Jernigan v. Stuchell, 02-6052.
| Citation | 304 F.3d 1030 |
| Decision Date | 17 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-6052.,02-6052. |
| Parties | Dewey Earl JERNIGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Karen STUCHELL; Ramona Hollier; James L. Saffle; Melinda Guilfoyle; John Doe, I; John Doe, II; B. Hendrix; Elvis Hightower; Joe S. Hopper, in individual and official capacities; Michael Quinlan, in individual and official capacities; Corrections Corporation of America, in individual and official capacities, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Dewey Earl Jernigan, Pro Se.
Linda Soper, Assistant Attorney General, Litigation Section, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants-Appellees James L. Saffle, Melinda Guilfoyle and Karen Stuchell.
Darrell L. Moore, Pryor, OK, for Defendants-Appellees Corrections Corporation of America, Inc., Michael Quinlin, Joe Hopper, and Elvis Hightower.
Before KELLY, McKAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.*
Plaintiff-Appellant Dewey Earl Jernigan, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the district court's order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
Mr. Jernigan alleges that his constitutional right of access to the courts was violated when his personal legal materials were improperly confiscated from his cell. Apparently, prison officials contended that Mr. Jernigan was providing legal assistance to other inmates for compensation. The case was referred to a magistrate judge who ordered a Martinez report. R. Doc. 21. Various Defendants filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on several grounds including lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies on January 22, 2002. R. Doc. 28. Mr. Jernigan then mailed a Motion for Clarification from the Court on February 4, 2002. R. Doc. 29. The district court ordered the Defendants to respond, particularly to Mr. Jernigan's arguments concerning the ODOC grievance process. R. Doc. 32. After the Defendants' response, the district court denied the motion for clarification on February 20, 2002. R. Doc. 34. On January 31, 2002, Mr. Jernigan mailed a notice of appeal from the district court's January 22 order dismissing the action. R. Doc. 30.
In his brief before this court, Mr. Jernigan argues that the district court erred because he had exhausted his administrative remedies and he gave notice of his grievance by other means. He also argues that the district court erred in its denial of his motion for clarification, which we construe as a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Because Mr. Jernigan has not filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for clarification or a motion to amend his initial notice of appeal, we consider only the January 22 judgment of dismissal. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
We review de novo the district court's finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Miller v. Menghini, 213 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.2000) overruled on other grounds by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires that "available" administrative remedies be exhausted prior to filing an action with respect to prison conditions under § 1983. Even where the "available" remedies would appear to be futile at providing the kind of remedy sought, the prisoner must exhaust the administrative remedies available. Booth, 532 U.S. at 740, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (). The Court held that Congress had eliminated both discretion to dispense with administrative exhaustion and the condition that it be "`plain, speedy, and effective.'" Id. See also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) ().
An inmate who begins the grievance process but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under PLRA for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). In Wright, an inmate alleged that he had substantially complied with the administrative procedures but did not see the process to its conclusion. The court noted that the PLRA does not "enable[] judges, by creative interpretation of the exhaustion doctrine, to prescribe or oversee prison grievance systems." Id. Mr. Wright's suit was dismissed so that he could "exhaust `available' remedies whatever they may be." Id.
For the same reasons, we reject Mr. Jernigan's assertion that "[i]nmates do not have to properly complete the grievance process, and they do not have to correct deficiencies." R. Doc. 24 at 9 (emphasis in original). Nor is his argument that he gave notice of his claims to various Defendants by means other than the grievance process persuasive — the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply.
Mr. Jernigan contends that he did submit a grievance but that it was lost or misfiled. The district court assumed for the purposes of its ruling that the grievance was filed. Seventeen days later, when he received no response within the fifteen day response time contained in the grievance policy, Mr. Jernigan sought to appeal the grievance to the Director of the ODOC. The Director rejected the appeal because there was no response from the warden and told Mr. Jernigan that he had ten days in which to cure that deficiency. Instead of attempting to cure, Mr. Jernigan filed this lawsuit.
While we agree that the failure to respond to a grievance within the time limits contained in the...
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