Jafar v. Webb
| Decision Date | 23 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 87009–8.,87009–8. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Abeda JAFAR, Petitioner, v. William Douglass WEBB, Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brian D. Buckley, Bradley Thomas Meissner, Fenwick & West LLP, Janet S. Chung, Legal Voice, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Donna J. Campbell, Campbell Law Office, North Bend, WA, for Respondent.
Monty Dale Cobb, WA Assoc. of County Officials, Olympia, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of County.
Sarah A. Dunne, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Molly A. Terwilliger, Summit Law Group, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU.
Karla Elizabeth Mary Carlisle, The Northwest Justice Project, Pasco, WA, Michelle Denise Raiford, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, Leslie J. Savina, Northwest Justice Project, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Northwest Justice Project.
Karla Elizabeth Mary Carlisle, The Northwest Justice Project, Pasco, WA, Michelle Denise Raiford, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, Leslie J. Savina, Northwest Justice Project, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Benton Franklin Legal Aid Society.
Karla Elizabeth Mary Carlisle, The Northwest Justice Project, Pasco, WA, Michelle Denise Raiford, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, Leslie J. Savina, Northwest Justice Project, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Snohomish County Legal Services.
Emily Susan Schlesinger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Seattle, WA, Jason R. Scheiderer, SNR Denton US, LLP, Kansas City, MO, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Sargent Shriver National Center.
Emily Susan Schlesinger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Seattle, WA, Jason R. Scheiderer, SNR Denton US, LLP, Kansas City, MO, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Statewide Poverty Action Network.
Emily Susan Schlesinger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Seattle, WA, Jason R. Scheiderer, SNR Denton US, LLP, Kansas City, MO, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Family Assistance Program at Sol.
[177 Wash.2d 522]¶ 1 This case asks us to decide whether, under General Rule (GR) 34, courts have discretion to grant only partial waivers of fees and surcharges to indigent litigants. Abeda Jafar filed an action in Snohomish County Superior Court to obtain a parenting plan involving her 19-month-old son. She also filed a motion under GR 34 to waive all mandatory fees and surcharges on the basis of indigency. Jafar's only sources of income are a monthly food stamp benefit and a Temporary Assistance for Needy Families cash assistance totaling $385 per month. The trial court found that Jafar is indigent but granted her only a partial waiver of fees and surcharges, waiving the $200 filing fee but ordering her to pay a $20 courthouse facilitator surcharge and a $30 judicial stabilization surcharge. The court further ordered her to pay the $50 within 90 days. We granted direct review of the trial court's decision.
¶ 2 We hold GR 34 provides a uniform standard for determining whether an individual is indigent and further requires the court to waive all fees and costs for individuals who meet this standard. The rule was adopted to ensure that indigent litigants have equal access to justice. Any fees required of indigent litigants are invalid and must be waived under the rule. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the trial court's order with instructions to waive all filing fees and surcharges.
¶ 3 This is an “interlocutory” review, and the facts are undisputed. On January 11, 2012, Jafar filed an action in Snohomish County Superior Court seeking a parenting plan governing custody and visitation for her 19–month–old son. Jafar sought to obtain a parenting plan, in part, because she was concerned about her child's safety with his father, respondent William Douglass Webb.1 Jafar also filed a motion, pursuant to GR 34, to waive all mandatory fees and surcharges. Along with her fee waiver motion, Jafar filed a declaration stating that she cannot afford to meet her necessary household living expenses and also pay the fees and surcharges. She also stated that she had been dependent on Webb for everything and that she does not have any savings. Jafar also submitted a financial statementshowing that she is unemployed and that her only sources of income are a monthly food stamp benefit and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance of $385 per month. According to her financial statement, Jafar has monthly expenses of at least $380. Jafar's annual income of $4,620 is less than 32 percent of the federal poverty guideline of $14,710 for a family of two.
