Voyager Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colwell, 65168
Decision Date | 11 March 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 65168,65168 |
Citation | 166 Ga.App. 17,303 S.E.2d 152 |
Parties | VOYAGER CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. COLWELL. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
William A. Erwin, Kenneth B. Hodges, Jr., Albany, for appellant.
Kenneth M. Henson, Jr., Columbus, Millard D. Fuller, Americus, for appellee.
Appellee-plaintiff instituted suit against appellant-defendant, originally seeking to recover $5,000 in basic PIP benefits and, pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-6 (Code Ann. § 56-3406b), 25% penalty, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Appellee subsequently amended her complaint to seek an additional $45,000 in optional PIP benefits. See Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Ga.App. 230, 274 S.E.2d 623 (1980). The case proceeded to trial and, at the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for appellee as to her entire PIP claim. The issue of appellant's liability for the 25% penalty, punitive damages and attorney's fees was submitted to the jury and a verdict as to these claims was returned for appellee. Appellant appeals from the entry of judgment on the verdicts.
1. Appellant enumerates as error the direction of a verdict for appellee as to her claim for optional PIP benefits. All arguments advanced by appellant in this regard have been rejected in Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.
2. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow into evidence certain testimony concerning its agent's oral "offers" regarding optional PIP coverage, which were made to but declined by the applicant. It is asserted that this evidence was relevant with regard to the issue of whether the optional PIP coverage had been rejected by the applicant and therefore whether appellee was entitled to recover those benefits. "While [the insurer] offered the ... testimony of its agent ... to prove that [the insured] had been informed of the optional coverages and had knowingly rejected these coverages, [former OCGA § 33-34-5 (Code Ann. § 56-3404b)] clearly sets out the requirements that the application contain 'separate spaces' and that an applicant's rejection of optional no-fault coverages must be in writing as evidenced by his signature on 'separate spaces.' " Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, 156 Ga. at 233, 274 S.E.2d 623. (Emphasis supplied.) Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., supra, 250 Ga. at 712, 300 S.E.2d 673. Accordingly, we find that the evidence concerning the oral communications between appellant's agent and the applicant had no relevance with reference to appellee's entitlement to recover optional PIP benefits. This enumeration is without merit.
3. In his closing argument to the jury, appellant's counsel was not allowed to discuss the fact that on the original policy application, which did not comply with OCGA § 33-34-5 (Code Ann. § 56-3404b) as interpreted in Jones and Flewellen, the insured had "accepted" only the basic $5,000 PIP coverage. Appellant asserts on appeal that this evidence was relevant on the issue of its good faith in denying appellee's claim for optional PIP benefits and was erroneously excluded from the jury's consideration as to that issue.
The policy application had no relevance with regard to appellant's good faith in refusing to pay appellee's claim for optional PIP benefits. As noted in Division 1, the trial court had correctly determined that, as a matter of law, appellee was entitled to those benefits as against appellant's defense which apparently was merely an attack upon the interpretation of OCGA § 33-34-5 (Code Ann. § 56-3404b), reached in Jones and subsequently upheld in Flewellen, that a single signature at the end of the application was not a sufficient rejection of optional PIP benefits. If anything, appellant's refusal to pay the claim solely on the basis that the applicant for coverage had "rejected" optional PIP benefits in the guise of an application form which did not comport with the requirements of OCGA § 33-34-5 as interpreted in Jones and Flewellen demonstrates appellant's "bad faith." See generally Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Mowery, 145 Ga.App. 45, 244 S.E.2d 573 (1978). Compare Sentry Indemnity Co. v. Sharif, 156 Ga.App. 828, 829(2), 280 S.E.2d 354 (1980). Flewellen, supra, 250 Ga. at 714, 300 S.E.2d 673. Whether or not there had been a valid rejection of optional PIP benefits under the circumstances in the instant case was not a question of first impression at the time of trial, Jones having already specifically decided against appellant's contentions in this regard and the mandate of the law being otherwise clear. The evidence was in no way relevant to appellant's good faith and was not erroneously rejected as such by the trial court.
4. Appellant was not permitted to introduce evidence concerning its unsuccessful efforts to reach a compromise with appellee concerning its untimely failure to pay her original claim for basic PIP benefits. The trial court's refusal to admit evidence of these compromise efforts is enumerated as error, the argument being that it was relevant as to appellant's "good faith" failure to pay that claim.
Newton Bros. v. Shank, 240 Ga. 471, 241 S.E.2d 231 (1978).
A review of the record in the instant case demonstrates that appellant was afforded the opportunity to introduce evidence that its original untimely failure to pay appellee's basic PIP claim was the result of a clerical error, evidence which would authorize but not demand a finding that appellant was acting in good faith when it did not pay the claim in a timely fashion. See Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Jones, 247 Ga. 238, 241(4), 275 S.E.2d 328 (1981). We find nothing which would take appellant's refused evidence of its subsequent unsuccessful efforts to compromise all of appellee's disputed potential claims arising from that untimely failure to pay--including attorney's fees, penalties and punitive damages--outside the general rule that such evidence would be "inherently harmful." ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Tatum v. Dairyland Ins. Co.
...itself; oral communications have no relevance to the insured's right to recover optional PIP benefits. See Voyager Casualty Insurance Co. v. Colwell, 166 Ga.App. 17, 303 S.E.2d 152, modified, 251 Ga. 744, 309 S.E.2d 617 Dairyland contends that summary judgment was properly granted in its fa......
-
Colwell v. Voyager Cas. Ins. Co.
...optional PIP benefits in assessing the penalty, punitive damages, and attorney fees." (Case No. 39879). Voyager Cas. Insurance Co. v. Colwell, 166 Ga.App. 17, 303 S.E.2d 152 (1983). Alphonzo Colwell was killed in an accident while a passenger in an automobile driven by the son of the owner/......
-
DeKalb County v. Daniels, 69111
...appellee's claim of bad faith. That argument is controlled adversely to appellant by this court's ruling in Voyager etc. Ins. Co. v. Colwell, 166 Ga.App. 17(4), 303 S.E.2d 152 (1983). 5. "Appellant ... complains of the trial court's exclusion of certain documentary evidence. However, the pr......
-
Davidson v. American Fitness Centers, Inc.
...claims if their ultimate failure to settle were admissible in evidence against them. [Cit.]' [Cit.]" Voyager Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colwell, 166 Ga.App. 17, 20, 303 S.E.2d 152 (1983), modified on other grounds, 251 Ga. 744, 309 S.E.2d 617 (1983). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not ......