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., McMahon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.

Mr. John Elliott Byrne, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from page 541 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents were convicted in a federal District Court for violating a provision of section 150 of the Criminal Code,1 which reads:

'whoever shall have or retain in his control or possession, after a distinctive paper has been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury for the obligations and other securities of the United States, any similar paper adapted to the making of any such obligation or other security, except under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury or some other proper officer of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.'

The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,2 holding that the act did not prohibit the possession of any except the distinctive paper adopted by the Treasury, and that other paper was not prohibited, even though it closely resembled the distinctive paper and was well suited for successful counterfeiting. The court accordingly believed that the evidence did not support a conviction.

The evidence disclosed that:

In 1928, the Secretary of the Treasury adopted a distinctive paper for obligations and securities of the United States; this paper was a high grade rag bond having a sharp rattle, very little gloss, and short fine silk fibers distributed throughout; in 1936, respondents had possession of paper of practically the same color, weight, thickness, and appearance as this distinctive government paper and cut to the dimensions of $20 government obligations; respondents' paper rattled like genuine money; it did not have red and blue silk fibers throughout, but red and blue marks were so expertly designed upon its surface that one judge, dissenting below, after a careful examination of these marks with a magnifying glass, was still wholly uncertain whether they were actually woven in the fabric or were traced on the surface.

Did respondents' possession of this paper violate the act?

The paper was not only perfectly adapted for counterfeiting, but it is difficult to conceive of its use for any other purpose. The history and language of the act are both of importance in determining whether Congress intended to make it a crime to possess, without authority, so close an imitation of the genuine paper adopted by the Treasury.

1. The history of the law under which respondents were convicted dates from a special session of Congress in 1837. That Congress was called upon to pass legislation to meet emergency conditions following crop failures, general business distress, unemployment and discontent. Urged to action by these conditions, Congress authorized the issue of a then unprecedented amount of Treasury notes. It had long been a criminal offense to make, utter, or pass counterfeit money. Realizing that the protection of the currency required more stringent laws against counterfeiters,3 Congress made it a crime to possess any plate, blank note, or paper to be used for counterfeiting pur- poses.4 This early forerunner of the present act provided in part:

'If any person * * * shall have in his custody or possession any paper adapted to the making of notes, and similar to the paper upon which any such notes shall have been issued, with intent to use such paper * * * in forging or counterfeiting any of the notes issued as aforesaid * * * such person * * * shall be sentenced,' etc. Section 11.

This original provision prohibited the possession of 'similar' paper adapted to making 'bank notes,' but such 'bank notes' obviously were to be forged or counterfeit—not genuine. This first act thus prohibited—not the genuine—but counterfeit paper, intended to be made into counterfeit obligations and its language and meaning were substantially re-enacted in 1847, 1857, 1860, 1861 and 1862.5

Beginning December, 1860, Congress, to meet imperative needs, again authorized great increases in government obligations. By July, 1862, new issues of currency and unsettled conditions had so stimulated counterfeiting that Congress made special funds available to detect and punish those guilty of the crime.6 Such action proved inadequate to curb counterfeiters, and in 1863 Congress re-enacted, strengthened and strongly reinforced the 1837 prohibition against possession of paper for counterfeiting.7 The 1863 law made it a crime to 'imitate, counterfeit, make, or sell any paper such as that used, or provided to be used, for the fractional notes.' Although the law had prohibited the possession of paper imitating the genuine since 1837, this 1863 amendment struck vigorously at all who in any manner trafficked in such imitation paper.

By July, 1864, the government had outstanding approximately two billion dollars in war obligations, and the counterfeiter had become a still greater public enemy. Under these circumstances, with more currency to be issued, and the necessity for protection from counterfeiters greatly accentuated, Congress once more re-enacted the 1837 act8 and made it a more effective weapon against counterfeiters.9 The element of intent was stricken from the offense and the mere unauthorized possession of imitation paper was made a crime. Congress also combined the phrase 'paper adapted to the making of bank notes' with the phrase 'similar to the paper upon which any such notes shall have been issued.' It is the phrase resulting from this combination—'similar paper adapted to making such obligations'—which was construed by the court below to limit the prohibited paper to the genuine Treasury-adopted paper. These phrases, carried in the law from 1837 to 1864, had obviously referred to any paper suitable for counterfeiting. If the Congress of 1864 did intend by combining these phrases to exempt from the act all who had possession of imitation paper, it thereby deliberately weakened the chance of the government to convict and punish counterfeiters. We do not impute such a purpose to Congress. By the change made in 1864 Congress undoubtedly intended to make the law a more effective weapon against counterfeiters. Indeed, two days after this amendment was passed Congress authorized a special appropriation to detect and punish counterfeiters.10 It is beyond belief that Congress intended to relax the law against counterfeiters at a time when the nation was engaged in financing a war. Such a construction would be neither logical nor reasonable. The section now under consideration is plainly the culmination of a long series of legislative acts, each of which has declared it to be a crime to have possession of paper, counterfeiting the distinctive paper, and suitable to be made into counterfeit obligations. Each change since 1837 was intended to make the possession of counterfeit paper more dangerous for counterfeiters.

Finding nothing in the history of this law which supports the construction given it by the court below, we proceed to an examination and analysis of the particular language believed to justify that construction.

2. That particular language is the phrase 'similar paper adapted to making such obligations.' The word 'similar,' and the phrase 'adapted to making such obligations or securities,' both describe the type of paper the possession of which is prohibited. The definitions given by the court below to this word and this phrase are irreconcilable.

That court defined 'similar' to mean 'somewhat alike'; 'not exactly alike'; 'like, but not exactly the same.' 'Similar paper,' thus defined, cannot be identical with the distinctive paper adopted by the government, because, while the two papers would be 'somewhat alike,' they would not be 'exactly alike' or 'exactly the same.' Similarity is not identity, but resemblance between different things.11 Under this definition, 'similar paper', the possession of which is prohibited, is not identical with, but differs from the distinctive paper.

However, after giving this definition to similar paper [which is prohibited by the act], the court below concluded that the phrase 'adapted to making such obligations' limits the prohibition of the act to the distinctive paper. This conclusion is not consistent with the determination that 'similar'—also describing the paper prohibited—designates paper which is different from the distinctive paper. A construction that creates an inconsistency should be avoided when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the plain words of the act, and will carry out the intention of Congress.12

There is no inconsistency in the act unless it is assumed that the word 'obligations' refers to genuine obligations only. Since words that have one meaning in a particular context frequently have a different significance in an- other,13 it is necessary to consider the context of the words 'such obligations,' in order to determine their significance. The provision of law here construed is the last of seven separate offenses set out in one paragraph of a chapter of the Criminal Code entitled 'Offenses against the Currency.' The provisions of this chapter were enacted to prevent and to punish counterfeiting. Six closely connected companion offenses are set out in the same section with the offense charged against respondents and all either penalize the possession of, or trafficking in, counterfeit obligations of the materials and devices used to make such obligations.

Examining the context of the words under consideration, we find that the word 'obligations' appears throughout the chapter relating to offenses against the currency, and does not always apply to 'genuine' obligations, but may, and often does, refer to 'counterfeit...

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