¶ 4 The trial court entered an order on January 11, 2012, finding Jafar indigent because her household income is at or below 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline. Based on that finding, the trial court ordered that “All filing fees and surcharges of $200 the payment of which is a condition precedent to the moving party's ability to secure access to judicial relief are waived.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2. On the form, the trial court crossed out the word “all” as well as the words “and surcharges” and added the words “of $200.” CP at 2. However, the trial court ordered Jafar to pay a “$20 facilitator surcharge” and a “$30 Judicial Stabilization surcharge” within 90 days. CP at 2. The trial court left blank section 3.4 of the form, which provides, “It is hereby ordered that this case shall be dismissed, without further order of the court, on [blank] (date) if any of the above fees have not been paid as ordered.” CP at 2. The Snohomish County fee waiver application packet informs applicants that “[i]f the Court defers payment of your fees to a later date, make your payment as ordered or your action may be dismissed for nonpayment of these fees.” See Br. of Pet'r, App. A at 5.
¶ 5 We granted Jafar's motion for direct discretionary review of the trial court's fee order.
¶ 6 1. Is this claim ripe for review?
¶ 7 2. Whether a trial court, under GR 34, may waive only some of the fees and surcharges once a litigant is determined to be indigent under the rule?
¶ 8 As an initial matter, we must decide whether Jafar's claim is ripe for review. We have said that in determining whether a claim is ripe for review, we consider if the issues raised are primarily legal, and do not require further factual development, and if the challenged action is final. We also consider the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 399–400, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), adhered to on remand,120 Wash.2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992).
¶ 9 Amicus Washington Association of County Officials (WACO) does not cite to these requirements or apply them to the facts in this case. Instead, WACO argues that because the trial court did not dismiss Jafar's action or mandate dismissal for failure to pay the fees, Jafar has not been “ ‘harmfully affected’ ” by the trial court's decision and therefore her claim is not ripe for review. Br. of Amicus Curiae WACO at 5 (quoting State v. Massey, 81 Wash.App. 198, 200, 913 P.2d 424 (1996)). We disagree. Current hardship is not a strict requirement for ripeness, and a case like this has a sufficient immediate effect to satisfy any ripeness concerns. From the perspective of Jafar (and any other indigent litigant seeking access), the order to pay coupled with the requirement to pay in 90 days has an immediate impact similar to any court order compelling action.
¶ 10 We conclude that Jafar's claim is sufficiently ripe. The interpretation of GR 34 presents a purely legal question that can be resolved on the current record and no further factual development would affect our analysis. In addition, the fee order is a final determination of Jafar's waiver request. Finally, the risk of hardship to Jafar is significant and permitting Jafar to bring a challenge to the fee order at this time eliminates any risk of dismissal created under the order.
¶ 11 The primary issue in this case is whether a trial court, under GR 34, may waive only some of the fees and surcharges once a litigant is determined to be indigent under the rule. Jafar argues that the trial court erred because GR 34 requires courts to waive all fees and surcharges. WACO responds that even when a court determines that a litigant is indigent, courts still have discretion to waive all, some, or none of the fees and surcharges.
¶ 12 GR 34(a) provides, in part, “Any individual, on the basis of indigent status as defined herein, may seek a waiver of filing fees or surcharges the payment of which is a condition precedent to a litigant's ability to secure access to judicial relief from a judicial officer in the applicable trial court.” The rule further provides that an individual may be found indigent under the rule in three ways. First, a litigant who receives need-based, means-tested assistance (such as TANF or food stamps), or whose household income is at or below 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline is automatically deemed indigent. GR 34(a)(3)(A), (B). Second, a litigant whose household income is above 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline may still be deemed indigent if the trial court finds that recurring basic living expenses or “other compelling circumstances” render that person unable to pay the mandatory fees and charges. GR 34(a)(3)(C), (D). Finally, a litigant represented by a “qualified legal services provider” (QLSP) is granted a presumption of indigency if counsel states that the individual was screened and found eligible for the QLSP's services. GR 34(a)(4).
¶ 13 We review a trial court's interpretation of a court rule de novo. Court rules are interpreted in the same manner as statutes. If the rule's meaning is plain on its face, we must give effect to that meaning as an expression of the drafter's intent. Gourley v. Gourley, 158 Wash.2d 460, 466, 145 P.3d 1185 (2006). When a rule is ambiguous, we must discern the...
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Table of Cases
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